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ABSTRACT 
 
The Dynamics of Attention: Agenda Setting in the Modern Media Environment 
by 
 
Galen Stocking 
 
The media environment has changed dramatically in recent years. First altered 
by cable news, which upended the dominance of network news, digital media has in 
recent years created a media landscape littered with media outlets, from new, 
ambitious websites like Politico to citizen media sourced on Twitter. It is unclear how 
or if these changes have changed the relationship between the media and the public; 
indeed, despite considerable attention from scholars, the interdependencies between 
media elements such as professional news, blogs, social media, and the public that 
define the modern media have yet to be unraveled.  Instead, several conflicting 
findings have emerged: some confirm the prevailing media to public agenda setting 
theory, others find a reverse agenda setting dynamic, while some uncover an 
interactive series of processes in which diverse elements influence the media and 
public agendas. I argue that modern agenda setting processes reflect a hybridized 
media ecosystem, with mutual interdependencies and feedback loops driving agenda 
creation. I further characterize the issues that are likely to emerge in particular 
elements and consider the role of partisanship.  To test my hypotheses, I analyze 
longitudinal data on issue attention across five elements of the contemporary media 
system: survey data, Twitter, key blogs, a record of Google searches within the 
 xvi 
United States; and top professional news sources. I track attention to 25 issues across 
a time horizon from January 2010 through December 2013. A lagged time series 
analysis further identifies issue origin points and trends as issues travel across 
elements.  In order to further illuminate this relationship, I examine three of these 
issues in more detail by shining a light on the media and public discussions of these 
issues during periods of canonical attention. I also show how the rise of partisan 
media has changed the media agenda itself, with the result that different outlets attend 
to issues at different rates. This dissertation is therefore able to characterize the 
interdependencies inherent within the system that drive the public and media agendas, 
challenging some of the assumptions of a generation of minimal effects theories. 
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Chapter One: 
Introduction 
 
On June 25, 2013, the Texas House of Representatives was in the final hours 
of a special session called to pass a set of measures, most notably a controversial 
abortion bill.  State Senator Wendy Davis filibustered the bill for more than 11 hours 
to a packed chamber, but her efforts quickly reverberated online, where more than 
182,000 people followed the filibuster online via live streams, Twitter, and liveblogs 
(Hooton, 2013).  On Twitter, the resulting #StandWithWendy hashtag quickly 
became one of the Top 20 hashtags of all time by volume, one of the few political 
events to earn that distinction (Rogers, 2013). Traditional media outlets, who were 
until then providing marginal coverage of the abortion debate, began covering her 
efforts only after this explosion of attention online (Kollmeyer, 2013). Consequently, 
the media narrative about the event became as much about the online response as it 
was about Senator Davis’ actions. Nonetheless, this increased coverage had almost no 
impact on public opinion, as measured by Gallup Most Important Problem polling: a 
week after the attention, when the next poll was conducted, abortion was named the 
Most Important Problem by just 1% of respondents (Gallup, 2013). 
 Public concern about unemployment has charted a different path. Mass media 
attention to unemployment peaked at the outset of the 2008 financial crisis, and then 
remained at a lower level in the years since.  However, public opinion, as measured 
by surveys, has remained concerned about unemployment since, and at a higher level 
than at the media peak (Gallup, 2013). In other words, while the public continually 
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cites unemployment as an important problem for the country, the media does not give 
it a similar level of attention. 
That these two issues took two different paths toward gaining and losing 
prominence within the media and public implies that the issues the media and public 
debates at any given moment are contingent upon a range of factors, including the 
nature of the issues themselves, the space within the media environment, and the 
impact on the public. Yet it also shows that the relationship between the media and 
the public is complicated, and potentially more complicated than current theory 
suggests. Agenda setting theory, as developed by McCombs and Shaw (1972), 
predicts that mass media attention to an issue will result in an increase in that issue’s 
salience among the public, with some caveats, like the issue’s day-to-day relevance to 
the public. 
This made sense for this era. In 1972, there were three major television 
networks supplying the news along with some radio outlets and a few major national 
newspapers, but there was a distinct paucity of other choices. Satellite and cable 
television began to rise to prominence in the 1980s, bringing with them a proliferation 
of alternative sources for entertainment. Whereas in the pre-cable television days, 
early evening programming was dominated by the evening news (and no other 
options), the average American could now watch television in the evening without 
having to pay any attention to the network news (Prior, 2007). This likely diminished 
the agenda setting power of mass media. 
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The Internet created new opportunities for distraction from mass media, 
further eroding its agenda setting power. Besides millions of websites on any topic 
imaginable, the Internet also afforded new opportunities for expression by average 
members of the public. At first, this was limited to the creation of static websites and 
posting in online forums, but by the early 2000s, blogging offered a simple, user-
friendly way to express one’s thoughts. Blogs quickly began to cover political issues, 
and had some success in drawing mass media attention to issues, particularly in the 
2004 Trent Lott scandal (Farrell & Drezner, 2008). This was largely driven by elite 
blogs that attracted high levels of Internet traffic but for whom the barriers to entry 
were low. Social media sites like Facebook and Twitter lowered those barriers 
further, and emphasized the ability to connect with friends, family, and 
acquaintances. Accordingly, these sites enabled discussion about politics between 
people with some level of trust, which can increase political knowledge (Himelboim, 
Lariscy, Tinkham, & Sweetser, 2012).  
As discussion about politics online became normalized such that they began to 
resemble offline discussions, studies began to explore the individual level effects of 
online usage. For instance, Kenski and Stroud (2006) found that those who used the 
Internet to find political information had higher levels of political efficacy, 
knowledge, and participation. On the other hand, the incivility that regularly afflicts 
online discussion had mixed effects; in some instances it reduced the credibility, and 
thus the influence, of news sources and in other instances it enhanced it (Borah, 
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2013). In either situation, though, such findings reflect the continuing trend toward 
the dilution of traditional sources’ influence. 
This dissertation stems from questions about how effectively agenda setting 
theory could explain the public-mass media relationship in this environment. Agenda 
setting theory, like framing, priming, and the broader media effects literature, was 
defined in the latter part of the 20th century, under a markedly different media regime 
than exists today. Noting these changes, repeated calls (Bennett & Iyengar, 2008; 
Chaffee & Metzger, 2001; Holbert, Garrett, & Gleason, 2010) have been made in the 
last fifteen years to revisit these theoretical constructs and either replace them with 
more fitting theories or adapt them to the modern era.  Despite some efforts that have 
looked at specific components of this ecosystem, this kind of broad thinking has not 
developed. Consequently, we have a developed understanding of slices of the agenda 
setting process in this environment, but have not built a theoretical understanding of 
the processes at play more broadly. 
This is not to say that those efforts have been inconsequential. Blogging, in 
particular, received considerable attention in the mid-2000s. Some of these examined 
the role more generally of blogs in the political sphere (Farrell & Drezner, 2008; 
Swift, 2011), while others examined specific incidents in which bloggers upended the 
political debate (eg. Schiffer, 2006). Some (Meraz, 2009; Wallsten, 2008) directly 
addressed the question of agenda setting, finding mutual influence between blogs and 
mass media – a reversal of traditional agenda setting. Similar results have been found 
on Twitter (Kushin, 2010), Youtube (Wallsten, 2010), and similar sites.  
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Despite these efforts, the findings from each study stand distinct each other, 
and little work has been done to survey how the various elements of this environment 
interact. The most notable of these efforts was Neuman et al.’s (2014) examination of 
interaction between online behavior on social media and discussion forums and 
professionalized, mass media1 over the course of 2012. Despite some technical 
limitations that limited their explanatory leverage, they showed substantial interaction 
between the public and mass media agendas, which points to the continuing need to 
clarify these interactions.  
This dissertation seeks to resolve these questions. Specifically, in a media 
environment where uni-directional agenda setting does not incorporate all agenda 
setting activity, what are the specific pathways in which agenda setting occurs? To 
what extent and under what conditions does the public influence the media agenda? 
Does the state of the media, which is currently fragmented and potentially polarized, 
create new media dynamics? By answering these questions, my analysis improves the 
literature in several fundamental ways. Most significantly, it expands the universe of 
measures of public opinion from the survey only technique of the past several 
decades to include several alternate measures, therefore combining several previous 
approaches (as described below). This presents a fuller, more detailed picture of 
public opinion. Additionally, this analysis takes the important step of interpreting 
agenda setting through the lens of short-term and long-term influence, an approach !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Throughout this dissertation I will use “mass media” to refer to that segment of the media composed 
of articles or broadcasts produced by professionals, i.e. those who have made a career out of 
journalism. This lies in contrast to non-professionals, including “citizen journalists,” who, while 
occasionally getting paid for their work, are not part of the mass media establishment as academics 
have traditionally conceived of it. 
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rarely taken before. The combination of these approaches sheds new light on agenda 
setting in the modern media environment. 
I use several methods in this analysis. Drawing from a diverse range of 
measures of the public and media agendas, I track 25 issues over the time period 
2010-2013 as their attention in the American mass media and public rose and fell. 
Furthermore, I survey this attention from across several measures of both the media 
and the public. On the media’s side, I include articles from traditional mass media 
sources like newspapers and transcripts from the four major broadcast networks 
(ABC, CBS, NBC, and Fox) as well as radio news in the form of NPR. In addition to 
this, I include several ‘new’ measures of mass media. The oldest of these is talk radio, 
which I capture with transcripts from the Rush Limbaugh Show (there was no 
comparable talk radio show from the left side of the political spectrum). Among more 
modern sources, I include articles from online news sites like Huffington Post or 
Politico. Finally, reflecting the intermediary role elite blogs play, I include blog posts 
from top blogs, as measured by traffic and attention. 
The public is measured through several measures of online behavior. Some of 
these are expressive, requiring a conscious effort on the part of the user to share her 
views: namely, blogs and Twitter. Not everyone uses these mediums, of course, so to 
capture a broader cross section of the public, I also include measures of search trends 
on Google and pageviews on Wikipedia. This approach is a break from traditional 
agenda setting studies, which have almost always been measured through surveys. 
However, surveys are slow, and therefore may not be responsive to the vacillations of 
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public opinion, thus obscuring many of the details of the media and public 
relationships. 
Because this includes a broad spectrum of the public and mass media, I can 
confidently show that media and public attention cycles are often interactive; that is, 
that, contrary to much of the findings in agenda setting theory, the public can now set 
the media’s agenda. Moreover, the public and media influence each other, with 
feedback loops between them pulling the others’ attention to new issues. This 
expands agenda setting theory beyond its traditional causal mechanism, replacing the 
unidirectional, vertical interaction between the media and the public with a theoretical 
framework that allows for simultaneous, multi-directional, and feedback driven 
causation.  This will lay the groundwork for future research that can help illuminate 
the interaction of these causal pathways, and, accordingly, the mechanisms 
underlying the creation and maintenance of the public and media agendas. 
Chapter 2 sets up and explores the broad, system level dynamics of this 
interaction. It asks how extensive the mass media and the public agendas interact over 
time, and compares this across issues. First, I negotiate the results from offline agenda 
setting studies, which have shown the influence of the mass media persisting for up to 
several months; with those from online agenda setting studies that are often 
constrained to a week or less. To do so, I develop a theory of influence that includes 
long term and short term influence. Grounded in theories of priming for the public 
and the mass media’s alarm/patrol model (Boydstun, 2013), I suggest that many of 
the issues that emerge within the national debate have some level of latent attention 
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based on previous cycles of attention. Accordingly, when an event occurs that triggers 
attention to an issue, that shift is more pronounced than it would be without that long-
term effect. Second, I determine the most parsimonious model for each issue through 
an ARIMA model. Third, I test the direction of this influence using Granger causality, 
which determines if a restricted model (without the mass media, for instance, in a 
public focused model) describes the data better than an unrestricted model (with mass 
media included).  Two Granger causality tests are run for each issue’s mass media-
public pairing; one with  
The results are shown in Tables 2.2 and 2.3.  Several findings quickly emerge. 
First, there are broad levels of interactions across issues, with the public and the mass 
media mutually influencing each other. This suggests that there are several feedback 
cycles driving this interaction, although this overhead view cannot really shine a light 
on the processes underlying those interactions. Second, there are several issues in 
which the mass media influences the public over both the long and short terms, but 
very few in which the reverse is true (just Climate Change and Arab Spring). Again, 
it is difficult to be certain as to the reasons for this, but it could be due to the working 
norms of the mass media, which does less reporting on long-term issues and attends 
more to events as they occur. Third, there are not strong correlations between how the 
mass media influences (or is influenced by) the two expressive forms of public 
opinion, implying that they are capturing different, though sometimes overlapping 
segments of the public. This extends to the other public measures as well. Finally, 
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while I categorize the issues included according to topic, there are few strong trends 
within each category. 
Outside the theoretical development of long and short term lags, Chapter 2 
does not attempt to apply any broad theoretical constructs or typologies to explain the 
different types of interactions evident in different issues. Chapter 3 accordingly 
explores the patterns of attention that explain the interaction uncovered in Chapter 2. 
Furthermore, it asks how this interaction occurs – what spurs salience to transfer 
between these segments of the media environment? This chapter is primarily 
composed of three case studies designed to investigate the particulars of this 
interaction: Fracking, Climate Change, and Gun Control. 
First, though, I develop a typology to describe the patterns of interaction in the 
findings in Chapter 2. Accordingly, I break those issues down according to the 
direction of influence and which side of the ecosystem is activated first. Only one 
issue exhibits no interaction between the mass media and the public (Drugs), while a 
few have overwhelming influence in one direction only. Most, however, are bi-
directional, with tight, interactive feedback loops between the mass media and the 
public. Many of these follow a similar pattern, however, in which attention explodes 
in the context of a crisis, and then quickly fades away, so these are categorized 
separately. The case studies selected include issues from the public influence over the 
media and these two bi-directional influence categories. 
Having explored the interaction between the mass media and the public, 
Chapter 4 turns to the potential for multiple agendas within the mass media itself. 
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Specifically, it asks if the agendas of partisan outlets differ from the agendas of non-
partisan outlets, as well as those from outlets from across the spectrum. This is 
important when considering how the mass media influences the public: since 
members of the public are likely to only get news from outlets with which they agree 
(Stroud, 2011), if the agendas of those outlets differ substantially, then their 
audiences may find some issues to be more important than their peers of a different 
partisan bent. This not only affects agenda setting theory but also could have ill 
effects on democracy. I dub these partisan spheres, in which the agendas of partisan 
public and mass media exist in spheres distinct from those of other partisans and non-
partisans. 
Outlets are therefore divided into left-leaning, right-leaning and centrist, as are 
issues. Results of ANOVA tests show that several issues do indeed receive unique 
levels of attention depending on the partisan leanings of the issue and the outlet. Left-
leaning media is particularly adept at covering left-leaning issues at a higher rate than 
other media, although right-leaning media covers some of the most controversial left-
leaning issues at a higher rate than any other outlets. Additionally, some of the most 
controversial issues receive similar coverage rates among outlets on both the left and 
the right and reduced coverage on centrist media, suggesting that partisan battles may 
be pitched within partisan camps before spilling over into centrist media. 
The final chapter summarizes this work and draws it together in a discussion 
of the impact on basic democratic theory. It also stresses the limitations inherent in 
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this study, consequences of time, resources, and data availability. Accordingly, it 
outlines a series of subsequent studies that could greatly expand upon these results. 
Taken together, the work within this dissertation attempts to sketch out some 
of the interactions between the mass media and the public within the parameters of 
agenda setting theory. While there may be some missing components (most notably 
Facebook), I have attempted to include measures that broadly represent the ecosystem 
and explore the particulars of these interactions. The results should serve as a building 
block for several future studies. 
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Chapter Two:  
The Dynamics of Attention 
 
Political communication scholars have traditionally viewed the mass media as 
a primary gatekeeper in society. In this role, the mass media can help the public 
understand the chaos of the modern world by emphasizing the salience of particular 
issues, dissecting political wrangling, and contextualizing major events. In many 
cases, the mass media’s efforts reside at the nexus of all three: while explaining a 
major event, it describes the political ramifications and connects it to major issues for 
the public. 
Before digital media, these dynamics were largely unidirectional: the mass 
media, defined as major national newspapers, the broadcast and cable news networks, 
and other major news outlets, were influential in creating and maintaining issue 
salience among the public. Agenda setting theory posited that, as mass media 
increased coverage of an issue, the public tended to view that issue as more 
important. Agenda setting research has shown that mass media's influence usually 
persists for one to eight weeks, depending on the portion of the mass media that 
transmits the agenda (e.g. newspaper vs. television news), with an average effect of 
around 3 weeks (McCombs, 2014). While some individual and issue characteristics 
mediate this relationship, the central truth of media coverage leading to increased 
public salience of an issue has been a distinguishing feature of agenda setting theory, 
supported across time and country. 
The advent of digital media, however, infused this relationship with new 
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pathways of influence, elevated new voices, and accordingly provided an opportunity 
for the public to influence the mass media. Recent studies (e.g. Neuman et al., 2014) 
have shown some evidence of this reverse agenda setting in the modern media 
environment, but the large system dynamics that shape this environment are not yet 
well understood. How much power does the mass media retain in setting the publics 
agenda? In which situations and for which issues is it most influential over the 
public? Similarly, how much does the public influence the mass media and under 
what conditions? How long does this influence – whether of the mass media over the 
public, or the public over the mass media – persist?  
This chapter probes those dynamics through an econometric analysis of mass 
media and public opinion data from 2010 to 2013. The data analyzed covers 25 issues 
ranging from social policy to economic issues to foreign-policy issues. It tests bi-
directional agenda setting over the short and medium run. These dynamics are 
captured by the inclusion in the model of short-run lags of one to seven days and 
medium term lags of one to three months. 
The resulting analysis shows that there is extensive bi-directional influence 
between the mass media and the public, although the effect varies by issue and source 
of influence among the public. Moreover, it suggests that agenda setting effects of the 
media can linger among the public for multiple months in some instances. Again, 
these results vary by issue, suggesting that the nature of public and mass media 
effects can not be broadly applied without attending to these nuances. 
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Conceptual Framework 
Agenda Setting 
The media’s influence over public opinion has been an important area of 
interest throughout modern political science, and agenda setting has been one of the 
primary theoretical constructs explaining media effects throughout the past 30 years 
(McCombs, 2004).  Agenda setting refers to the process by which issue salience is 
transferred from the media to the public: over time, the rank order of issues to which 
the media gives prominence will be reflected in the list of issues the public considers 
important (McCombs & Shaw, 1972).  Agenda setting has been found to describe the 
public – media interaction across an array of issues, including environmentalism 
(Ader, 1995), civil rights (Winter & Eyal, 1981), immigration (Dunaway, Branton, & 
Abrajano, 2010), foreign affairs (Wanta & Hu, 1993), and many others, in the United 
States and abroad, and in surveys and experimental research (i.e. Iyengar & Kinder, 
1987).  
The effect can be constrained, however, both at the issue level and the 
individual level. At the issue level, the primary constraint is the obtrusiveness of an 
issue (Neuman, 1990; Winter & Eyal, 1981; Zucker, 1978), although how dramatic or 
conflictual an event is (Birkland, 1998) can raise the agenda setting capacity of the 
media. At the individual level, a person’s need for orientation (McCombs & Weaver, 
1985), trust in the media (Wanta & Hu, 1994) and his or her engagement in 
interpersonal discussions (Wanta & Wu, 1992) can further alter this relationship. 
Despite these efforts, though, several areas of agenda setting theory remain ripe for 
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investigation, including changes as a result of the media environment, issue or 
individual characteristics, and network effects.  
The Modern Media Environment  
Despite the breadth of agenda-setting efforts, few agenda setting scholars have 
fully characterized how the relationship between the public and the media has been 
altered by the changes in the media environment. McCombs and Shaw’s initial study, 
and many subsequent studies, were conducted in a limited, vertical media 
environment. In this environment, which was dominant throughout much of the latter 
half of the 20th century, newsworthiness was decided by a few mass media sources, 
such as The New York Times, Washington Post, and the nightly network news  
(Williams & Delli Carpini, 2011). Their agenda decisions were largely mimicked by 
smaller regional papers (Danielian & Reese, 1989), with the result that anyone paying 
attention to almost any media source was likely exposed to a similar agenda (Prior, 
2007). 
 With the advent of the Internet, and particularly its facilitation of easy content 
creation and distribution and the corresponding rise in consumer choice, the 
universality of the mass media’s agenda setting power may be diminished, and, 
perhaps, upended. In a 2001 article, Chaffee and Metzger cautioned that the agenda-
setting research question may become reversed: that the important consideration may 
become “what issues people tell the media they want to think about,” rather than what 
issues the media covers (Chaffee & Metzger, 2001, p. 375). Such changes would 
necessitate a visitation of media effects theories, they claimed. Similarly, Bennett and 
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Iyengar (2008) called for a new era of theory building that accounted for changes in 
the media environment that accounted for the fragmentation of audiences and their 
ability to produce and distribute content. In response, Holbert, et al. (2010) countered 
that existing mass media theories could be adapted to the new media environment.  
Indeed, scholars have thus far largely worked within the boundaries of 
agenda-setting theory, exploring how the new environment alters some of its 
assumptions.  One of the major questions has revolved around the direction of 
agenda-setting: whether or not the mass media still sets the public agenda, or if the 
public can influence the mass media’s agenda. Defining the public as those who post 
content online and are not members of the media, early Internet era research showed a 
uni-directional, professional media to Internet agenda setting effect occurring both in 
blogs (Lee, 2007) and online discussion forums (Roberts, Wanta, & Dzwo, 2002).  In 
contrast, other scholarship showed a limited bi-directional effect, with the media and 
the public mutually influencing each other’s agendas in blogs (Messner & Garrison, 
2011; Schiffer, 2006; Wallsten, 2007) as well as Twitter (Kushin, 2010). In a broad 
study, Neuman, et al. (Neuman et al., 2014) showed bi-directional agenda interaction 
between the mass media and the public (defined as blogs, Tweets, and forum 
postings) across several issue domains. 
Such top-level results may obscure some of the conditions under which this 
bi-directional effect occurs, however.  In a comparison of left and right of center 
blogs, Meraz found that the agenda of left leaning blogs was more likely to be guided 
by professional media than that of right leaning blogs, with weakened influence of 
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media elite (2011a).  Schiffer found that left-leaning bloggers were influenced by 
media coverage, but that these blogs influenced the media as well, with op-ed 
columnists acting as the primary transmission avenue for blogs into the media (2006). 
Similarly, Wallsten uncovered a far more influential role for the public than for the 
media in driving attention to prominent Youtube videos, although the campaign 
setting of his research may limit the extension of these results to other time periods 
(Wallsten, 2010).  Nonetheless, recent research has shown that members of the media 
pay close attention to online discussion through reading blogs and Twitter and 
watching article reading and sharing statistics (Hermida, Fletcher, & Korell, 2012; 
Verweij, 2012; Wendelin & Neubarth, 2013).  
Chadwick suggests that this results from the newly hybridized media 
environment, in which the sources of power, practices, and communication structures 
are shaped by the continuing influence of old media as it interacts with new media 
(2013). Because of this hybridity, it may not matter where a story begins – whether 
it’s with the public or the media – as much as that it attains salience with some 
element of the public or the media, which will then influence other elements of the 
public and the media. In other words, the media and the public agendas will exhibit 
similar characteristics, namely responsiveness and interactivity, no matter whether the 
cycle begins with the media or the public. This leads to my first hypothesis: 
H1: Attention to issues in non-professional media, particularly 
expressive media like Twitter or blogs, will both influence and be 
influenced by the broad media agenda. Accordingly, the agendas of 
the public and mass media entities will interact, meaning that as 
attention in one agenda to an issue rises or falls, the other agenda will 
reflect those changes. 
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Influence Persistence 
While inspired, Neuman, et al.’s 2014 analysis of social media and 
mass media agenda interaction was limited in that they did not examine 
interaction that persisted longer than one week. This decision is justified by 
Roberts, et al., 2002, in which the authors similarly decided to not examine 
lags longer than 7 days because they didn’t expect effects to persist longer 
than that online; and Wanta (1997), which did not thoroughly investigate 
online agenda setting (and actually found that effects sometimes persisted for 
months). 2 Yet there are reasons to believe that agenda setting influence will 
take longer than one week to decay, especially from the mass media to the 
public. On the one hand, people’s online activity is not purely driven by what 
they encounter online, as the inclusion of broadcast media such as television 
news suggests. Indeed, since offline interaction with peers may mediate the 
agenda setting process, it may also be the case that it extends the process 
longer than would be expected if one was only influenced by online behavior 
(Wanta & Wu, 1992).  Moreover, traditional mass media sources have been 
found to affect the public at time intervals lasting from 1 to 8 weeks (Wanta & 
Hu, 1993). Combined, this suggests that the influence of the mass media over 
the public have the potential to persist longer than one week. The most 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 As an example, long-term influence from one agenda to another will be part of the influence 
registered in a seven day lag measurement. However, it is difficult to untangle the differences between 
long and short term influences when measured at only a short interval. 
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effective technique to measure this is through impulse response functions (see 
Chapter 3).  
But what of reverse agenda setting – the influence of the public over 
digital and mass media? Since they were conducted in the pre-Internet era, 
Wanta and his collaborators’ work examined mass media’s influence over the 
public and eschewed any reverse agenda setting effects. The question of how 
the media selects which news to cover is outside the scope of this paper; one 
prominent theory suggests that the media indexes their stories according to the 
views of relative political actors (Bennett, Livingston, & Lawrence, 2007); 
other theories stress the gatekeeping and institutional norms that guide 
editorial decisions (e.g. Gans, 2004).  
However, one such set of theories, which deal with the dynamics of 
mass media attention, is relevant to this discussion. Boydstun (2013) makes a 
case for a hybrid alarm/patrol model that incorporates time effects into an 
argument about mass media attention. In this model, when a major event 
occurs, the mass media rushes to cover the story, often crowding out space for 
other stories. As demand for more information rises, the mass media enters 
patrol mode, in which journalists and outlets look for new angles to the story 
and for new, related stories. Consequently, when the mass media is in patrol 
mode, small events that may not otherwise receive broad attention are 
promoted to the top of the mass media agenda. The mass media has, in 
essence, primed itself to believe those stories are important. After several days 
!!
 20 
or weeks, then, the immediate explosiveness of the alarm mode may decay, 
but new events can elevate attention again (Boydstun, 2013). This reflects the 
persistence of long and short term effects. 
Because mass media to public agenda setting is possible only through 
a similar priming mechanism, it is likely that the mass media’s effect on the 
public will follow a similar pattern. It is not clear, however, whether the 
public will influence the media to a similar extent – causing the media to go 
into alarm mode – or how long those effects will persist, and it is likely that 
each will vary by issue. That leads to the following hypotheses: 
 
H2a: The mass media will influence the public over both the long and 
the short term, with increases in mass media attention leading to 
increases in public attention, and at different rates depending upon the 
issue.  
H2b: The public will influence the mass media over both the long and 
the short term, with increases in public attention leading to increases 
in mass media attention, and at different rates depending upon the 
issue. 
 
I expect Hypothesis 2a to be true across most issues, but that Hypothesis 2b will be 
less consistently supported. 
Data and Methods !
Data Collection 
 
 This study collected measures of the mass media and public opinion from the 
period 2010-2013 for 25 issues (see Appendix A for the issue and keyword list). This 
period is broad enough that it incorporates both election and non-election years in 
American politics, but is not so long that the structure of the media ecosystem has 
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radically altered. In other words, a savvy consumer or member of the mass media 
from the beginning of 2010 would likely largely recognize the 2013 environment. 
Several methods were utilized to collect these measures across the mass media and 
public domains, although each source was ultimately collected by a series of keyword 
searches for each issue. 
 Issues and their appropriate keywords were selected through a multi-stage 
process. First, I surveyed other literature that looked at several issues, particularly the 
Policy Agendas Project (policyagendas.org, n.d.) and the Most Important Problem 
Codes developed by McCombs and Zhu (1995). From these sources, I selected 
general categories and specific issues from this list and supplemented it with a few of 
my own, namely net neutrality and fracking. I then developed an extensive set of 
keywords for each issue through coordination with several peers inside and outside of 
academia. With this list of potential keywords in hand, I underwent several rounds of 
testing per issue to determine what elicited the most accurate results from the 
associated database. 
Mass Media Sources. Mass Media data came from several types of outlets: 
broadcast transcripts, newspapers, websites of major digital outlets, and influential 
blogs.  
Most broadcast media, for which transcripts were analyzed, were collected 
from Lexis Nexis queries for each relevant issue. Sources included nightly news 
broadcasts from ABC, CBS, and NBC, as well as cable news broadcasts from CNN, 
Fox News and MSNBC, and radio broadcasts on NPR. I also included talk radio 
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transcripts from Rush Limbaugh’s radio show, which were retrieved by scraping 
rushlimbaugh.com using a custom python script. 
I limited newspapers to the top 25 newspapers by circulation, as ranked by the 
Association for Audited Media. The resulting list includes national newspapers like 
The New York Times as well as more local newspapers like The Houston Chronicle. I 
also included news wire services like the Associated Press. These data were collected 
from Crimson Hexagon, a media data company whose dataset includes articles 
scraped from media websites. Accordingly, the newspapers dataset includes articles 
that would be found in the print edition of the database as well as prominent blogs on 
the newspaper website. 
Finally, reflecting the changed landscape of the media environment, I included 
prominent digital media sources like Talking Points Memo or Daily Caller as well as 
influential blogs. These sources were selected from Technorati.com’s U.S. Politics 
category for blogs and news sites. When it catalogued the growing digital media 
sphere (the company changed its mission in 2014), Technorati rated each site 
according to its relevance and the number of times it was linked to by other blogs and 
digital news sites. Accordingly, I looked at monthly archived versions of 
Technorati.com on the Internet Archive (archive.org) over the time period of this 
analysis. Sites were included if they were rated among the top 30 most influential 
blogs or news sites 3 or more times during this period. Finally, article data for these 
sites was downloaded from Crimson Hexagon using keyword searches. A full list of 
these sources is available in Appendix B. 
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Public Sources. The traditional agenda setting metric of the public’s agenda 
has been surveys; namely, surveys that ask respondents a variation of “What is the 
most important problem facing the country today?,” also known as the Most 
Important Problem (MIP) question.  Despite the distinguished set of research utilizing 
the MIP metric, a number of criticisms of this method have emerged.  The first 
suggests that the causal link between an issue’s prominence in the media and salience 
among the public may not be best measured by the Most Important Problem question.  
In essence, this critique suggests that people are not responding to the question with 
their personal feelings regarding the most important problem but instead their 
perception of what the rest of the public believes is important.  Cues regarding the 
public’s views are actually found in the media. For instance, a survey respondent may 
find himself unemployed, but because the media proclaims that the economy is doing 
well, he does not believe that other people think this is an issue, so he responds with 
his estimation of the public’s view of the most important issue.  The actual issues the 
respondent selects may be further based on individual behavior, such as selective 
exposure and perceived credibility of media sources rather than her actual opinion 
(Huck, Quiring, & Brosius, 2009). 
 Second, agenda setting theory is premised on the transfer of salience from the 
media’s agenda to the public’s agenda.  However, salience and importance do not 
carry the same meaning; nor do issues and problems, yet agenda setting literature 
treats them as fundamentally the same concepts (Wlezien, 2005).  Additionally, 
problems are often more narrowly defined than issues, yet most agenda setting studies 
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group problems and issues together in a blunt metric.  Such concerns raise questions 
regarding the transfer of salience over a discrete problem in the media to salience of 
an entire issue or from an issue to a problem (Atwater et al., 1985). 
 Third, the results to the most important problem question may not be equal 
over time as the number of problems being discussed vary.  Consequently, a ranked 
ordering of problems does not convey the magnitude of separation between problems, 
assuming the first and second most important problems hold relatively similar 
salience over time (Jones & Baumgartner, 2005).  Finally, and perhaps most 
important for the modern media environment, the time required to deploy, analyze, 
and publish a survey inhibits its utility in interpreting a fast-moving news cycle. 
 Accordingly, I replace the traditional survey metric with several alternate 
measures of the public agenda, all of which rest on the assumption that measuring the 
public’s attention to an issue is comparable to survey responses.  Grounded in the 
recognition that an individual’s behavior will reflect her interests (at least at the 
moment in which the behavior takes place) in that she is choosing to direct her 
attention toward that issue rather than others, this assumption does not differ 
dramatically from other agenda setting assumptions.  For instance, media’s power in 
setting the agenda is rooted in the conflict between the infinite number of news or 
relevant issues and the finite number of issues an individual can cognitively attend to. 
Furthermore, as the media itself serves as the conduit between world events and the 
masses, it is itself limited on an institutional level by resources, television time or 
newspaper space, and in many cases the market driven imperatives of the media 
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entity - just as an individual is limited by his cognitive capacity to make sense of the 
world around him (McCombs, 2004).  In both cases, the restriction is of a zero-sum 
conceptualization of attention - an individual’s ability to attend to a limited subset of 
the world around him, and, in turn, the institutional limitations of the media, which is 
limited by the cognitive capabilities and status quo tendencies of the people that are 
involved. Jones and Baumgartner frame this as the limitations of attention, and 
present a compelling argument that these cognitive limitations drive much of the 
public agenda (Jones & Baumgartner, 2005). 
These attention-oriented measures of the public agenda include Google search 
trends, Wikipedia page views, Tweets from Crimson Hexagon’s historical archive of 
the Twitter firehose, and blog postings recorded by Crimson Hexagon. Utilizing these 
multiple metrics is more cost-effective than surveys while sidestepping some of their 
concerns, offers greater theory building and testing options, can be more sensitive to 
rapid or subtle agenda shifts, and may help paint a more complete picture of the 
public agenda than surveys or social media alone. Surveys are not included in this 
analysis because the time period between them (Gallup surveys are monthly; all other 
data is daily) means they do not fit easily into any econometric analysis without using 
interpolation between monthly data points – and doing so obscures much of the 
variance shown by other metrics. Additionally, the use of Google search trends and 
Wikipedia pageviews provides some access to portions of the public that are not 
active Twitter users or bloggers. It accordingly may be able to pick up some of latent 
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dynamics within the media system that draw on offline attention or attention on social 
media sites that do not make user data available (e.g. Facebook). 
I accordingly collected a large amount of data to build the mass media and 
public attention datasets. Across 25 issues and four years of data from a wide range of 
media outlets, this resulted in approximately 250 GB of data in text format, which 
was stored in a SQL database. The data downloaded included all media data, blog 
data, and Wikipedia page views. Tweet data were drawn from Crimson Hexagon’s 
daily count by keyword, so the individual Tweets did not need to be stored locally 
(although I did download a random sample for verification purposes and to inform 
Chapter 3). Search data were similarly gathered; I downloaded daily data from the 
Google Trends website. 
A constellation of studies have employed similar methods.  One of the earliest 
used Yahoo! Buzz data on searches and viewed news content to develop a record of 
attention to the same sex marriage issue (Hester & Gibson, 2007).  Building on their 
approach, Weeks and Southwell (2010) used data from Google Trends, which 
aggregates all searches for a given search term to analyze attention to political 
rumors. Similarly, Scharkow and Vogelsong used Google Insights for Search (which 
was later merged with Google Trends) to track interest in a political candidate 
(Scharkow & Vogelgesang, 2011). 
 Other studies, particularly those addressing blogs and Twitter, have used 
online discussion as an agenda proxy.  Some of the earliest studies simply sought to 
characterize the network within the blogosphere (Adamic & Glance, 2005; Hargittai, 
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Gallo, & Kane, 2007).  Others have used blogs as a proxy for public discussion and 
analyzed the agenda setting relationship between blogs and the professional media 
(Wallsten, 2007; 2010; Woodly, 2007), while a large set of studies have used Twitter 
in much the same way (Leskovec, Backstrom, & Kleinberg 2009; O’Connor, 
Balasubramanyan, Routledge, & Smith, 2010). Finally, Neuman, et al. (2014) 
concurrently conducted a similar study comparing media stories to Twitter, blogs, and 
forum comments. 
Accordingly, the employment of an attention-specific method is not novel, but 
it does not appear that many others have explicitly justified this approach nor 
emphasized the difference between measures of salience and measures of attention.  
As alluded to above, these are not the same; in fact, it is possible that an aggregate 
measure of attention does not even measure a similar concept since an individual may 
search for, read, or tweet about issues that are of little long-term personal 
significance.  Unfortunately, such questions are outside the scope of this paper; for 
now, the existence of previous studies that effectively include similar measures 
provides the necessary impetus for this approach. 
To gauge an overall effect of the public’s presence in this environment, I 
combined these variables into a public opinion index using Principal Components 
Analysis (PCA), which identifies the components within a set of variables that define 
the co-variance of those variables. Each component represents this co-variance in a 
single dimension (eigenvector) across all variables; combined, the co-variance across 
components should approximate to 100% of the variance across variables. Variance is 
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described by the eigenvalue of each component; the first component always has the 
largest eigenvalue (or explains the most variation). In the construction of an index 
such as this, components with an eigenvalue greater than one are usually considered 
to incorporate enough of the variation to sufficiently describe the underlying 
dynamics of the data (Vyas & Kumaranayake, 2006).  
Issue Queries. Upon the selection of each issue, a sample query of news 
articles was run using the issue name and any obviously relevant terms (for instance, I 
searched for both “climate change” and “global warming”).  I then randomly sampled 
these news stories to find other terms that seemed to come up regularly.  If any such 
search terms were uncovered, a secondary search was run including those terms and 
excluding the original term (e.g. “planned parenthood” and not abortion).  Because of 
their relative brevity, blog searches utilized the same queries. 
 The other measures required a more complicated approach. For Wikipedia, I 
selected relevant pages from a Google search of the Wikipedia site or were listed on 
the issue category page and gathered pageviews of those topics using a custom 
python script to access the Wikipedia pageviews Application Programming Interface 
(API), found at stats.grok.se.  The resulting daily aggregate is a sum of the views of 
all related pages.   
Google Search data was first limited to the United States.  I then entered 
search terms from the news collection method and added additional relevant terms as 
indicated by the Google Search engine, which suggests related search terms. Often, 
there was no clear variation between related search terms, so they were eliminated.  
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Tweet collection was the most complicated of these methods, requiring 
multiple approaches to develop the query.  First, I searched Google for the already 
developed query terms and “hashtag” in order to retrieve relevant hashtags and news 
articles about Twitter campaigns or activity.  Second, I searched Twitter itself for the 
term over the course of several months, noting relevant terms that could be used in 
the resulting query. Finally, before using the set of search terms for each issue, I 
tested each search term to ensure it does not retrieve spurious results. After the 
removal of hashtags, these Twitter search term sets were also used for blogs. 
 Attention Aggregation. For most data types, aggregation was simple. Mass 
media, blogs, and tweets were identified according to their publication date; the sum 
of the day’s published work on an issue represents the amount of attention accorded 
that issue that day. Similarly, Wikipedia’s attention is a sum of all pageviews of all 
pages identified as related to the issue.  
Aggregation of Google searches was more complex, largely because Google 
Trends provides two different metrics of Google searches at different time intervals. 
If searching over a time period shorter than 90 days, it will provide a daily measure of 
searches. Any period longer than 90 days returns search trends aggregated to the 
weekly level. The returns themselves are not a direct measure of the number of 
searches (which is proprietary information), but a measure known as the query index. 
This, in turn, is derived from the query share, which is described in a paper by two 
Google employees as the:  
“total query volume for the search term in question within a particular 
geographic region divided by the total number of queries in the region during 
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the time period being examined. The maximum query share in the time period 
specified is normalized to be 100, and the query share at the initial date being 
examined is normalized to be zero.” (Choi & Varian, 2012) 
 
Consequently, the data from each 90 day period are not on the same scale. However, 
they can be combined by using weekly data as an index and scaling the daily 
measures from each subperiod to the weekly scale. There is no clear, Google 
endorsed way to combine this data, and I have found no one in the literature that does 
so. Accordingly, the method I devised assumes that each weekly data point reflects 
the mean query index for that week. I then find the mean of all daily values for each 
week, and scale the difference between each day’s values and the calculated mean to 
the level of the weekly data.  
 Proportional Attention. The final analysis does not use a simple measure of 
the amount of attention afforded an issue on a given day but the amount of attention 
as a proportion of all activity on that day. The denominator in this equation could be 
the number of articles published across a newspaper or stories on a news broadcast or 
the number of tweets or blog posts. Measuring attention in this manner helps alleviate 
trends caused by extraneous variables (such as increased use of Twitter on the part of 
the public), keeps all data in the same format as Google searches, and, substantively, 
helps contextualize attention in a crowded media environment.  
 Converting data types other than Google search into this proportional measure 
required some measure of all attention for that data type. In some instances, the 
databases used posed limitations on queries that would allow this. For instance, 
Crimson Hexagon does not allow blank searches, whereas Lexis Nexis does, and 
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Wikipedia’s pageview statistics have no comparable metric on a daily basis. 
Accordingly, the measure of all attention on broadcast media from Lexis Nexis – 
ABC, CBS, CNN, Fox News, MSNBC, NBC, and NPR – includes all available 
transcripts, with no limitations imposed by the search. I re-scraped 
RushLimbaugh.com with the search term “the” to retrieve this metric for this data 
type. Mass media and digital media sources, including blogs, from Crimson Hexagon 
also used a query string with just the word “the.” To incorporate tweets that do not 
use “the”, the query string “the OR a” was used, and tweets were limited to English. 
Finally, to measure the total attention on a given day to Wikipedia, I used the number 
of pageviews on the front page.  
Analysis 
 Statistical analysis was performed through the use of an Autoregressive 
Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) approach. This class of analysis, designed for 
time series data, incorporates autocorrelation in the data, or instances in which present 
values of the dependent variable are influenced by previous values of the dependent 
variable, not just the independent variables. This is important for time series data, 
which often features long trends. Consequently, this approach allows for the selection 
and analysis of the best fitting model for each time series, which enables the analysis 
of the short and long term influence of earlier values in the dataset. A series of 
ARIMA tests were conducted on each data series – public and mass media – for each 
issue, with the public an independent variable in the mass media model and vice 
versa. A test for each potential lag structure of a combination of 1-7 days and 0-3 
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months for both the dependent and independent variable was conducted for each 
issue, followed by an Aikike Information Criterion (AIC) test, which shows the 
goodness of fit. The lag structure with the lowest AIC is the most parsimonious 
model (Enders, 1995). This determines which lag structure to use in the following 
analysis. 
The agenda setting effect was measured using Granger Causality, which 
allows one to determine the effects of one series of time-specific data on another by 
determining if future values of Time series A can be better predicted by values of 
Time Series B than just by looking at Time Series A alone.  While relatively 
underutilized in political science, it is a favored tool of econometrics literature 
because it overcomes issues of spurious relationships in lagged regression analysis 
(Kennedy, 2003).  In an analysis of previous studies using each time series, Freeman 
found that the Direct Granger approach, despite several potential issues, is the best 
method for the analysis of political time series data. Nonetheless, problems can arise 
from its generalizable nature, such as when the researcher does not allow for the 
appropriate amount of lagged periods because there may not have been time for the 
effects to manifest, has a limited dataset, excludes causal variables, or ignores 
feedback effects between the two time series or complications caused by actor 
knowledge of previous effects. These are all factors that can be controlled for with 
proper model specification and theory building, however (Freeman, 1983).   
Accordingly, because agenda setting theory has been supported robustly 
across time and environment, the causal link between media and public agenda allows 
!!
 33 
for a similarly robust theory driven model.  Consequently, several agenda setting 
studies in recent years have adopted this method (e.g. Jenner, 2012; Meraz, 2011b).  
In this analysis, my first model contains all public or mass media variables, while my 
second model (Model B, the restricted model), excludes the independent variables. 
For example, in a test of mass media’s influence over the public, the public is the 
dependent variable whereas the mass media is the independent variable. If Model B, 
which excludes the mass media variables, has less explanatory power than Model A, 
which includes them, then it can be said that mass media attention Granger causes 
public attention. 
In the included analysis, I conducted at least 10 ARIMA and Granger tests for 
each issue (issues whose data required the inclusion of multiple principal components 
in the public opinion index required two additional tests for each additional 
component). These tests are: mass media’s agenda setting influence over the public as 
a whole (with public opinion measured by the principal component or components), 
twitter, blogs, Google searches and Wikipedia page views; and, in the opposite 
direction, those public sources’ influence over the mass media. In other words, each 
element of the mass media-public relationship were tested together and separately for 
each issue.  
Results 
Public Index  
 Table 2.1 shows the results from the principal components analysis for each 
issue. It reports the first two components, along with their eigenvalue and the 
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proportion of the variance they represent. It also includes each component’s loading 
coefficient for each public opinion variable. 
 
Table 2.1. Principal Components for each Issue 
    
  Coefficients 
 
Issue Eigenvalue Proportion Twitter Blogs Google Wikipedia 
Social 
  
  
    
 
Abortion 
 
  
    
  
Component 1 2.404 0.601 0.525 0.487 0.567 0.407 
  
Component 2 0.978 0.245 -0.307 -0.553 0.229 0.740 
 
Healthcare Reform 
 
  
    
  
Component 1 2.622 0.656 0.462 0.530 0.531 0.473 
  
Component 2 0.848 0.212 0.553 -0.463 -0.471 0.507 
 
Race 
 
  
    
  
Component 1 2.009 0.502 0.547 0.606 0.518 -0.255 
  
Component 2 1.081 0.270 0.301 -0.215 0.357 0.858 
 
Reproductive Rights 
 
  
    
  
Component 1 2.814 0.704 0.531 0.500 0.502 0.465 
  
Component 2 0.517 0.129 -0.166 -0.510 -0.094 0.839 
 
Same Sex Marriage 
 
  
    
  
Component 1 2.998 0.749 0.527 0.478 0.507 0.487 
  
Component 2 0.458 0.115 -0.123 0.729 0.082 -0.668 
Environmental 
 
  
    
 
Climate Change 
 
  
    
  
Component 1 2.361 0.590 0.583 0.518 0.571 0.257 
  
Component 2 0.913 0.228 -0.113 -0.254 -0.085 0.957 
 
Fracking 
 
  
    
  
Component 1 2.807 0.702 0.505 0.503 0.534 0.455 
  
Component 2 0.649 0.162 -0.424 -0.473 0.214 0.742 
Entitlements 
 
  
    
 
Medicare 
 
  
    
  
Component 1 2.548 0.637 0.501 0.515 0.460 0.522 
  
Component 2 0.684 0.171 -0.590 -0.248 0.755 0.146 
 
Social Security 
 
  
    
  
Component 1 2.033 0.508 0.554 0.505 0.446 0.490 
  
Component 2 0.793 0.198 -0.338 0.386 0.626 -0.587 
 
Welfare 
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Component 1 1.792 0.448 0.607 0.062 0.615 0.500 
  
Component 2 1.019 0.255 0.061 0.978 -0.195 0.045 
Economic 
 
  
    
 
Deficit 
 
  
    
  
Component 1 2.694 0.674 0.534 0.560 0.397 0.494 
  
Component 2 0.688 0.172 -0.311 -0.224 0.913 -0.142 
 
Inequality 
 
  
    
  
Component 1 1.967 0.492 0.523 0.549 0.599 0.258 
  
Component 2 0.957 0.239 -0.078 -0.331 -0.033 0.940 
 
Taxes 
 
  
    
  
Component 1 2.247 0.562 0.558 0.352 0.559 0.502 
  
Component 2 0.842 0.210 -0.347 0.919 -0.079 -0.172 
 
Unemployment 
 
  
    
  
Component 1 1.611 0.403 0.634 -0.469 0.179 0.588 
  
Component 2 1.325 0.331 0.007 0.594 0.771 0.232 
Law and Order 
 
  
    
 
Crime 
 
  
    
  
Component 1 1.912 0.478 0.599 -0.098 0.555 0.569 
  
Component 2 1.218 0.305 0.065 0.849 0.412 -0.325 
 
Drugs 
 
  
    
  
Component 1 1.537 0.384 0.651 0.590 0.355 -0.320 
  
Component 2 1.219 0.305 0.041 -0.079 0.697 0.712 
 
Gun Control 
 
  
    
  
Component 1 3.126 0.782 0.480 0.522 0.521 0.476 
  
Component 2 0.378 0.094 -0.228 -0.300 -0.293 0.879 
 
Immigration 
 
  
    
  
Component 1 2.541 0.635 0.573 0.461 0.594 0.326 
  
Component 2 1.015 0.254 -0.029 -0.580 0.031 0.814 
Foreign Policy 
 
  
    
 
Afghanistan 
 
  
    
  
Component 1 2.217 0.554 0.542 0.440 0.561 0.445 
  
Component 2 0.860 0.215 0.307 0.630 -0.264 -0.663 
 
Iraq 
 
  
    
  
Component 1 2.519 0.630 0.528 0.366 0.554 0.530 
  
Component 2 0.849 0.212 0.169 0.838 -0.345 -0.387 
 
Terrorism 
 
  
    
  
Component 1 3.268 0.817 0.512 0.494 0.468 0.524 
  
Component 2 0.420 0.105 -0.514 0.257 0.722 -0.386 
 
Arab Spring 
 
  
    
  
Component 1 2.454 0.614 0.472 0.570 0.540 0.400 
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Component 2 0.881 0.220 -0.605 -0.190 0.170 0.755 
Other 
  
  
    
 
Labor 
 
  
    
  
Component 1 2.080 0.520 0.593 0.579 0.480 0.287 
  
Component 2 0.922 0.231 -0.027 -0.269 -0.204 0.941 
 
Education Reform 
 
  
    
  
Component 1 2.251 0.563 0.529 0.374 0.567 0.509 
  
Component 2 0.811 0.203 -0.193 0.912 -0.355 -0.074 
 
Net Neutrality 
 
  
    
  
Component 1 3.305 0.826 0.527 0.515 0.515 0.438 
    Component 2 0.458 0.115 -0.276 -0.329 -0.146 0.891 
 
 
Public opinion on most issues loaded primarily on the first component, with 
only Race, Welfare, Unemployment, Crime, Drugs, and Immigration requiring two 
issues to capture a significant percentage of the variance (no issues required three 
components). For all other issues, the first component captured from 49% (Inequality) 
to 81% (Terrorism) of the variance. The disparity in explanatory power of the first 
component in many cases reflects the strength of secondary component trends; those 
issues with the lowest first components tend to have quite powerful second 
components representing around 25% of the variance (e.g. Crime, Unemployment). In 
this analysis, I test two components for all issues who have an eigenvalue greater than 
1; for all other issues I use a single component to represent the public index. 
 The second set of columns report how well the components capture the 
variance within each variable. While magnitude of the coefficient cannot be measured 
across issues or variables, the direction can be. Accordingly, if three of the variables 
have a positive coefficient while the fourth has a negative coefficient, it suggests that 
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the underlying trend that drives the variance in the first three components is not 
present in the final one. There are no instances in which the first component does not 
report a positive coefficient from at least three of the variables; of those that variables 
not included on some issues, it is most frequently Wikipedia or Blogs. The second 
component’s coverage is less consistent, with the tests reporting negative components 
anywhere from 8 issues for Twitter up to 16 issues for Wikipedia. Patterns also 
emerge in how variables tend to co-vary. While there are many ways to slice these 
results, perhaps the most interesting is that when Twitter is not explained well by the 
second variable, Blogs or Google frequently is not either. Wikipedia seems to be 
more independent. 
 The lack of uniformity across variables, as well as the sometimes minimal 
proportion represented by the first component, warrant not just the use of the second 
component when appropriate, but also the inclusion of each subsidiary measure. 
Accordingly, the time series models of these data include tests of the relationship of 
each variable with mass media as well as the broad public index. 
Time Series Analysis 
 Tables 2.2 and 2.3 show the results of the time series analysis for each issue, 
with Table 2.2 showing the results with mass media as the influencer and Table 2.3 
showing the results when the public is the influencer. There are 10 columns for each 
issue. The left side of the dividing line shows the results from tests of mass media’s 
influence over the public while the right side of the line shows the results of tests of 
the public’s influence over the mass media. Each set of directional tests is further 
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distinguished by the type of public attention measured. The first test for each set uses 
the public index, determined by the principal components analysis above, while the 
remaining four columns demonstrate the role of Twitter, blogs, Google searches, and 
Wikipedia, respectively, with each results in a new column. There are at least two 
rows for each issue. The first row reports the F-statistic of the Granger causality test 
as well as the significance level; those issues that called for the use of two 
components for the public index report both values. The second row(s) for each issue 
report the most parsimonious lag structure, as determined by the AIC test.3 The public 
lag structure is indicated by some variant of “P-0M1D,” with P- indicating that it is 
the lag structure of the current public variable, 0M indicating the long-term lag 
structure (from 0-3M), and 1D indicating the short term lag structure (from 1-7D). 
The mass media lag structure uses a similar format, with the exception that it is 
prepended with “M-“ instead of “P-“. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 As described above, the AIC test finds the most parsimonious model by minimizing the standard 
error across each model. Several alternate tests could be utilized, such as the Bayes Information 
Criterion (BIC), but the AIC is generally the most utilized approach (Enders, 1995). 
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Table 2.2 ARIMA Results – Mass Media as Influencer 
   
  
F-Stat F-Stat F-Stat F-Stat F-Stat 
  
(Time) (Time) (Time) (Time) (Time) 
 
Issue Public (All) Twitter Blogs Google Searches Wikipedia 
Social 
     
 
Abortion 3.69 ** 11.49 *** 13.16 *** 6.90 *** 1.89 
  
(P-3M7D M-1M3D) (P-0M7D M-0M3D) (P-0M6D M-0M1D) (P-0M7D M-3M7D) (P-0M6D M-1M7D) 
 
Healthcare Reform 4.05 *** 13.19 *** 16.52 *** 8.06 *** 15.06 *** 
  
(P-3M6D M-2M7D) (P-3M6D M-0M7D) (P-0M7D M-0M7D) (P-0M3D M-3M6D) (P-2M3D M-1M6D) 
 
Race 4.54 * / 1.99 * 11.23 *** 18.40 *** 1.21 0.03 
  
(P-3M3D M-0M1D) (P-0M2D M-0M1D) (P-0M5D M-0M2D) (P-3M3D M-0M2D) (P-0M6D M-0M1D) 
  
(P-3M7D M-0M7D) 
    
 
Reproductive 
Rights 14.32 *** 26.08 *** 27.94 *** 3.06 *** 15.07 *** 
  
(P-3M5D M-1M3D) (P-0M3D M-0M3D) (P-0M6D M-0M3D) (P-0M7D M-3M7D) (P-0M1D M-0M2D) 
 
Same Sex Marriage 31.15 *** 30.38 *** 41.63 *** 20.69 *** 34.96 *** 
  
(P-3M2D M-0M3D) (P-0M2D M-0M3D) (P-0M3D M-0M2D) (P-3M7D M-0M3D) (P-0M1D M-0M1D) 
Environmental 
     
 
Climate Change 3.19 * 9.37 *** 1.78 5.71 *** 25.12 *** 
  
(P-3M7D M-1M2D) (P-2M7D M-0M5D) (P-1M7D M-0M5D) (P-1M7D M-2M7D) (P-0M4D M-0M1D) 
 
Fracking 0.36 2.95 2.35 1.54 2.21 
  
(P-3M7D M-3M1D) (P-0M7D M-0M1D) (P-0M7D M-0M1D) (P-0M6D M-3M1D) (P-0M1D M-0M1D) 
Entitlements 
     
 
Medicare 15.60 *** 34.50 *** 92.19 * 9.20 *** 6.53 *** 
  
(P-3M7D M-2M7D) (P-0M2D M-0M2D) (P-0M7D M-0M1D) (P-3M7D M-0M7D) (P-0M7D M-3M7D) 
 
Social Security 11.52 *** 8.38 *** 76.34 *** 4.08 *** 10.70 *** 
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(P-3M7D M-0M4D) (P-0M5D M-0M5D) (P-0M5D M-0M1D) (P-3M7D M-0M7D) (P-0M6D M-0M4D) 
 
Welfare 1.83 / 0.26 5.42 * 0.00 1.94 2.03 
  
(P-3M7D M-3M1D) (P-0M1D M-0M1D) (P-0M7D M-0M1D) (P-0M7D M-3M1D) (P-0M1D M-0M1D) 
  
(P-3M7D M-0M1D) 
    Economic 
     
 
Deficit 6.40 *** 34.48 *** 16.99 *** 3.75 ** 10.43 *** 
  
(P-3M6D M-0M7D) (P-0M2D M-0M2D) (P-0M7D M-0M6D) (P-0M7D M-3M2D) (P-0M7D M-0M4D) 
 
Inequality 4.51 *** 1.46 6.62 *** 4.89 *** 3.7 
  
(P-3M7D M-3M7D) (P-0M1D M-0M1D) (P - 0M7D M-1M6D) (P-2M7D M-3M7D) (P-0M7D M-0M1D) 
 
Taxes 4.09 *** 3.45 11.56 *** 3.39 ** 2.54 * 
  
(P-3M7D M-3M6D) (P-0M7D M-0M1D) (P-0M7D M-3M7D) (P-0M7D M-3M1D) (P-0M7D M-0M6D) 
 
Unemployment 5.34 *** / 10.10 *** 1.61 6.38 *** 4.43 *** 16.98 *** 
  
(P-3M7D M-0M5D) (P-1M7D M-3M2D) (P-3M7D M-2M7D) (P-0M7D M-3M6D) (P-0M1D M-0M4D) 
  
(P-3M7D M-2M7D) 
    Law and Order 
     
 
Crime 0.03 / 2.71 2.91 * 3.50 * 2.24 * 4.57 * 
  
(P-3M7D M-0M1D) (P-0M7D M-0M4D) (P-3M7D M-2M1D) (P-3M7D M-0M7D) (P-0M1D M-0M1D) 
  
(P-3M7D M-0M2D) 
    
 
Drugs 3.21 * / 0.65 0.30 3.05 * 0.84 3.79 
  
(P-3M3D M-0M2D) (P-0M6D M-0M1D) (P-3M7D M-1M3D) (P-3M7D M-0M1D) (P-0M6D M-0M1D) 
  
(P-3M7D M-0M1D) 
    
 
Gun Control 7.96 *** 13.63 *** 37.05 *** 18.02 *** 48.50 *** 
  
(P-3M2D M-1M4D) (P-0M3D M-0M2D) (P-0M4D M-0M4D) (P-3M7D M-0M7D) (P-0M2D M-0M4D) 
 
Immigration 4.40 ** 0.11 11.33 *** 3.80 *** 2.1 
  
(P-3M7D M-2M1D) (P-0M5D M-0M1D) (P-0M7D M-0M7D) (P-0M7D M-3M7D) (P-0M1D M-0M1D) 
Foreign Policy 
     
 
Afghanistan 1.24 2.10 6.50 *** 5.12 *** 7.52 *** 
  
(P-3M1D M-1M1D) (P-0M1D M-0M1D) (P-1M7D M-0M7D) (P-3M7D M-1M6D) (P-0M1D M-0M2D) 
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Iraq 2.81 * 7.17 ** 7.80 *** 7.58 *** 12.28 *** 
  
(P-3M1D M-3M1D) (P-0M3D M-0M1D) (P-1M7D M-0M7D) (P-3M7D M-3M6D) (P-0M3D M-0M3D) 
 
Terrorism 16.83 *** 2.89 * 10.82 *** 0.01 8.04 *** 
  
(P-3M1D M-1M1D) (P-1M2D M-3M1D) (P-0M4D M-0M3D) (P-3M5D M-0M1D) (P-3M1D M-1M1D) 
 
Arab Spring 14.25 *** 1.62 73.02 *** 5.14 *** 1.77 
  
(P-3M4D M-2M1D) (P-0M6D M-0M1D) (P-0M6D M-0M1D) (P-3M7D M-3M6D) (P-0M3D M-1M1D) 
Other 
     
 
Labor 5.31 *** 9.98 *** 13.52 *** 1.19 5.97 * 
  
(P-3M7D M-3M7D) (P-0M4D M-0M3D) (P-0M7D M-0M7D) (P-1M7D M-3M1D) (P-0M1D M-0M1D) 
 
Education Reform 3.36 ** 11.48 *** 7.05 *** 7.51 ** 6.13 * 
  
(P-3M7D M-0M6D) (P-0M1D M-0M1D) (P-0M7D M-0M7D) (P-3M7D M-0M1D) (P-0M1D M-0M1D) 
 
Net Neutrality 5.41 *** 43.89 *** 51.87 *** 5.55 *** 5.74 * 
    (P-1M1D M-3M3D) (P-0M3D M-0M1D) (P-0M3D M-0M1D) (P-1M1D M-3M3D) (P-0M1D M-0M1D) 
 
*** < 0.001 ** < 0.01 * < 0.05 
   !
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Table 2.3. ARIMA Results - Public as Influencer 
  
F-Stat F-Stat F-Stat F-Stat F-Stat 
  
(Time) (Time) (Time) (Time) (Time) 
  Issue Public (All) Twitter Blogs Google Searches Wikipedia 
Social 
     
 
Abortion 22.85 *** 11.33 *** 35.52 *** 13.94 *** 1.86 
  
(M-0M1D P-0M1D) (M-0M3D P-0M2D) (M-0M1D P-0M1D) (M-0M1D P-0M1D) (M-0M1D P-0M1D) 
 
Healthcare Reform 0.27 2.78 *** 5.27 *** 5.57 *** 11.48 *** 
  
(M-0M6D P-0M1D) (M-0M7D P-0M7D) (M-0M7D P-0M7D) (M-0M7D P-0M6D) (M-0M6D P-0M1D) 
 
Race 45.92 *** / 4.25 * 40.62 *** 7.64 *** 4.99 *** 0.29 
  
(M-0M5D P-0M1D) (M-0M5D P-0M1D) (M-0M5D P-0M5D) (M-0M5D P-0M5D) (M-0M5D P-0M1D) 
  
(M-0M5D P-0M1D) 
    
 
Reproductive Rights 63.43 *** 17.64 *** 10.06 ** 43.46 *** 17.17 *** 
  
(M-0M3D P-0M1D) (M-0M3D P-0M2D) (M-0M3D P-0M1D) (M-0M3D P-0M4D) (M-0M3D P-0M1D) 
 
Same Sex Marriage 1.08 24.25 *** 9.42 *** 14.73 *** 2.46 
  
(M-0M1D P-0M1D) (M-0M2D P-0M2D) (M-0M2D P-0M2D) (M-0M2D P-0M2D) (M-0M1D P-0M1D) 
Environmental 
     
 
Climate Change 50.60 *** 15.32 *** 7.09 *** 16.66 *** 0.70 
  
(M-1M6D P-0M1D) (M-1M6D P-2M6D) (M-1M7D P-2M5D) (M-2M6D P-0M5D) (M-1M6D P-0M1D) 
 
Fracking 4.57 * 1.75 3.29 ** 2.61 * 7.12 ** 
  
(M-0M1D P-0M1D) (M-0M1D P-0M4D) (M-0M1D P-0M7D) (M-0M1D P-0M7D) (M-0M1D P-0M1D) 
Entitlements 
     
 
Medicare 1.18 1.73 0.15 7.71 *** 3.00 
  
(M-0M2D P-0M1D) (M-0M2D P-0M1D) (M-0M2D P-0M1D) (M-0M2D P-0M2D) (M-0M2D P-0M1D) 
 
Social Security 2.83 6.12 *** 3.98 ** 11.13 *** 1.3 
  
(M-0M4D P-0M1D) (M-0M4D P-0M5D) (M-0M4D P-0M4D) (M-0M6D P-0M6D) (M-0M4D P-0M1D) 
 
Welfare 3.88 * / 27.95 *** 5.16 * 27.11 *** 0.31 1.52 
  
(M-0M1D P-0M1D) (M-0M1D P-0M1D) (M-0M1D P-0M1D) (M-0M1D P-0M1D) (M-0M1D P-0M1D) 
  
(M-0M1D P-0M1D) 
    Economic 
     
 
Deficit 6.16 * 14.97 *** 6.50 *** 0.13 5.02 * 
  
(M-0M4D P-0M1D) (M-0M4D P-0M3D) (M-0M3D P-0M4D) (M-0M3D P-0M1D) (M-0M4D P-0M1D) 
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Inequality 1.97 3.50 ** 5.75 *** 4.75 *** 16.91 *** 
  
(M-0M5D P-0M1D) (M-0M5D P-0M4D) (M-0M4D P-0M4D) (M-0M4D P-0M4D) (M-0M4D P-0M1D) 
 
Taxes 4.04 * 12.13 ** 9.53 *** 11.44 *** 4.14 * 
  
(M-0M5D P-0M1D) (M-0M5D P-0M2D) (M-0M5D P-0M6D) (M-0M5D P-0M3D) (M-0M5D P-0M1D) 
 
Unemployment 1.68 / 52.72 *** 4.98 *** 13.85 *** 14.62 *** 6.85 ** 
  
(M-0M6D P-0M1D) (M-0M6D P-0M6D) (M-0M5D P-0M7D) (M-0M6D P-0M5D) (M-0M3D P-0M1D) 
  
(M-0M3D P-01MD) 
    Law and Order 
     
 
Crime 12.09 *** / 18.35 *** 9.16 *** 7.31 *** 5.88 *** 2.81 
  
(M-0M7D P-0M1D) (M-0M7D P-0M4D) (M-0M7D P-0M2D) (M-0M7D P-0M7D) (M-0M7D P-0M1D) 
  
(M-0M7D P-0M1D) 
    
 
Drugs 1.16 / 0.21 2.11 0.00 0.64 0.07 
  
(M-0M1D P-0M1D) (M-0M1D P-0M1D) (M-0M1D P-0M1D) (M-0M1D P-0M1D) (M-0M1D P-0M1D) 
  
(M-0M1D P-0M1D) 
    
 
Gun Control 152.13 *** 50.18 *** 36.12 *** 8.32 *** 73.69 *** 
  
(M-0M3D P-0M1D) (M-0M5D P-0M6D) (M-0M5D P-0M5D) (M-0M3D P-0M2D) (M-0M3D P-0M1D) 
 
Immigration 37.00 *** 27.54 *** 22.59 *** 10.17 *** 0.73 
  
(M-0M3D P-0M1D) (M-0M3D P-0M2D) (M-0M3D P-0M1D) (M-0M3D P-0M3D) (M-0M3D P-0M1D) 
Foreign Policy 
     
 
Afghanistan 0.13 4.17 * 1.97 2.25 0.02 
  
(M-0M1D P-0M1D) (M-0M4D P-0M2D) (M-0M4D P-0M2D) (M-0M4D P-0M4D) (M-0M1D P-0M1D) 
 
Iraq 10.86 *** 10.56 *** 23.57 *** 15.50 *** 1.67 
  
(M-0M1D P-0M1D) (M-0M4D P-0M3D) (M-0M1D P-0M1D) (M-0M1D P-0M3D) (M-0M1D P-0M1D) 
 
Terrorism 0.26 0.04 0.13 9.50 ** 1.73 
  
(M-0M1D P-0M1D) (M-0M1D P-0M1D) (M-0M1D P-0M1D) (M-0M1D P-0M1D) (M-0M1D P-0M1D) 
 
Arab Spring 84.49 *** 22.59 *** 16.44 *** 20.11 *** 1.98 
  
(M-0M1D P-0M1D) (M-0M1D P-3M7D) (M-0M1D P3M1D) (M-0M1D P-0M1D) (M-0M1D P-0M1D) 
Other 
     
 
Labor 77.21 *** 47.54 *** 48.29 *** 11.27 *** 4.51 * 
  
(M-0M4D P-0M1D) (M-0M4D P-0M2D) (M-0M4D P-0M1D) (M-0M4D P-0M2D) (M-0M4D P-0M1D) 
 
Education Reform 7.79 ** 3.68 4.63 * 6.52 4.78 * 
  
(M-0M1D P-0M1D) (M-0M1D P-0M1D) (M-0M1D P-0M1D) (M-0M1D P-0M1D) (M-0M1D P-0M1D) 
 
Net Neutrality 1.95 11.95 *** 7.42 *** 1.98 0.00 
    (M-0M1D P-0M1D) (M-0M1D P-0M4D) (M-0M1D P-0M3D) (M-0M1D P-0M1D) (M-0M1D P-0M1D) 
  
*** < 0.001 ** < 0.01 * < 0.05 
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 One of the factors that distinguish this analysis from Neuman, et al. (2014) is 
the recognition that the dynamics underlying the relationship between the mass media 
and the public is not stable across issues. Indeed, the variance in lag structures across 
issues and elements within each issue demonstrates the faultiness of their approach: 
by artificially constraining the lag structure and applying it uniformly across all 
issues, these authors do not account for the different dynamics of each issue, which 
may result in impulse response functions that are distorted by the introduction of 
statistically unimportant lags. Of course, Neuman, et al. did not employ impulse 
response functions, so their analysis was unable to address this potential problem (see 
Chapter 3).  
Figure 2.1 Monthly lags (Mass Media influencing public) 
!
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Figure 2.2 Monthly lags (Public influencing mass media) 
!
Some other trends emerge from this analysis. Without taking into 
consideration statistical significance, when the mass media is the influencer, it 
influences the composite public index over the long term more frequently than it does 
not. The inverse is not true, however: when the public is the influencer over the mass 
media, that influence tends toward the short term. Similarly, looking at each public 
agenda measure, the results differ greatly. When the media is the influencer, the 
individual measures tend toward a stronger influence in the short term, as shown in 
Figure 2.1. The same is true, but stronger, when the public is influencing the mass 
media, as shown in Figure 2.2. 
 Hypothesis 1, which suggested that there will be multi-directional causality 
across issues, is held up by these results. Looking just at the public index variable, 
there is bi-directional agenda setting as measured at the p < 0.05 level evident in 
about two thirds of issues; with no public influence over the mass media for same sex 
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marriage, social security, inequality, drugs, terrorism; no mass media influence over 
the public on crime or welfare, and a lack of influence in either direction for 
Afghanistan. However, for almost all of these issues, other measures of the public 
show influence. For instance, the mass media is influential over the public at the .05 
level for all other variables while the public is influential over the mass media for all 
variables except for Wikipedia. Similarly, the mass media influences blogs, Google 
searches and the public on the Afghanistan issue, but only Twitter influences the mass 
media on this issue. There is only one instance of significance for drugs, which is 
significant at the .05 level for just the first component of the public index for mass 
media influence, and shows no significant influence of the public over the mass 
media. Afghanistan and Medicare have a similar structure. Fracking, on the other 
hand, demonstrates the opposite effect, with no mass media influence over the public, 
but public influence over the mass media for all indicators except Twitter. This 
suggests that this issue might not receive any attention in the mass media if not for the 
effort of the public. Finally, some issues, like gun control and reproductive rights 
show bi-directional influence across all measures of the public, while several issues 
demonstrate causality for a majority of issues. 
 The most consistent bi-directional influence seems to occur in the Social 
Issues category, where Twitter and blogs are influential in both directions, with 
Google searches and Wikipedia showing limited levels of influence. On the other 
hand, with the exception of Gun Control, Law and Order Issues are the least 
consistently bi-directional issues. There may be a logical explanation for this, 
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grounded in agenda setting theory, which finds that obtrusive issues, or those with 
which the public encounters on a day to day basis, are least likely to exhibit agenda 
setting effects (Neuman, 1990; Winter & Eyal, 1981; Zucker, 1978). Moreover, social 
issues are often broad, nationally focused phenomenon, whereas discussions of crime 
and drugs are often more local. Accordingly, the broader issues within the law and 
order category, like gun control and immigration, show a higher number of 
statistically significant interactions.  
Previous research has shown that foreign policy issues are particularly 
susceptible to agenda-setting effects from the media because the public has no frame 
of reference for interactions with foreign nations (McCombs, 2004; Wanta, Golan, & 
Lee, 2004). Additionally, many of the events that drive coverage of these issues are 
dramatic - bombings, elections, etc. – which rivet attention from the public, drive the 
media into alarm mode, and buoy traditional agenda setting influence (Birkland, 
1998); often, there are no events to presage this attention. Accordingly, one would 
expect limited influence from the public to the mass media and extensive influence of 
the mass media over the public, yet this is really only the case for terrorism and 
Afghanistan, whereas Iraq and Arab Spring show bi-directional influence. It is 
difficult to hypothesize why this pattern emerges, however the Iraq results may be a 
consequence of the longstanding presence of this nation in American foreign policy 
and the continuing relevance of events there to foreign policy decisions. Additionally, 
the limited influence of the media over the public on the Arab Spring issue likely 
reflects the extent to which protestors and supporters utilized that medium. 
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The patterns of each variable are also interesting. Blogs seem to be more 
frequently responsive to media effects than other variables. Blogs have a similarly 
more frequent impact on the mass media than other public variables, although the 
difference between the number of issues for which blogs, Twitter and Google 
searches are influential is minimal. Wikipedia is least frequently influential over the 
mass media. Again, it is difficult to characterize the underlying dynamics of these 
results, but it could stem from the accessibility of the mediums and the needs of them. 
Political bloggers may be the most informed or politically motivated segment of the 
public, so they may be likely to be responsive both to other bloggers and to the mass 
media as a consequence. Accordingly, journalists and editors may read commentary 
on their articles or on issues with which they are concerned. Tweets, on the other 
hand, are obviously much shorter, and may therefore just be a link and some brief 
commentary. They could be similarly influential because many news organizations 
track metrics on the stories they publish; the virality of Twitter in spreading links 
propels its agenda setting capacity.  
The responsiveness of Google search trends and the more limited 
responsiveness of Wikipedia pageviews could be emerging because people are less 
likely to actively search on issues relating to those in the news; in other words, when 
people read about events in the mass media, they may not be inclined to seek more 
information online, instead being satisfied by the information contained in the article. 
Alternately, people may be more familiar with longer term or less complicated issues; 
people may understand and hold established views on social issues such as abortion 
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or race. In the other direction, Google searches frequent influence may reflect mass 
media responding to searches that lead people to their articles. 
Hypothesis 2 proposed that agenda setting effects would persist for longer 
than just a week. This analysis examined bi-directional agenda setting effects at two 
levels: in the short-term, effects that linger for one to seven days, and, in the long-
term, effects that take up to three months to decay. Hypothesis 2a, which addresses 
the influence of the mass media over the public, is supported by these results. Nearly 
every issue exhibit long term effects; only race, same sex marriage, deficit, and 
education reform, show no evidence of long-term effects. 
Hypothesis 2b, which suggested the opposite effect – a long term impact of 
the public on the media – was not shown to be true, with the sole exception of Arab 
Spring. Arab Spring’s results are unsurprising, as this event was made possible in part 
by an explosion of online activity. However, the lack of evidence for public influence 
over the mass media in the long term may reflect the structural nature of the media 
itself, which often does not linger in patrol mode for long (Boydstun, 2013). 
Conclusion 
 This study tested agenda setting effects across the media ecosystem in the 
modern era, which is characterized by an active and vocal public, 24 hour news 
cycles, and a proliferation of news avenues for interaction between the mass media 
and the public. Contrary to long-standing views of agenda setting, and in line with 
some more recent studies, there is considerable bi-directional agenda interaction 
between the mass media and the public. Consequently, the mass media has become in 
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some ways more responsive to public opinion than it was in the earlier era. However, 
the nature of these effects is dependent upon the issue in question, with even some 
topically similar issues exhibiting different patterns. 
 Additionally, this study showed that the effects of the mass media may linger 
for several months, depending on the issue. In these instances of heightened attention, 
when events related to the issue at hand emerge, they receive more attention than they 
would otherwise, and may help agenda setting effects persist for longer than they 
would otherwise. This is a consequence of the alarm/patrol modes of the mass media 
as well as priming effects on the public. 
 While this study demonstrates the broad dynamics within the mass 
media/public ecosystem, they do not show how those effects occur or how unified the 
mass media agenda is. These questions will be addressed in later chapters. 
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Chapter Three: 
The Causal Pathways of Attention 
 
Chapter 2 explored the system-level interaction between the public and the 
mass media. As the results show, there are several causal pathways and lines of 
interaction, but a few patterns do emerge. This chapter organizes the issues into a 
limited typology and outlines some of these interactions. This is done in two ways. 
First, I explain the context in which the issue rests: the issue environment, including 
the actors involved and the parameters of the debate, as well as how the influence 
between the public and the mass media unfolded within the constraints of a specific 
time period. Second, I use an impulse response function to demonstrate how mass 
media and the public influence each other in the average period. I select the issue and 
the time period to be the most canonical examples. In the typology presented below, I 
present all possible scenarios and illustrate the most common scenarios with 
examples drawn from real world issues.! 
Issue Activation Typology 
Soon after agenda setting theory drew research attention, scholars noted that 
the agenda setting effect differed by issue. Eyal, for instance, initially found no 
agenda setting effect because the lack of agenda setting in some issues obscured the 
effects of other issues (unpublished research discussed in Winter et al., 1982). 
Agenda setting, in other words, cannot be measured effectively in the aggregate but 
needs to be broken down by issue (Winter et al., 1982).  
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If the public and media agendas interact differently depending on the issue at 
hand, then some characteristic of the issue may be part of the reason. As early as 
Zucker (1978), communication scholars have recognized an issue’s obtrusiveness to 
be a primary factor in mitigating the agenda setting effect. Obtrusiveness describes 
the presence of an issue in the average person’s life, meaning that if an issue regularly 
and directly impacts people, increased attention in the media will not raise that issue’s 
salience. Agenda setting, then, is more effective when it is able to draw attention to, 
and provide more information about issues that the public would not normally 
consider (Atwater et al., 1985; Zucker, 1978).  
Some studies have found conflicting results, however, with the media 
increasing an issue’s salience among the public even when it is obtrusive (Behr & 
Iyengar, 1985; Demers, Craff, Choi, & Pessin, 1989; Erbring, Goldenberg, & Miller, 
1980). Furthermore, Erbring, et al. point out that real world conditions matter even if 
an issue isn’t particularly obtrusive. In particular, they point to interpersonal 
communication as a key mitigating factor of agenda setting (1980). There has also 
been considerable inconsistency in defining which issues are obtrusive, as the 
decisions regarding which issues are obtrusive are often made by the researcher 
(Demers et al., 1989).  
Other factors may shape audience reaction, although they have not received 
the level of attention that obtrusiveness has in the literature. Some scholarship has 
pointed to factors such as the dramatic nature of an issue as intrinsic to the agenda 
setting effect, as the public is transfixed by the media’s coverage of that issue 
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(Birkland, 1998; MacKuen & Coombs, 1981). Wars, terrorism attacks, and other 
kinds of vivid, conflict-laden events fit this category. Additionally, Yagade and 
Dozier found that abstract issues were less susceptible to agenda-setting effects than 
concrete issues (1990). Both of these ideas were confirmed in some respect by Wanta 
and Hu, at least as they concern international issues (Wanta & Hu, 1993). 
Other scholarship has attempted to define an agenda setting typology 
according to the substantive emphasis of the issue and the relationship between the 
public and the media. Neumann developed a typology of issues according to the 
responsiveness of the public to media coverage, which would vary not just on the 
type of issue but also across the lifecycle of attention to the issue. In his view, there 
were four issue categories: crises, which had clear beginnings, middle periods, and 
ending periods that defined the attention of the media and public; symbolic crises, 
which were consistent problems across time that would be elevated to the level of 
crisis for a short period when the media could strongly influence the public agenda; 
problems, which were “continuing concerns” that would slowly fluctuate in attention 
– but for which the public would be highly responsive to media coverage; and non-
problems, which were issues that had low levels of public concern but occasionally 
high levels of media concern (Neuman, 1990). Drawing on this kind of attention-
based typology, Soroka defined issues as either prominent, long-lasting issues that 
were important to the public at large; sensational issues that drew considerable media 
attention, governmental issues such as the public debt or taxes that were cyclical in 
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nature; and valence issues, which were long-lasting social issues (such as racism) that 
had largely one-sided portrayals in the media (2002).  
Theories of issue differences in agenda-setting have accordingly shifted from 
an analysis of generic issue attributes (obtrusiveness, dramaticness, abstractness) to 
typologies that emphasize the importance of the public-media relationship and 
intrinsic substantive characteristics of the issues themselves.  This allows for more 
expansive theory-building in the modern media era because it expressly incorporates 
interactivity into the analysis. Certain issues are by their very nature more likely to 
draw notice because they come to the attention of the public in the aftermath of a 
critical, dramatic event. Other issues are of high obtrusiveness to the public, but the 
media may ignore them except for periodic bursts of attention. In contrast, some 
issues are primarily the province of the media, the elite, or a dedicated issue public 
and therefore do not receive much attention outside of those groups. In all of these 
situations, the public and the media co-exist in a hybridized media environment and 
therefore continuously interact; at times this interaction is driven on the part of the 
public by some politically-motivated individuals or organizations who can, in some 
instances, draw media and in turn public attention to the issue.   
In many ways, how the issue is activated across the public and the media 
agendas becomes more important to this analysis than the issue itself. A critical or 
dramatic event can be a war, but it could also be a protest about, say, reproductive 
rights. Moreover, characteristics like an issue’s obtrusiveness or its concreteness can 
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change over time. For instance, an abstract issue like climate change may become 
more concrete at the end of a long, hot, dry summer. 
Accordingly, this typology is centered around how the issue is activated rather 
than the issue itself. Certain issues will generally be activated via consistent 
processes, but this approach allows for this variance and focuses attention on 
interaction, which facilitates agenda setting. Additionally, this theoretical construct 
breaks from the traditional agenda-setting approach of expecting a media to public 
process: the hybridized, interactive environment lends agency to individuals across 
power structures (Chadwick, 2013). Nonetheless, a single tweet or blog post is not 
enough to sway agendas toward a new issue; instead, some kind of threshold needs to 
be reached before this kind of attention shift occurs. This threshold could be reached 
through increased media attention just as easily as it could be a cacophony of social 
media; most likely, this swell of attention will develop simultaneously across 
mediums but will take different shapes, in terms of the rise and fall of attention, and 
be directed by different types of actors.  
Accordingly, I suggest several different types of interaction and activation. 
First, this is broken down along interaction: no interaction, one-way influence, and bi-
directional interaction. Second, I distinguish between different sources of interaction: 
mass media or public, with several potential different sub-sets guiding this.  
No Interaction. Agenda interaction between the mass media and the public on 
these issues may occur in discrete periods, but it is inconsistent across the time 
studied, as measured by the statistical tests in Chapter 2. Issues consistent with this 
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pattern could be elite-driven, holding little salience for the public or which are 
obtrusive to the public and thus makes the public resistant to agenda setting effects; or 
they could be the reverse: widespread public issues for which the elites are unaware 
or unconcerned. 
One-Directional: Media Activation. This is the classic agenda setting 
scenario, in which the media is the first to start attending to an issue at a higher rate, 
and their demonstrated interest draws in the public.  
One-Directional: Public Activation. These issues are what McCombs calls 
reverse agenda setting, in which media starts attending to an issue following cues 
from the public (McCombs, 2004). These issues are classic reverse agenda-setting 
issues, in which the public is broadly concerned about a policy because it is obtrusive 
and concrete, but it lacks much of the drama or other qualities that will make the 
media notice in a concerted manner. In such instances, media attention will likely 
start as small, tepid responses to broad public attention, but expand as the issue 
becomes more salient for an even broader cross-section of the public. That does not 
mean, however, that the media is guaranteed to notice this public concern; instead, the 
issue could languish for years without significant media attention. Economic or local 
issues that are obtrusive to the public are likely to constitute much of this category. 
For instance, the Occupy Wall Street movement capitalized on the latent public 
concern over economic inequality, a topic the media had largely ignored prior to the 
movement’s arrival. Because these topics start with public concern, media attention to 
the issue will likely wane before public attention does. 
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One Directional – Public Activation (Entrepreneur). Entrepreneur issues are 
similar to public issues, but the source of agenda-setting and the mechanism 
mediating the public-media interaction differs. Although an entrepreneur issue may 
reflect broad concern, the media attends to the issue only after a concerted campaign 
by Dreier’s opinion entrepreneurs activates a broader issue public, whose attention in 
turn pressures the media to attend to the issue. The obtrusiveness or abstraction of the 
issue are of less importance than the effectiveness of these entrepreneurs in activating 
these issue publics. Once the public and media are activated, they will interact, but 
because this is not a deeply rooted issue, the public may move on quickly while the 
media remains caught up in an interactive political discussion driven and dominated 
by those entrepreneurs. Of course, these entrepreneurs are consistently trying to draw 
attention to a cause. It is unclear when these efforts will succeed or fail, and will 
likely be a result of either changes in tactics or exogenous changes in the media 
environment. Social or polarizing issues are the most likely issues in this category. 
This category is the most difficult to observe, although it is most likely in expressive 
measures of the public, such as blogs or Twitter, rather than behavioral measures like 
Google searches and Wikipedia pageviews. 
In fact, it is quite possible that these two categories should be subsumed: that 
absent of media coverage, public attention to an issue does not galvanize until it is 
organized by some activist organization. In this telling, public concern, even when 
widespread, is unfocused, so there is no story for the media to cover. Accordingly, 
this widespread public support remains unnoticed, and the issue remains in the No 
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Interaction category. With this caveat, I am going to leave the two categories distinct 
in the hope that future research can explore this relationship. 
Bi-Directional: Mutual Activation. Such issues are characterized by the 
continual interaction between the mass media and the public. Moreover, this 
influence is compounding: as the public becomes more interested in an issue, it will 
demand more information from the media; this increased media attention will cause 
more of the public to notice. These interlinkages may develop and wane quickly.  
Bi-Directional: Crisis Activation. Much like Neuman’s crises or MacKuen’s 
dramatic events, these are issues that are activated quickly in response to a dramatic, 
usually observable event. It is often obtrusive and concrete. Violent conflict like 
terrorist attacks and war are likely to drive these. Attention in the public and media 
agendas will likely be very quick, and feature high levels of interaction between the 
two spheres, as the public digests, theorizes and comments on on-the-scene reporting, 
followed by incorporation of that discussion in future coverage. A prime example of 
this interaction is the aftermath of the Boston Marathon Bombing of April 22, 2013, 
in which members of the public almost immediately scoured photos of the event; 
pictures of commonly identified (although incorrect) potential suspects were splashed 
across newspaper covers the following day (Chittum, 2013). In some instances, the 
media will continue to attend to this issue longer than the public. 
A few clarifications are required. None of this is to suggest that there is 
complete rigidity either in the issues associated with each category or the presence of 
just one activation process at a given time. For instance, at a given time an issue may 
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be activated according to processes exclusive to a crisis or an entrepreneurial 
activation. However, it will likely fit one category better, and ensuing analysis will 
benefit from these distinctions. Additionally, there are other constraints that can limit 
this interaction, such as agenda congestion, the proximity to elections, policymaker 
attention, and the diversity of discussion in the media (Boydstun, 2013); these are 
beyond the scope of this study, as are other exogenous factors that drive media 
attention (such as politicians). Finally, this reflects a potential change in how scholars 
think about agenda-setting: because of the new impermanence of agendas, it may be 
more appropriate to discuss agenda-setting in terms of attention shifting or agenda 
swaying, with an eye toward the process of activation and the interactivity of actors 
as key.  
Methods 
 There are two parts to the subsequent analysis. First, I categorize each issue 
according to the typology above. Second, I select several issues to use as case studies. 
Within each case study, I first explain the context of the issue as well as the media 
environment itself. This helps explain how the interaction occurs: how long it takes 
for one party to pick up the issue, and any persisting or reverse influence. This is 
conducted through searching the archive of Tweets, blog posts, and mass media 
articles collected as part of this research, and turning to other research where 
available. This research is confined to a short time window, as describing the 
particulars of an issue over the course of four years is a book-length project on its 
own. 
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I then show the typical interaction between the mass media and the public 
through custom-made impulse response functions. Based on the most parsimonious 
model selected in Chapter 2, an impulse response function simulates a shock to the 
environment as the mass media and the public register it and then decays as attention 
returns to normal. One way to think about this is to view it as simulating a major 
event, which could be a terrorist attack, passage of a major bill, or simply protests 
relating to an issue. After initial attention is drawn toward the issue, the impulse 
response function demonstrates how attention will rise and then fall, including times 
in which it will first fall and then rise, plateau, or other situations.4 Moreover, with an 
impulse response function, one can simulate the interaction between the mass media 
and the public. So, for instance, if attention rises first in the public (the public variable 
is shocked), an impulse response function can show how that public attention 
influences (or doesn’t influence) the mass media (Hamilton, 2004a).  
In an impulse response function, the amount of attention on a given day is a 
calculation of the coefficients from the most parsimonious model for that day 
multiplied by the amount of attention on the appropriate number of lagged days. 
Accordingly, if the most parsimonious model includes 3 public lags and 4 media lags, 
for the current day, the model will multiply the coefficient of day 1 for the public 
variable by the previous day’s attention measure plus a similar multiplication of day 
2’s coefficient and the public attention from two day’s prior, and so on. The same !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Typically, an impulse response function is run after a vector autoregression (VAR) analysis, which 
includes the co-variance of the variables in the system. For a number of reasons, a VAR analysis was 
not conducted here. Consequently, the assumption is that effects take one day to manifest, which may 
be reducing the level of interaction between the public and the mass media. 
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occurs for media variables. Consequently, the amount of attention in an impulse 
response function after the system is shocked (it uses real world data up to that point) 
is the sum of attention in previous days, as specified by the appropriate model, 
multiplied by the coefficients from that model. The results of the shocked system are 
then subtracted from those of an unshocked system, and this difference is plotted as a 
percentage of the value shocked (Hamilton, 2004a). 
In this analysis, the shock value is the mean of the system (ie. the mean 
attention on Twitter for the issue across the entire time period), although the standard 
deviation or any other value can be used – larger values such as the mean will simply 
highlight any changes. Once the mean was calculated, I selected a 90 day time period 
from the collected time series that best exemplifies the trends inherent in the dataset. 
This constitutes the real data, which the impulse response function uses to simulate 
subsequent values. I then constructed two simulations using the values from Chapter 
2’s best fitting models. For example, the most parsimonious model may suggest that 
Twitter attention on a given day is dependent upon the amount of attention from the 
past 2 days on Twitter and the preceding one day on mass media. Accordingly, all 
simulated data is constructed by multiplying the model coefficients by the appropriate 
preceding day’s attention value. 
Recall that there are two sets of simulated data, with each set containing data 
for a measure of the public and the mass media. The first set contains just data 
simulated according to the model. In the second set, I shock the system using the 
value specified above. I then calculate the difference between the two sets. This is the 
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impulse response. Given the parameters of the model, it shows how changes in 
attention persist over the following days; sometimes this is just an immediate drop 
off, while at others it plateaus before dropping off or leads to cyclical patterns of 
attention. The plots that are included show these changes as a percentage of the value 
that is shocked. I conducted all of this analysis in Excel so that I could verify visually 
that the results were calculating correctly. 
Typology Results 
Table 3.1 categorizes the issues analyzed in Chapter 2 according to this 
typology. Because there are multiple measures of public attention (Twitter, blogs, 
Google searches, Wikipedia page views, and 1-2 , and the first component of the four 
unique measures),  and those mediums might diverge in influence, I employ two 
methods for determining the role of the public. First, if the public to media or media 
to public measure of that first (or second, if relevant) component (as determined in 
the PCA test in Chapter 2) is significant (as determined by the Granger Causality tests 
in Chapter 2), the public is viewed as influential over the media or influenced by the 
media, respectively. Similarly, if at least three of the unique measures of the public 
are significant, that issue is included. Accordingly, I am erring on the side of 
inclusion.  
Some additional classification caveats are important. Distinguishing between 
One-Directional Public and One-Directional Public (Entrepreneurial) requires a 
deep dive into several cases to determine the beginning of this interaction. This is 
outside the scope of this project at this point. Additionally, the distinction between Bi-
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Directional Mutual Activation and Bi-Directional Crisis Activation rests in the pattern 
of attention. A Crisis issue will have several unique, sharp spikes in attention that 
decay quickly, i.e. attention to this issue will be positively skewed. 
Table 3.1. Activation Typology 
Activation Type   Issues 
No Interaction 
 
Drugs 
 
  One-Directional - Media Activation 
 
Medicare, Afghanistan, Net Neutrality, 
Terrorism 
One-Directional - Public Activation 
 
Fracking, Welfare 
One-Directional - Public Activation 
(Entrepreneur) 
 
N/A 
 
  Bi-Directional - Mutual Activation 
 
Abortion,* Arab Spring, Climate 
Change, Crime, Education Reform, 
Immigration,* Inequality, Iraq,* Race, 
Social Security, Taxes, Unemployment 
Bi-Directional - Crisis Activation 
  
Deficit, Gun Control, Healthcare 
Reform, Labor, Reproductive Rights, 
Same Sex Marriage 
* Indicates that issue showed some elements of a crisis activation issue, but this 
was not consistent. 
 
 Only one issue exhibits virtually no interaction – Drugs. Several exhibit signs 
of uni-directional media activation (Medicare, Afghanistan, Net Neutrality, 
Terrorism) while just two are uni-directional public activation issues (Fracking, 
Welfare). Accordingly, the majority of issues are bi-directional, with six looking like 
crises and 12 exhibiting different patterns of activation. Three of those mutual 
activation issues, Abortion, Immigration, and Iraq, had several crisis episodes, but the 
overall interaction was more mixed. 
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Case Studies 
 The following analysis includes three case studies: a uni-directional public 
activation issue, a bi-directional general activation issue, and a bi-directional crisis 
activation. I do not include a case study of a uni-directional media activation issue 
because it is the classic agenda setting story – any number of previous stories explain 
this. Instead, I will begin with a uni-directional public activation issue: Fracking, 
particularly in late 2012, shows how public attention can influence the media. While 
several of the bi-directional general activation issues could work, I selected Climate 
Change because of the cyclical nature of attention. Finally, because attention toward 
Gun Control appears to lurch from crisis to crisis, examination of the early 2011 
period after Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords was shot will show how this 
interaction occurs. All posts, Tweets, and news articles highlighted are meant to serve 
as examples of the kind of discussion that occurs. !  
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Uni-Directional Public Activation: Fracking 
 
Figure 3.1. Attention to Fracking 
 
!
Context. Despite recent attention, hydrofracturing (fracking) is actually an old 
technique for extracting oil and natural gas from the ground, with documented 
examples of it as early as the 1860s. The fracking debate generally refers to the 
process of injecting a mixture of water and chemicals into a fossil fuel deposit in 
order to build more pressure inside the deposit or change the viscosity of the oil to 
make it easier to pump out. In either situation, this process makes it easier to pump 
the fuel out of the deposit. Recent improvements to the process, along with the high 
energy prices, have made fracking both technologically and economically feasible 
(Prud'homme, 2013). 
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 Fracking is controversial due to perceived localized and general 
consequences. In the areas local to the drilling, many have reported contaminated 
water supplies, a consequence of the hazardous chemicals pumped into the oil 
deposit. Shocking documentaries like 2010’s Gasland showed people in areas near 
where fracking was taking place lighting the water from their faucets on fire. 
Fracking has also been shown to induce earthquakes (Keranen, et al., 2014; Mazur, 
2014; Warner & Shapiro, 2013). At the global level, fracking is part of the ongoing 
debate about climate change. Because fracking is an energy intensive technique, it not 
only sends more carbon into the atmosphere when the extracted fuel is burned, but it 
also burns extra energy during the extraction process(Prud'homme, 2013). Fracking 
has also been controversial at the legislative level, with several states considering 
fracking bans, most notably New York. Many of the legislative and judicial battles 
have come about because of the work of anti-fracking activists (Warner & Shapiro, 
2013). 
 An informal analysis of content on blogs, organized by my statistical findings, 
shows that blogs were the most statistically significant drivers of media attention 
during this time period, so much of the remaining analysis will focus on them. The 
conversation around fracking at this point on blogs seemed to split along two lines: on 
the one side, there were anti-fracking activists or other opponents, who talked about 
some of the potential problems with fracking, while supporters tended to promote the 
economic benefits of the practice. Bloggers opposed to fracking discussed several 
issues. For example, earthquakes were a key concern after several earthquakes hit the 
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Dallas area in October, challenging the view from industry that they weren’t linked to 
fracking: “Industry will say fracking doesn’t cause earthquakes but that’s bull” 
(reefrelieffounders.com, 2012). My survey of blogs at crucial times also shows that 
Bloggers also highlighted news articles linking earthquakes in other parts of the world 
to fracking, most notably in Spain (bluelivingideas.com, 2012). This discussion 
mostly occurred in October 2012, although when California started to consider 
fracking legislation, some discussion turned toward the benefits and drawbacks of 
fracking there and the associated political and regulatory hurdles 
(digbysblog.blogspot.com, 2012). Many of the pro-fracking blog posts emphasized 
the potential economic gains (realclearpolitics.com, 2012). 
Toward the end of the period, I found that much of the discussion had turned 
toward Promised Land, a 2012 film about fracking starring Matt Damon. This 
included both those who supported fracking, who criticized the film as being 
inaccurate, overwrought, and bankrolled by foreign oil interests 
(daveinboca.blogspot.com, 2012). Anti-fracking bloggers were split in supporting or 
criticizing it, but did tend to talk about it considerably over this period. 
Finally, in my dataset, many bloggers, particularly among the pro-
environmental groups, paid attention to the ongoing battle over fracking playing out 
in New York State, where a review of the risks of fracking was extended. Fracking 
was eventually banned in the state. Many of these posts were critical of Governor 
Cuomo and his flirtation with allowing fracking, with some urging the Governor to 
ban fracking in the state (LadyBunny.net, 2012) while others suggested that he was 
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being controlled by oil interests (RochesterEnvironmentNY.blogspot.com, 2012). 
Indeed, this appeared to be an activist led discussion, which may have influenced 
Governor Cuomo’s decision to delay the review panel’s decision. 
 Whereas bloggers addressed a range of issues, my analysis of mass media 
shows that they concentrated more on elite or legislative changes, formal reviews, and 
other more official news events, as well as protests. There were several major events 
covered: California’s examination of fracking, the United Kingdom lifting the ban on 
shale oil drilling (often connected to fracking), and the ongoing struggle over fracking 
in New York state. The latter appeared to draw the most attention, with hundreds of 
articles written about the role of activists (Cantarow, 2012) as well as the review 
process and the politics surrounding it (Bloomberg, 2012). The battle in California, 
which was instigated by activists suing the state, also drew considerable coverage 
(Mishak, 2012). 
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Figure 3.2. Fracking: Blog Shock 
!
 System Analysis. Figure 3.2 demonstrates the effect of a shock within the 
blogs community. As shown in Chapter 2, the most parsimonious model includes a 
one day media lag and a seven day blogs lag (blogs were the most statistically 
significant representation of public opinion). Because this is a uni-directional 
analysis, only this impulse response function is included. 
 When a shock occurs, it appears to take almost a week for the effects to 
manifest. In fact, attention on media tends to dip below the mean for a few days in the 
media, just as attention within the blogging community is dropping precipitously. 
Toward the end of the first week, attention within media begins to rise, perhaps in 
response to the plateau of increased attention among blogs (at about 20% above 
average attention). While blogs continue to drop, more media begins to pick up on the 
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story, giving it legs through the second week, a phenomenon that coincides with a 
revisiting of the issue among blogs. Attention in both mediums accordingly peaks on 
day 8 and slowly returns to the mean after that. 
Analysis. While it is difficult to pinpoint a single element of the fracking 
debate in which salience transferred from blogs to the media, the flurry of attention 
preceding the review session in New York appears to have precipitated the attention 
in mass media, which included the protests and online discussion as part of the story. 
However, as the impulse response function shows, this attention is in fact short lived, 
quickly being subsumed by other events by the second week.  
Fracking is a technical issue, and it is also mostly a local issue: the scope of a 
fracking ban does not appear to immediately extend beyond the state or locale that 
implements it. Accordingly, national media only seems to attend to the issue when 
something occurs at an official level or when a protest movement appears to be 
drawing support. Unlike other issues, in which public attention drives media attention 
and the subsequent media attention in turn drives public attention, it does not appear 
that this cycle develops on this issue. Accordingly, bloggers, whether activists or non-
activist members of the public, appear to be most effective when they are able to 
create a spectacle or spur official action. 
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Bi-Directional, General Activation: Climate Change 
Figure 3.3. Attention to Climate Change 
!
 Context. Climate Change refers to the increase in global temperatures that has 
occurred since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution and that is projected to 
continue without intervention in the coming century. In the past century, this has led 
to an approximately 1 degree Celsius increase, with scientists cautioning that current 
economic and political structures (not to mention access to resources, geography, and 
other issues) cannot be sustained if temperatures increase another 2 degrees Celsius – 
a prospect alarmingly possible if current trends continue. Moreover, it is clear from 
the historical and geological records that the increased carbon levels in the 
atmosphere are a consequence of human activity, not some natural cycle. The effects 
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manifest differently in different parts of the globe, from increased temperatures in 
many areas, rising sea levels that threaten shorelines and islands, decreased 
temperatures in some areas (particularly the Eastern United States) and abnormal or 
unusual weather patterns in many places (Burch & Harris, 2014). 
 The political debate over climate change stems from the magnitude of the 
costs associated with mitigating this problem and the uncertainty associated with 
those costs. Because this is a global issue, it requires cooperative global intervention, 
but debates have ensued surrounding who should be responsible for it: developed 
states, who were largely responsible for the preceding several centuries of carbon 
emission, or rapidly developing states like India or China, whose large populations 
could permanently increase temperatures as they modernize. Several international 
efforts have been undertaken to address these problems, mostly through the United 
Nations (UN) Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), as well as annual 
meetings of the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UN Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (Bernauer, 2013). 
 In the United States, the debate over climate change has become polarized, 
with conservatives generally skeptical of climate science and liberals more supportive 
of it, despite overwhelming support for the associated theories within the scientific 
community (Gauchat, 2012; Nisbet, Cooper, & Garrett, 2015). Some of this 
skepticism has resulted from confusion over the science itself, with skeptics 
questioning climate change when the weather is cold while in other situations, the 
opposition is due to hacked emails purporting to show ‘fixing’ of data at a major 
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climate science research center in the United Kingdom. Recent studies have shown 
that elite cues and depressive economic conditions are most responsible for this 
climate skepticism (Brulle, Carmichael, & Jenkins, 2012), which suggests that factors 
at both the mass media and public levels are responsible for these political views. 
 This may explain the complex interaction between the mass media and the 
public. Chapter 2’s tests showed a high level of interaction, with most elements of the 
public asserting a statistically significant (p < 0.01) influence on mass media (with 
the exception of Wikipedia page views) and the mass media influencing all measures 
of the public except for blogs at a statistically significant level. Because Twitter was 
consistent across both directions of influence, it will be used for this analysis.  
 With a few exceptions, my reading of public discussion of climate change 
shows that it is largely driven by weather. Long-standing complaints from climate 
change skeptics suggesting that cold weather showed the folly of climate change was 
a recurring theme, and led to increased attention on Twitter in winter months. For 
example: 
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Tweets from climate change skeptics such as these tended to be similarly snarky. 
However, they did not contribute to a noticeable increase in climate change news that 
shared this skepticism. Similar patterns of increased attention during winter and 
decreased attention during the summer were evident on the Google search and 
Wikipedia pageviews measures. There were frequently increases in coverage in mass 
media that coincided with increased attention on Twitter, particularly in early 2010 
and late 2011, but they were about a variety of subjects. For example, a number of 
mass media articles in early 2010 covered the breakdown in talks over ‘cap and trade’  
legislation in the Senate (Williamson, 2010). One subset, however, did try to explain 
the ensuing controversies or report on elite skepticism (Williamson & King, 2010).  
 One weather event did have a particularly large and lasting impact in my 
analysis: Hurricane Sandy, which devastated the New York City area October 29-30, 
2012. The strength of the storm, as well as the property damage it caused, spurred the 
opposite reaction on Twitter from cold weather: instead of decrying climate change as 
a hoax, debate ensued as to how much additional devastation from the storm was the 
result of climate change. This also led to media consideration of the debate. While it 
is unclear where this began – media or public – attention in the media persisted longer 
than it did on Twitter, with stories linking Hurricane Sandy to climate change 
continuing into mid November. 
 I also found that major official events also drew attention within Twitter and 
mass media. On June 25, 2013, President Obama gave a major speech on climate 
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change in which he outlined plans to limit emissions from power plants. Three days 
later, supporters were still talking about it: 
 
as were climate change skeptics: 
 
Attention in mass media did not persist, with attention largely turned elsewhere by the 
time the above tweets were posted. In other words, while Obama’s speech moved the 
public opinion needle, they were unable to draw lasting attention in the media. 
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Similarly, attention on Google and Wikipedia had returned to normal levels within 2-
3 days. 
 System Analysis. As the model in Chapter 2 showed bi-directional influence, I 
will include impulse response functions for a shock on Twitter, on media, and a 
simultaneous shock. For media’s influence over Twitter, Chapter 2’s analysis showed 
that a two month, seven day influence from Twitter and a five day influence from the 
mass media. Twitter’s influence over mass media was best represented by a two 
month, six day lag structure from the public and a one month, six day lag structure 
from mass media. Interestingly, this and Arab Spring are the only issues in which the 
public had a long-term influence over the mass media. 
Figure 3.4. Climate Change: Twitter Shock 
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Figure'3.5.'Climate'Change:'Media'Shock'
'
!
Figure 3.6. Climate Change: Simultaneous Shock 
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 Figures 3.4-3.6 show the results of the impulse response function in graphical 
form. Interestingly, the results for each function demonstrate a cyclical pattern, in 
which attention in both mediums strays from the issue before being renewed a few 
days later, albeit at a lower level. In each instance, there is a clear downward trend, 
with subsequent peaks slowly dropping in intensity, and attention bottoming out 
lower than the initial value. This pattern may be a result of the long term trends at 
play in these models.  
When Twitter is shocked, attention on Twitter peaks and drops over several 
cycles over a three day period, suggesting that attention is diverted quickly. Mass 
media attention in this model follows a similar pattern, albeit with less intensity, and 
appears to be diverted more quickly. When mass media is shocked, on the other hand, 
Twitter barely responds, with the cycle’s peaks hitting about 10% initially, then much 
lower later, with each subsequent peak decaying more quickly. Mass media’s first 
peak, at around 30%, is never replicated, with subsequent periods of renewed 
attention on par with Twitter attention. Finally, simultaneous shocks resemble the 
shock on Twitter, with slightly higher effects on mass media. 
Analysis. Attention to Climate Change on Twitter and on mass media do not 
appear to be in sync very often, with Twitter users often casting a skeptical eye 
toward climate change during the winter and ignoring it the rest of the year, and the 
media addressing climate change in a range of ways, but occasionally reporting on the 
conflict itself. When it does so, the mass media appears to repeat these refrains 
frequently over the following days. Despite this disparity, there does appear to be 
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moments of topic correlation, such as when President Obama released his vision for 
regulating power plants. In this instance, mass media attention shifted quickly, while 
Twitter attention lingered. It is unclear why this is the case; many of the later tweets 
appeared to be from people who had just heard about the plans rather than responses 
to an ongoing discussion. This may reflect people being informed through other 
mechanisms. 
Bidirectional Crisis Activation: Gun Control !
Figure 3.7. Gun Control Timeline 
 
 !
Context. The gun control debate is rooted in the ambiguity of the Second 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which guarantees the right to bear arms, but, by 
some interpretations, frames this in terms of the militia and not personal use 
!!
 80 
(Waldman, 2014). The debate is uniquely American; in many ways it mirrors the 
urban/rural divide as much as it does the frontier mentality that still holds salience 
amongst many Americans (Spitzer, 2011). In some instances, this has taken on almost 
an insurrectionist facet, as some opponents of gun control legislation (and federalism 
more generally) believe that any restriction of gun rights is an abrogation of freedom 
that should be countered with violence (Cook & Goss, 2014).  
The nexus of most of the mainstream opposition to gun control laws is the 
National Rifle Association (NRA), which in the 1980s started turning toward gun 
rights legislation by lobbying for the repeal of concealed carry laws in the states 
(Cook & Goss, 2014). Analysis of the passage of federal gun control legislation 
showed that financial support from the NRA predicted a legislator’s vote against this 
legislation (Kahane, 1999). Indeed, after a spate of legislation in 1994, Democrats 
believed that the NRA was responsible for their defeats in subsequent elections, 
although this was not borne out by the evidence (Kenny, McBurnett, & Bordua, 
2004). Nonetheless, the Democratic Party, by now the main supporter of gun control 
legislation, limited their efforts on this issue, and adopted pro-gun language in 
national party platforms (Cook & Goss, 2014). Accordingly, by the start of 2010, gun 
control was a secondary issue, if not a third or fourth tier issue. That would change in 
subsequent years, however, as events prompted a revisitation of this debate. 
The first major incident related to gun control during the period under study 
was the January 2011 shooting of Democratic Representative Gabrielle Giffords at a 
campaign event in Tucson, Arizona. Six people were killed in the shooting spree 
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(Lacey, 2011). Almost immediately, some began stressing the climate of violence in 
the region: 
 
My investigation showed that the discussion also quickly acquired a partisan 
tone, as Democrats pointed to an image former Republican Vice Presidential 
candidate Sarah Palin had released the previous year in which a map of the United 
States was overlaid with crosshairs on Congressional districts that Palin believed 
could be won by Republicans instead of the Democratic incumbent. Representative 
Gifford’s district was featured in this map. Approximately half an hour after the 
shooting, Twitter users were noticing the connection. The earliest Tweet available 
through Twitter search on the issue notes the connection: 
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Soon thereafter, I found that more prominent Twitter users had noticed this, and 
chastised Palin for, first, making the map, and second, taking it down. Among the 
most retweeted early Tweets on this came from left-leaning activist Michael Moore: 
 
 
Attention to this partisan element extended into media as well, with several media 
sources citing that map that day; by the next day, traditional sources such as the New 
York Times were calling for an end to the climate of fear that had engulfed the 
country in recent months, and blamed Republican officials and media for cultivating 
this environment (New York Times, 2011). This view was, of course, not shared by 
everyone, with bloggers, Twitter users, and members of the media chastising the 
liberal media for immediately blaming Republicans (Sheppard, 2011). 
 Although the volume of attention to this issue makes it difficult to see who 
started the discussion, in the aftermath of the attack, gun control became a frequent 
and early topic. Some gun rights supporters attempted to pre-empt this debate: 
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while supporters of gun control also began talking about it online: 
 
In fact, Gun Control quickly became a major topic of discussion. On January 
7, 2011, “gun control” and related terms were just 0.4% of news articles, 3% of 
Tweets, 11% of blog posts and 1.6% of Google searches. The following day, attention 
had shifted dramatically, with 1.6% of news articles attending to the issue, and 12.6% 
of Tweets, 19.5% of blog posts, and 3% of Google searches. Those numbers 
continued to rise in the coming days, peaking on Twitter at 15.2% on 1/9/2011, blogs 
at 39.7% on 1/12/2011, and Google searches at 8.4%, also on January 12th. Amongst 
the public, attention to this issue generally returned to the median within 1-2 weeks, 
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with attention on blogs persisting at elevated levels until around January 28th – but, 
even on blogs, exhibiting a downward trend. 
Media attention also began to subside in the days following the attack, 
dropping to just 1.4% of all articles, but this diversion was short-lived: by the 19th, 
media attention briefly returned to gun control. A survey of the articles at this time 
period shows that they were describing the debate over gun control legislation that 
had been introduced by Representative Carolyn McCarthy of New York (Parkinson, 
2011). While this legislation did not come up for a vote in the newly Republican 
House, the existence of it focused media attention – potentially because of the 
familiar political wrangling angle of the story. It also drove a minor uptick in public 
attention (of about 1-2% in each medium), which did not continue. By the following 
week, attention in both the media and the public was returning to its mean. Such was 
the avoidance of gun control that President Obama even gave a State of the Union 
address that week without mentioning the issue. 
Similar patterns were repeated two other times during this period: after the 
July 20, 2012 shooting in a theater in Aurora, Colorado, and after the December 14, 
2012 shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut. My 
reading showed that after the Aurora shooting, public attention faded more quickly 
than media attention, just as it did after Gifford’s shooting. Attention among both the 
public and the mass media persisted for longer after the Sandy Hook shooting and the 
resulting, wide ranging gun control debate, but as each new element of the debate 
commenced, the public appears to have turned away from the discussion before the 
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media. In fact, gun control did not register at all as an important problem to the 
public, according to Gallup’s monthly poll (Jones, 2011). 
System Analysis. Results from the Granger test suggested that Gun Control 
was a bidirectional issue, in which attention in the public and mass media was 
mutually reinforcing at the p < .001 level for all public-media interaction modes. 
Additionally, the principal components analysis showed high loading on the first 
component – an eigenvalue of 3.126, higher than all other issues except terrorism – 
suggesting that there was considerable shared variance across all mediums. 
Accordingly, and because it is difficult to conceptualize discussion of a component, 
the impulse response functions will explore the interaction between Twitter and mass 
media. 
Figure 3.8. Gun Control: Media Shock 
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Figure 3.9. Gun Control: Twitter Shock 
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Figure 3.10. Gun Control: Simultaneous Shock 
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Figures 3.8-3.10 shows the impact of a major gun control-related incident on 
the levels of attention toward that issue within the mass media and Twitter.  This is 
based on the most parsimonious model discovered in Chapter 2, which showed that 
Twitter attention was influenced by the previous three days of Twitter attention and 
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the previous 2 days of mass media attention, whereas mass media attention was best 
explained by a six day twitter / five day media model.  
When an event takes hold on Twitter, mass media responds immediately (one 
day later), with peak attention occurring on day three. Mass media attention is often 
diverted, however, dropping precipitously for two days before briefly returning to the 
issue a bit, and then slowly turning attention elsewhere. Meanwhile, Twitter attention 
drops sharply, down to about 25% of the mean by the 4th day and under 10% of the 
mean by the 8th day. Unlike mass media attention, there is no comparable return to 
attention, with the result that, even when the event breaks first on Twitter, attention 
noticeably persists in the media at a higher rate than it does on Twitter. 
Events that take hold on media first exhibit similar patterns, at least for media. 
On mass media, attention falls to the 35-40% level within three days, but it then 
lingers above 30% of the mean for 10 days, with some volatility in attention, and then 
slowly decays. On the other hand, attention on Twitter rises over the course of three 
days to about 21% of the mean and then slowly fades away. 60 days later, attention 
on media is still slightly higher than attention on Twitter. 
When an event is registered equally (as compared to that system’s mean) on 
both systems on the same day, similar patterns emerge. Within the mass media 
system, the second round of attention that is evident in the mass media in the other 
scenarios occurs on day five, with similar attention on day six before gradually 
decaying. Attention on Twitter drops off quickly within the first four days, and then 
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also gradually decays. By the third day, media attention has outpaced attention on 
Twitter, and this dynamic persists as attention wanes. 
Analysis. The Granger Causality tests suggest that Gun Control is a bi-
directional issue, with mass media and public attention forming a reinforcing 
feedback loop. This may be because of the event-based nature of the attention to this 
issue, in which attention skyrockets in response to some tragedy, but quickly fades 
away. Mass media and public attention rises in tandem, and some of the sub-issues, 
such as Palin’s map, travel from one to the other easily.  
The public is much more fickle than the media, however, on this issue. This 
may be a consequence of the issue itself. Gun control has a long history as an issue in 
this country, dating back to its founding. In the modern era, it has been a commonly 
discussed issue since at least the 1980s. Moreover, it has calcified along partisan lines 
(Cook & Goss, 2014). Accordingly, many people already have well-considered and 
stable opinions on the issue; perhaps their interpersonal debates are just people 
talking past each other, as illustrated by some of the Tweets above. So people move 
on, and dismiss some of the news around it, although this does not mean that a core of 
interested members of the public – a spontaneous issue public – give up on the issue. 
The mass media, on the other hand, continues to attend to the issue as long as elites 
do, explaining their continued attention. 
Conclusion 
 This chapter expanded on the system dynamics explored in Chapter 2. 
Whereas Chapter 2 tried to identify general patterns, this chapter explored the 
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discussions and topics of public and mass media attention and, where possible, tried 
to untangle the interaction cycles between the two mediums. To do so, I relied on 
typology of interaction and attention activation. The resulting typology categorized 
issues according to the direction of interaction as well as the patterns that interaction 
took, as attention in many of the bi-directional issues appeared to increase only during 
crisis periods.  
I selected three issues to represent these categories: Fracking for the public 
influence over the media, climate change for general bi-directional influence, and gun 
control for bi-directional crisis issues. Each of these are contentious issues in their 
own way. Gun control is a long-standing issue, dating to at least the 1980s, with 
polarization largely among partisan lines. Climate change has also polarized in recent 
years along partisan lines, with many Republicans believing that it is a hoax. 
Accordingly, the contentious frames surrounding the issues have largely been 
concretized. Fracking, however, has only been an issue in the last 7-8 years. At the 
national level, it is polarized and often seems to attract little attention, but at the local 
level, where people are actually affected by it, the lines are not so clear. This may be 
why fracking is one of the few issues in which influence flows from the public to the 
mass media but is not statistically significant from the mass media to the public. 
 While it is difficult to extrapolate results to other issues, several patterns 
emerge from these case studies. The mass media appears to attend to issues longer 
than Twitter, as shown by the gun control example and several periods in climate 
change. Additionally, each issue shows different patterns of interaction, with the most 
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unique being the cyclical interaction of climate change. In this example, it is 
interesting that attention waxes and wanes the way it does; this may be a consequence 
of the news cycle renewing from elite engagement.  
Indeed, there is a powerful role for elites in all of these case studies. In 
fracking, getting elites to notice your protests or take official action appears to be the 
most effective way to get mass media attention. In the climate change issue, the mass 
media attended more to official action than the public, but both responded strongly (if 
briefly) to Obama’s climate change action. Despite the renewed attention to the role 
of the public in this kind of analysis, it is clear that elites are still intrinsic to the 
process of attention activation. 
Each of these case studies deserves their own, much more in-depth analysis. 
The bi-directional influence issues would particularly benefit from this. Given more 
time and space, one could uncover more fully how the interactions occur: whether 
attention begins on Twitter, which members of the public or the mass media are most 
influential, how mass media outlets respond to the public and to each other, and how 
these feedback cycles quicken and intensify before unraveling. In the meantime, the 
impulse response functions shed some insight into this interaction. As this research 
continues, hopefully more in-depth qualitative analysis can be conducted to 
compliment this more quantitative approach. 
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Chapter Four: 
Spheres of Attention 
 
The “Fast and Furious” scandal, which broke in late 2011, involved a U.S. 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms operation that allowed suspected Mexican 
drug dealers to buy weapons at American gun dealerships, in the hope that they could 
be tracked back to the leadership of the Sinola cartel (Horwitz, 2011). The failed 
operation was investigated by several committees in Congress and resulted in a 
Contempt of Congress charge against Attorney General Eric Holder (Silverleib, 
2012).  Crucial to the scandal were waves of attention across right-leaning media. A 
Lexis-Nexis search of Fox News, for instance, finds over 600 mentions of the scandal 
in the period 2012-2013, while a Google search of Rush Limbaugh transcripts elicits 
over 400 results.  A similar search of Redstate.com, a right-leaning blogging 
community, finds almost 9000 pages. On the other hand, a similar Lexis-Nexis search 
of MSNBC, often viewed as a left-leaning network, shows fewer than 200 mentions. 
Similarly, a Google search of Dailykos.com, a left-leaning community similar to 
redstate, finds just 2,750 webpages.5 These results suggest that Fast and Furious 
received asymmetric attention between liberal and conservative media. 
Fracking, a controversial process of extracting natural gas from the ground that 
critics say poses severe environmental risk, exhibits the same asymmetry but in the 
other direction. Although it received negligible coverage in both cable networks, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Search text for all was simply “Fast and furious”. While this may also pull in stories about the movie 
series with a similar name, these effects are likely to be similar across outlets. 
For Google searches, the operator ‘site:’ and the site name was also added. 
These sites were chosen for their prominence, general interest focus, and community element. Similar 
searches among other partisan sites showed the same disparity. 
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there was a great deal of coverage disparity between online sources: a Dailykos 
search resulted in over 37,000 results while a Redstate search only found about 8,500 
results.6 
Partisan media are well known for how they talk about issues, namely that they 
blur editorial position-taking with news reporting and they commonly seek to 
advance a political viewpoint about what they cover (Aday, 2010; Feldman et al., 
2011; Jamieson & Cappella, 2008; Williams & Delli Carpini, 2011).  Less well 
known is the extent to which partisan media differ in what they cover.   The examples 
of Fast and Furious and fracking suggest that disparities in attention to issues may be 
an important characteristic of the partisan media environment. However, there is a 
paucity of systematic analysis comparing agendas across many issues.  In this paper I 
explore this aspect of partisan media. Specifically, I ask whether there is a significant 
distinction between the agendas of left-leaning, right-leaning, and centrist media. I 
expect to find systematic differences in issue attention between partisan and non-
partisan media, as well as between left- and right-leaning partisan media. 
To test these expectations, I analyze 11 million articles from approximately 100 
sources, including traditional media and online media, over the period of 2010-2013. 
I then test the variability of agendas across partisan media and non-partisan media.   
My findings show that there are differences between the agenda sets of both centrist 
and left leaning outlets and centrist and right leaning outlets, with left leaning media 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Search text was “fracking site:redstate.com” and “fracking site:dailykos.com” 
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being the most frequent outlier. Some of these differences, I show, conform to classic 
conceptions of issues favored by the right and left. 
 
Theoretical Review 
Agenda Setting Theory 
Agenda setting refers to the process by which issue salience is transferred from 
the media to the public: over time, the rank order of issues to which the media gives 
prominence will be reflected in the list of issues the public considers important 
(McCombs, 2004). According to years of theorizing and research, the most prominent 
media issues often become the most important public issues. The first agenda setting 
study found correlations as high as .97 in some situations between the media agenda 
and the public agenda (McCombs & Shaw, 1972). Agenda setting has been found to 
describe the media - public interaction across a myriad of issues, including 
environmentalism (Ader, 1995), civil rights (Winter & Eyal, 1981), immigration 
(Dunaway et al., 2010), foreign affairs (Wanta & Hu, 1993) , and many others.  The 
effect has also been uncovered in several countries, including the United States, 
Germany (Brosius & Kepplinger, 1992), Spain (Lopez-Escobar, Llamas, McCombs, 
& Lennon, 1998), and Japan (Mikami, Takeshita, Nakada, & Kawabata, 1995), 
among others.  Moreover, agenda setting has been shown in surveys and in 
experimental research (Iyengar & Hahn, 2009; ie. Iyengar & Kinder, 1987). 
The assumption of a single media agenda underlies much of the agenda-setting 
literature, from small studies that explore one issue (e.g. Ader, 1995) or one region 
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(Atwater et al., 1985) to broad studies that evaluate agenda-setting across a range of 
issues and time (McCombs & Zhu, 1995). In fact, many of these studies use only one 
media outlet (e.g. Behr & Iyengar, 1985; Iyengar & Simon, 1993; Shaw, McCombs, 
Weaver, & Hamm, 1999; Yagade & Dozier, 1990) or a few media sources (e.g. Craft 
& Wanta, 2004; McCombs & Shaw, 1972; McLeod, Becker, & Byrnes, 1974; 
Roberts et al., 2002) across mediums to represent the media’s agenda. Even those 
studies that used a wide range of media sources (Dunaway et al., 2010; Erbring et al., 
1980) treated the sources largely equally. In a survey of the most cited agenda setting 
studies, only a few (e.g. McLeod et al., 1974; Sweetser & Lariscy, 2008) evaluated 
whether or not there were any differences between the agendas of each outlet (see 
Appendix 1).7 
Agenda-setting researchers use a number of justifications for this. Winter & 
Eyal (1981), for instance, limit their analysis of media to the New York Times 
because it “is considered the most prestigious national newspaper” and would 
therefore “be indicative of national media coverage” on civil rights, the issue they 
were studying (p. 379). But even studies that do evaluate agenda differences can 
neglect sources that are likely to have a distinct agenda. For example, in a study of the 
Internet’s effect on traditional media, Lee (2007) includes CNN but does not include 
Fox News because the two networks likely have similar coverage and a shared 
audience (p.  750), although the accuracy of that claim is not evident in the piece.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Because there are thousands of agenda-setting studies, this meta-analysis is not meant to be 
comprehensive. To gather studies, I did a search for “agenda setting” and media in both Google 
Scholar and Web of Science. I included all articles and books that featured original research on media-
public agenda setting in the first 10 pages of results, and supplemented that list with studies that were 
cited in that literature multiple times, as well as studies that were included in this paper. 
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A single media agenda? 
Even in the current age of incredible media diversity, the assumption of a single 
agenda is not unreasonable. There are several reasons why one would expect the same 
or a similar agenda reflected across media outlets. First, media outlets share a similar 
set of procedures, routines and journalistic norms because they are required for news 
production to function (Cook, 1998) and, according to market-based theories of news 
production, to be profitable (Hamilton, 2004b). The “news factory” is therefore 
standardized across industry in order to ensure that journalists, producers, 
cameraman, etc., who often switch jobs, can seamlessly integrate into an organization 
(Bantz, McCorkle, & Baade, 1980). Additionally, many of the norms, like objectivity, 
are instilled in journalism school and reinforced by these organizational routines 
across the industry (Gans, 2004; Waldman & Jamieson, 2003).  
Second, this dynamic can shape story selection, or the determination of 
newsworthiness.  Given enough time and space, the news media can be thought of as 
a mirror to reality; but in the real world, with limited broadcast time and news pages, 
some criteria has to be established for story selection (McCombs, 1991, p. 47).  A 
number of factors affect this newsworthiness criteria for a given event, including 
magnitude, clarity, the policy area, the level of sensationalism, actors involved, 
proximity to the reader, and others (Boydstun, 2013; Galtung & Ruge, 1965). Even 
when media sources do not initially adopt the same stories, once a story has gained 
prominence, outlets often mimic each other because they do not want to miss out on 
an important story (Boczkowski & Mitchelstein, 2010; Graber, 1971).  
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Third, many scholars have found that non-media elites have an outsized 
influence on reporting (Berkowitz, 1992). For instance, indexing theorists like 
Bennett, et al. (2007) find evidence that media framing of an issue correlates to the 
frames promoted by elites, with more prominence given to frames from more elite 
officials. As a result, the media’s interpretation of an issue or event reflects the elite 
discourse about it. Alternately, Entman (2004) describes a networked cascade model 
in which frames flow from elites through different elements of the media and to the 
public. While both of these models describe framing processes, their basic insights 
can be extended to news selection: if elites can influence the discussion of issues, 
shouldn’t that influence extend to which issues receive attention in the first place? 
Finally, a small literature has examined the phenomenon of intermedia agenda 
setting, in which the agendas of one media source influence others; if this 
phenomenon is valid, one can study just the most influential outlets. Danielian and 
Reese (1989) found that news outlets across the country began turning their attention 
to the issue of drugs only after the New York Times did. Similarly, Golan (2006) 
found that the international news agenda in the New York Times informed the 
international coverage of the evening news. In fact, in one study, newspapers in 
general were found to influence television (Roberts & McCombs, 1994). This effect 
is not uniform; for instance, Weaver and Elliott found that local media were more 
likely to follow local issues rather than national issues (Weaver & Elliott, 1985). 
Although intermedia agenda setting extends into the online sphere, the results are 
mixed: Lee, et al. found that the blog agenda and the media agenda were largely 
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similar during the 2004 election (Lee, Lancendorfer, & Lee, 2005) whereas Meraz 
found that effect had diminished, and, in some cases led to reverse agenda setting 
(Meraz, 2011b). 
Media Fragmentation 
While major events are likely to be covered by all outlets (Birkland, 1998), the 
confluence of these factors - journalistic norms and organizational homogeneity, 
decisions about newsworthiness, the influence of external actors, and the prevalence 
of intermedia agenda setting - support the idea that smaller events and issues are 
likely to have similar coverage across the news media. Yet the continued media 
fragmentation and media choice precipitated first by cable television and then by the 
Internet threatens many media effects theories, including agenda setting (Bennett & 
Iyengar, 2008; Chaffee & Metzger, 2001; Holbert et al., 2010). In this context, 
fragmentation refers not just to the proliferation of news outlets, including 
professional online news sources, blogs, and social media, but also to the 
specialization inherent in this process, which could lead to niche outlets (Prior, 2007; 
Tewksbury, 2005). Fragmentation accordingly could undermine agenda setting 
because it limits the percentage of the public that is exposed to the dominant media 
agenda - if a dominant agenda even exists. Some evidence suggests that new media is 
undermining this dominant agenda. For instance, Maier (2010) found around a 60% 
congruence between online and offline media agendas, with the greatest similarities 
between online media and network news.  
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As the media fragment, two simultaneous and corollary agenda setting trends 
may develop: the influence of elite, traditional media may diminish while other 
outlets may gain agenda setting power. Addressing the latter, Meraz (2011b), Schiffer 
(Schiffer, 2006), and Wallsten (Wallsten, 2011) all show that blogs have influenced 
the agendas of traditional media sources, although the results are not uniform across 
traditional outlets.  It appears that no research has examined any diminishing of the 
influence of traditional outlets, so the path of this trend is unclear. 
Partisan Media 
One trend has been consistent, however: partisan media has expanded as a 
consequence of fragmentation. Once limited largely to talk radio and some 
newspapers, partisan media now includes a major 24-hour news channel (Fox News) 
as well as dozens of high traffic websites and perhaps millions of blogs. In a 
landmark framing study, Jamieson and Cappella (Jamieson & Cappella, 2008) 
showed that right-leaning media act as an echo chamber, reframing mainstream media 
news for their audience, policing ideological purity, and balkanizing and insulating its 
audience against effects from mainstream media. Other studies, though more limited, 
have shown that partisan media tends to reinforce ideological views on specific 
issues. For instance, Aday (2010) found that Fox News offered a much more 
favorable view of the Bush Administration than NBC did, while Feldman et al. 
(2011) showed that Fox News’ coverage of climate change was much more negative 
and dismissive than that of the other cable news networks. Moreover, this coverage 
tends to emphasize outrage as a form of expression (Sobieraj & Berry, 2011). This 
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kind of opinion-based reporting often replaces unbiased reporting in what would 
otherwise be a neutral media source (Williams & Delli Carpini, 2011). 
There is limited evidence that the kind of news that is covered may also differ, 
at least in the online sphere. For instance, weblogs (blogs) tend to overemphasize 
news that is good for their political side while minimizing news that is detrimental to 
their views when compared to ‘neutral’ wire services (Baum & Groeling, 2008). 
Additionally, partisan blogs tend to influence each other, with the result that agendas 
among blogs of the same partisan sphere tend to follow a similar agenda (Meraz, 
2011b). This can cross the new media-traditional media line, with blogs and other 
partisan media influencing the traditional media agenda on some issues (Dreier & 
Martin, 2010; Meraz, 2009; Wallsten, 2007) and successfully reframing coverage on 
others (Ignatow & Williams, 2011). 
Hypotheses 
This research suggests that political communication’s traditional conception of 
the media insufficiently describes the reality, and that new paradigms (or adjustments 
to pre-existing ones) may be needed. As the debate between Holbert et al. and 
Bennett et al. suggests, fragmentation and especially the rise of niche, often partisan 
sources may indeed preclude the existence of a single, coherent agenda across outlets 
(except in the instance of major events). Instead, an outlet’s agenda may reflect its 
political leanings, with left-leaning outlets featuring stories that reflect favorably on 
the Democratic Party or highlight left-wing issues and right-leaning outlets doing the 
opposite. There are several potential reasons for this. First, this may be similar to 
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documented cases of elected officials trying to promote issues that are favorable to 
their party and most likely to lead to electoral victory (Sellers, 2009, p. 63). Partisan 
media may have similar motivations (Sherman, 2014). On the other hand, these 
outlets may prioritize issues because they are intrinsically important to them for 
ideological reasons. For instance, a left-leaning outlet may devote more of its agenda 
to a left-leaning issue such as inequality or poverty not because it is necessarily 
politically advantageous but because it is a core issue to the ideology. Business 
motivations also apply: outlets may just be catering to an audience that seeks to hear 
about issues with which they are concerned (Uscinski, 2009).  
A primary component of this idea is agency – the active decision on the part of 
newspaper staff to emphasize certain issues over another. This is a departure from the 
ideal of journalism as a mirror of reality and violates norms of objectivity inherent in 
newsrooms. Accordingly, these effects would be greater for outlets that have an 
explicit partisan outlook. 
One way to operationalize this idea is by employing the traditional distinction 
between issues that are classically understood to favor one party over the other. For 
instance, national security, law-and-order, and traditional values topics are favorable 
to the Republican Party, while issues of social justice (including poverty and 
women’s issues) and intergroup relations have fit this criterion for the Democratic 
Party, and other issues, such as corruption or the economy can favor one party or 
another depending on incumbency (Petrocik, 1996; Petrocik, Benoit, & Hansen, 
2013). Accordingly, my first hypothesis suggests that: 
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Hypothesis 1a: Compared to non-partisan media, partisan media will attend more to 
issues that are more politically favorable to their views/political fortunes. 
,Hypothesis 1b: Left-leaning media will attend to social justice, poverty, 
environmental, women’s issues, and related issues at a higher rate than other 
outlets.  
Hypothesis 1c: Right-leaning media will attend to issues related to national security, 
traditional values, and law-and-order issues at a higher rate than other outlets. 
Hypothesis 1d: Other issues, such as corruption or economic issues, will receive more 
equal attention across outlets or be prioritized in centrist outlets.  
Additionally, following Meraz (2011)’s study of blogs, the agenda of partisan 
media outlets is likely to be much more similar to that of their co-partisans than to 
other media outlets. This phenomenon stems from the epistemic closure and echo 
chamber effect Jamieson and Cappella (2008) document. In their telling, right-wing 
partisan media outlets borrow story ideas (and frames) from outlets with a similar 
ideological disposition. This reinforces the links between the outlets both within the 
ideological network but also within the minds of audience members. Because each 
outlet engages in ideological policing and in-group/out-group language, media 
sources within the partisan network are able to keep others from straying too far away 
from party ideas, at least on important issues. 
There are good reasons to think that this effect extends beyond those outlets 
examined by Jamieson and Capella, namely the Wall Street Journal editorial board, 
Fox News, and Rush Limbaugh. Through a similar mechanism of in-group / out-
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group policing and intermedia agenda setting within the partisan network (e.g. 
Messner & Distaso, 2008; 2008), the agenda issue profile of  outlets within the 
broader partisan media networks should,  across issues, look more similar to that of 
other partisan outlets than outside of them.  
There may be several mechanisms through which this functions. Most of the 
research on partisan agendas online have focused on blogs and their relationship with 
elite media. Within that corpus of research, several studies showed that left-leaning 
and right-leaning bloggers consume different media diets (Adamic & Glance, 2005; 
Meraz, 2009).  Additionally, Messner and Garrison (2011) showed that while liberal 
blogs are likely to follow the agenda of the traditional, non-partisan media, 
conservative blogs are more likely to follow conservative media than non-partisan 
media. Peer pressure within the informal social network that developed within the 
partisan blogosphere produced homogeneous agendas (on the secondary, attribute 
level), reducing elite agenda setting capability (Meraz, 2011).  
These findings point to a few important implications. First, they reinforce the 
idea that there will be noticeable differences in issue coverage between outlets as a 
function of their partisan leanings – at least among blogs. Additionally, as Jamieson 
and Cappella showed, there is tight coupling across outlets of a similar partisan angle 
(with a potentially stronger effect for conservative media).  
Hypothesis 2: Because partisan outlets develop a common agenda, within group 
agenda variation is smaller than across group agenda variation.  
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This can be imagined as a set of partisan and non-partisan spheres, with largely 
reinforcing agendas that are distinct from other spheres. The agenda of media spheres 
likely will not differ on each issue, but the emergence of differences between media 
types on a variety of issues may form distinct agenda profiles for each partisan 
grouping.  
Data and Methods  
To test these hypotheses, I collected news articles, blog postings, and broadcast 
transcripts on 25 public policy issues over the period January 1 2010 – December 31 
2013 using data from Lexis-Nexis, Crimson Hexagon (a social media, blogs, and 
news database), and, in one case, directly from the websites of the news outlet. 
Articles were selected using a keyword search, which was developed using an 
iterative process. First, I combined categories from the Policy Agendas Project 
(policyagendas.org, n.d.) and the Most Important Problem codes used by McCombs 
and Zhu (1995). From this combined list, I selected general categories and developed 
an expansive set of keywords relating to the topic. I then tested those keywords 
against both Crimson Hexagon and Lexis-Nexis and inspected the results to 
determine if keywords were producing spurious results. For instance, the use of the 
term “pro-choice” in a search on the issue abortion returned every article in which a 
politician was described as pro-choice, even if the article had little to do with the 
issue, so that keyword was dropped. The full list of keywords is available in 
Appendix 2. 
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The data set drew from approximately 100 outlets from several different 
mediums: broadcast news, newspapers, and major blogs (Appendix 3). All major 
American television news networks (ABC, CBS, NBC, as well as CNN, Fox News 
and MSNBC) as well as NPR were included in the broadcast news category. These 
data were downloaded from Lexis-Nexis. Newspapers were limited to the top 25 
newspapers by circulation, as ranked by the Association for Audited Media. This list 
included newspapers with a national reach, such as The New York Times as well as 
more local newspapers like The Houston Chronicle. I also included the Associated 
Press, Time and Newsweek to include alternative mediums, and included The 
Washington Times because it is an expressly partisan outlet in the nation’s capitol. 
This resulted in 35 traditional news sources. Any online blogs hosted by these 
newspapers were also included. Additionally, I included non-media blogs and digital 
news outlets, which were selected from Technorati.com, a site that ranked blogs in 
various categories, including U.S. Politics, according to their relevance to the 
category and how frequently they were linked (Technorati, 2014).8 Drawing from 
monthly snapshots of these rankings recorded on Archive.org, a site that archives web 
sites, I created a list of those blogs who appeared in the top 30 results in this category 
three times in the period 2010-2013. 42 blogs and 22 other digital outlets were 
selected using this method. Data for both newspapers and blogs were retrieved from 
Crimson Hexagon. Additionally, because talk radio is an important component of the 
conservative media ecosystem, I included transcripts of Rush Limbaugh’s daily radio 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Since data collection, Technorati has rebranded their website and no longer publishes these rankings. 
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program, which I retrieved by scraping the rushlimbaugh.com website using a custom 
script and the scrapy framework.9 After removing duplicates, this dataset included 
over 11 million articles and blog posts.  
Classifying outlets according to their partisanship is a difficult task, and the 
appropriate method for doing so is still debated. Groseclose and Milyo (2005) 
measured media bias by counting the number of times each outlet cited liberal, 
centrist, or conservative think tanks, and found that most outlets were biased to the 
left. On the other hand, Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) develop a measure of media 
bias based on a newspaper’s position relative to members of Congress. Outside of 
these indices, others have looked at individual outlets on specific topics, such as 
Puglisi’s (2011) study of economic issues in the New York Times.  
Specifying media bias is not a focus of this study. Moreover, the outlets 
included were diverse, and many have not been examined in the literature. Therefore, 
I use a combined approach. Newspapers were categorized as left, right, or center 
based on their slant score in Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010), which includes a large 
grouping just left of center as well as outliers on the left and right. Based on this 
study, the Houston Chronicle, Wall Street Journal, Washington Times, Arizona 
Republic, and Daily Oklahoman were categorized as right-leaning. The Atlanta 
Journal-Constitution was the only newspaper classified as left-leaning; all others 
were considered centrist for this measure in this study. Broadcast sources were 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Rush Limbaugh, besides being perhaps the most influential talk radio host, is the only major host to 
publish transcripts of each show. While there are several such outlets on the right, there is no show 
with comparable reach on the left. 
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categorized as centrist unless they have open partisan leanings.  Accordingly, Fox 
News and Rush Limbaugh were classified as right-leaning while MSNBC was 
classified as left-leaning, even though not all programming from each outlet may be 
ideologically coherent with the dominant classification. Finally, I visited all blogs on 
the list and categorized them based on the content on their front page, including any 
self-identification (e.g. “A conservative blog” in the site header) as well as the 
ideological leanings of the top links and blogroll, if evident. Any blogs whose 
ideological leanings were not evident were classified as centrist. 
Once categorized, I calculated the proportion of attention each outlet gave to 
each issue as a percentage of the entire corpus of articles retrieved from that outlet 
(controlling for duplicate articles). This controls for varying levels of output: a large 
metropolitan newspaper, for instance, is likely going to publish more than a blog 
written by a single person. For instance, 4,244 articles on abortion were retrieved 
from the New York Times during this period, or 2% of their total output across these 
issues. Using this ratio, a one way Analysis of Variance test was run on each issue, 
with outlets aggregated to their partisan alignment. In keeping with Hypothesis 2, this 
test determines the tightness of the overall relationship between agendas within each 
partisan / non-partisan sphere. The statistical significance of the mean difference was 
then tested using a Tukey HSD test. 
Results 
Table 4.1 displays the means and standard deviations of attention to each issue 
by outlet partisan alignment. Because the overall activity varies disproportionately by 
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outlet, the actual count of articles per issue is represented as a ratio of each outlet’s 
actual article count divided by the overall number of articles from that outlet in the 
dataset. So, for example, if Outlet A, a left-leaning outlet, featured 10 articles about 
abortion out of a total set of 100 articles, the proportional mean for the abortion issue 
for this outlet would be 0.1. This was then averaged across all outlets in each partisan 
sphere. Accordingly, Table 4.1 shows the mean proportion of articles across each 
issue / alignment pairing. The highest mean for each issue is bolded to indicate which 
partisan grouping afforded it the most attention. 
Several issues received considerable attention across outlets, namely 
Unemployment and Taxes, both of which received more than 10% of coverage across 
outlet groupings; and Iraq, Crime, and Terrorism, each of which received more than 
5% of coverage across outlet groupings. On the other hand, some issues received 
scant attention (less than 2%) across outlets, including Education reform, Fracking, 
Labor issues, Reproductive rights, Arab Spring, and Net neutrality. This occurred 
despite large controversies surrounding Race to the Top and Common Core within the 
Education Reform issue, Card Check for Labor Issues, controversies surrounding 
Planned Parenthood, and renewed attention at the FCC to Net Neutrality.  Finally, 
across outlets, left leaning issues constituted 32.75 percent of coverage, right leaning 
issues were 38.87 percent of coverage, and centrist issues comprised 28.83 percent of 
all coverage. 
Hypothesis 1b posits that left-leaning outlets will address issues that are 
important to the left at a higher rate than right-leaning or centrist outlets will.  Indeed, 
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all but three of the thirteen issues classified as ‘left’ issues in this study received a 
greater proportion of attention among left-leaning outlets than among centrist or 
right-leaning outlets. For many issues, this reflected a 1/3 or greater increase over 
centrist or right media coverage. This is particularly evident with poverty related 
issues like Inequality, which constituted 4.79 percent of left-leaning media’s 
coverage, compared to 3.17 percent for centrist and 2.73 percent for right leaning 
media; social justice issues like same sex marriage (3.53%, 2.28%, and 1.44% for 
left, center, and right-leaning media respectively); and gender-related issues like 
abortion (3.43%, 2.36%, and 2.48%).  
Nonetheless, right leaning outlets attended more to two issues expected to 
receive more coverage in left leaning media. Healthcare reform was covered at nearly 
double the rate on right-leaning media (8.02%) than on left-leaning media (4.79%). 
Though not as drastic of a disparity, Racial issues represented almost six percent of 
coverage on right leaning media and just under five percent on left leaning media 
(and less than four percent in centrist media). Given the hypothesis’ issue 
categorization, this is surprising, but may be explained in the context of the 
contemporary media environment, in which opposition to “Obamacare” and racial 
issues springing in part from the election of an African-American are rampant. 
Finally, Labor issues were covered slightly more in centrist media than on the left. 
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Table 4.1. Mean of Coverage for each issue 
  
Proportion Means (Std. Dev.) 
 
Issue Left Center Right 
Left 
   
 
Abortion 3.43 (2.76) 2.36 (2.34) 2.48 (1.62) 
 
Climate Change 3.02 (1.77) 1.48 (0.86) 2.51 (1.8) 
 
Education Reform 1.71 (4.61) 1.37 (1.91) 0.87 (0.97) 
 
Fracking 0.44 (0.38) 0.27 (0.3) 0.29 (0.27) 
 
Healthcare Reform 4.27 (1.96) 3.19 (2.62) 8.02 (6.09) 
 
Inequality 4.79 (1.97) 3.17 (1.51) 2.73 (1) 
 
Labor 1.11 (0.86) 1.46 (4.04) 1.22 (1.26) 
 
Medicare 3.83 (1.77) 2.59 (1.74) 2.71 (2.1) 
 
Race 4.9 (1.8) 3.44 (2.55) 5.94 (5.17) 
 
Reproductive Rights 1.28 (0.9) 0.69 (0.4) 0.91 (0.59) 
 
Same Sex Marriage 3.53 (3.95) 2.28 (2.21) 1.44 (0.87) 
 
Social Security 3.01 (1.36) 1.95 (1.1) 1.93 (1.2) 
 
Welfare 2.74 (0.8) 2.1 (0.85) 2.71 (1.1) 
Right 
   
 
Afghanistan 4.48 (2.74) 5.84 (4.23) 4.37 (2.32) 
 
Crime 7.46 (3.76) 10.68 (6.18) 8.35 (4) 
 
Deficit 4.52 (2.3) 4.31 (3.78) 4.2 (1.81) 
 
Drugs 3.12 (2.06) 4.79 (2.97) 2.87 (1.96) 
 
Gun Control 1.76 (1.16) 1.87 (1.24) 2.52 (1.73) 
 
Immigration 2.4 (1.12) 2.3 (1.25) 3.04 (2.07) 
 
Iraq 5.22 (3.25) 6.05 (5.55) 4.62 (2.51) 
 
Terrorism 6.04 (3.25) 6.95 (3.56) 8.84 (5.89) 
General 
   
 
Arab Spring 0.82 (1.05) 0.79 (0.71) 0.9 (0.92) 
 
Net Neutrality 0.17 (0.1) 0.13 (0.19) 0.14 (0.25) 
 
Taxes 13.31 (4.34) 14.83 (4.76) 14.2 (4.41) 
 
Unemployment 12.78 (4.91) 15.96 (6.57) 12.47 (4.37) !! !
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 Hypothesis 1c offers a corollary prediction: that right-leaning media would 
attend to right-wing issues more than other outlets would. The dynamic among these 
issues was markedly different than the one for left-leaning issues. Among these 
issues, right-leaning media only attended to Gun control, Immigration, and Terrorism 
at a higher rate than other media. Instead, foreign policy issues surrounding Iraq and 
Afghanistan and coverage of Crime was higher in centrist media (6.05%, 5.84%, and 
10.68%, respectively) than in right-leaning media (4.62%, 4.37%, and 8.35%). Left-
leaning media only attended to one right-wing issue – Deficit – at a higher rate than 
right-leaning media, although the difference was minimal (just 0.3 %).  
 It is interesting that some foreign policy issues – namely Iraq and Afghanistan – 
receive more coverage in centrist media than right leaning media while Terrorism 
exhibited the opposite dynamic. This may have been a consequence of real world 
events: during this period, President Obama committed higher number of troops to 
Afghanistan as part of the “surge” strategy and also oversaw the withdrawal of 
combat troops from Iraq. Over the same period, however, there was only a single 
major terrorist attack on American soil (the Boston Marathon bombing in April 
2013). Coverage in right-leaning media, then, may have been less about specific 
incidents and more about the more general threat of terrorism. On the other hand, the 
preponderance of the coverage of Crime in centrist media as compared to other 
outlets may reflect the responsibility many local newspapers have to cover incidents 
within their communities; partisan media often do not share these journalistic 
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responsibility or foci. Determining if this is the case would require closer 
interrogation of the data, however, and is therefore outside the scope of this paper. 
 Additionally, Hypothesis 1d expects that more general issues will be covered by 
centrist outlets or be equally dispersed across outlets. Economic issues like Taxes and 
Unemployment were indeed covered more by centrist outlets than others, although 
the difference between outlets on the Taxes issue was relatively slim (13.31%, 
14.83%, and 14.2% for left, center, and right media, respectively). Arab Spring and 
Net Neutrality both received very little, and relatively uniform, attention across outlet 
groupings.  
According to Hypothesis 2, there should be very little variance across issues 
within each partisan sphere. A one-way ANOVA test was used to determine whether 
the difference in means for each issue was due more to within group variation or 
between group variation. Higher F-Test values in the ANOVA test indicate that the 
variation in the means between partisan spheres is higher than the variation in the 
mean within the sphere. Consequently, higher F-Test values highlight issues in which 
the partisan spheres are tightly coupled and distinct from other spheres.  
Table 4.2 shows the results of that analysis. In addition to the standard reported 
significance levels, Table 4.2 also reports significance at the 0.1 level in order to 
show slightly less significant but still potentially meaningful levels.10 The left side of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 There is considerable debate as to how conservatively such results should be reported. On the one 
hand, greater range gives the researcher more latitude in finding potentially significant results. 
However, given the large number of statistical tests run (100, including all Tukey HSD tests), some 
would call for a Bonferroni test to correct for Type I errors, or errors of identifying significance that 
exist purely from chance. Given the large number of statistical tests in this model, there is a high 
chance of such errors occuring. Bonferroni tests aggregate the statistical comparisons into one family, 
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the table displays the total sum of the squares of the difference between the 
observation and the mean within each partisan group (Left, Right, and Center) by 
outlet in the Sum of Squares column, the sum of means between groups in the Mean 
of Squares column, and the results of an F-test that determines if the differences 
between the two are the consequence of tight integration or statistical noise. The right 
side of the column shows the results of a Tukey’s Honest Significant Difference 
(HSD) test, which uses pairwise tests between groups to determine the source of any 
significance in the ANOVA test. There are three tests included: difference between 
Left and Center means, Right and Center means, and Left and Right means. Issues are 
grouped according to whether or not they should be left, right, or general issues, 
according to Hypothesis 1. 
Table 4.2 indicates that several issues exhibit signs of distinct partisan agendas. 
Statistically distinct agendas emerge on several left-leaning issues, including Climate 
Change, Healthcare reform, Inequality, Reproductive Rights, Social Security (all 
significant at the 0.001 level), Same Sex Marriage, Welfare, Drugs, Unemployment 
(all significant at the 0.01 level), Medicare, Crime, and Terrorism (significant at the 
0.05 level). Additionally, there is marginally significance in agenda difference for 
Fracking, Gun Control, and Immigration (0.10 level; most were between 0.05 and 
0.055). Nine of the 13 left-wing issues were significant to at least the .05 level, while 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
in this case, a family with 100 comparisons. Such tests lower the significance level according to the 
number of comparisons made. This is not performed in this study but could be included in future 
analysis. 
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just three of the right-wing issues and only one centrist issue exhibited similar 
significance. 
Table 4.2. ANOVA and Tukey Test Results 
      
Post Hoc Test - Difference 
 
Issue 
 
Sum of 
Squares 
Mean of 
Squares F-Test 
Left-
Center 
Right-
Center Right-Left 
Left 
    
  
  
 
Abortion 
 
0.00209 0.00104 2.086 0.011 0.001 -0.01 
 
Climate Change 
 
0.00442 0.00221 10.17 *** 0.015 *** 0.010 *** -0.01 
 
Education Reform 
 
0.00113 0.00057 0.819 0.003 -0.005 -0.01 
 
Fracking 
 
0.00005 0.00003 2.756 ^ 0.002 ^ 0.001 0.00 
 
Healthcare Reform 
 
0.04979 0.0249 15.06 *** 0.011 0.048 *** 0.038 ** 
 
Inequality 
 
0.00693 0.00347 15.63 *** 0.016 *** -0.004  -0.021 *** 
 
Labor 
 
0.00023 0.00011 0.149 -0.003 -0.002 0.00 
 
Medicare 
 
0.00287 0.00143 4.06 * 0.013 * 0.001  -0.011 ^ 
 
Race 
 
0.0129 0.00645 5.101 ** 0.0146 0.025 ** 0.01 
 
Reproductive Rights 
 
0.00058 0.00289 7.651 *** 0.006 *** 0.002  -0.004 * 
 
Same Sex Marriage 
 
0.00666 0.00333 5.545 ** 0.013 -0.008  -0.021 ** 
 
Social Security 
 
0.00206 0.00103 7.409 *** 0.001 ** -0.001  -0.001 ** 
 
Welfare 
 
0.00103 0.00051 5.861 ** 0.006 * 0.006 * 0.00 
Right 
    
  
  
 
Afghanistan 
 
0.00512 0.00256 2.309 -0.013 -0.014 0.00 
 
Crime 
 
0.1918 0.00959 3.928 *  -0.031 * -0.023 0.01 
 
Deficit 
 
0.00015 0.0001 0.091 0.002 -0.001 0.00 
 
Drugs 
 
0.00874 0.00437 7.243 **  -0.017 **  -0.019 *** 0.00 
 
Gun Control 
 
0.00119 0.00059 2.977 ^ -0.001  0.007 ^  0.008 ^ 
 
Immigration 
 
0.00124 0.00062 2.638 ^ 0.001 0.008 ^ 0.01 
 
Iraq 
 
0.00401 0.00201 1.14 -0.008 -0.014 -0.01 
 
Terrorism 
 
0.01336 0.00668 3.387 * -0.009 0.019 0.028 * 
General 
    
  
  
 
Arab Spring 
 
0.00003 0.00001 0.173 0.001 0.001 0.00 
 
Net Neutrality 
 
0 0 0.483 0.001 0.001 0.00 
 
Taxes 
 
0.0382 0.00191 0.926 -0.015 -0.006 0.01 
 
Unemployment   0.0298 0.015 4.905 **  -0.032 ^  -0.035 * 0.00 
   
Significance: *** - 0.001; ** - 0.01, * - 0.05, ^ - 0.1 
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The results of the Tukey HSD Post Hoc Test indicate which outlet groupings 
are responsible for the differences in the F-Test; i.e. which issues receive more 
similar coverage within outlets in the left, right or center than between those 
ideological groupings. These tests show that coverage of Climate Change, Welfare 
and Drugs is statistically similar on right and left leaning media, with centrist media 
covering the issue at a lower rate. Such results suggest that these issues may be 
uniformly partisan. Alternately, Inequality, Reproductive Rights, and Social Security 
are all covered at a statistically higher rate among left-wing media than centrist or 
right-wing media, indicating that these issues may be the domain of left-wing media, 
as hypothesized. On the other hand, Healthcare reform is covered at a statistically 
significant higher rate in right-leaning media than in centrist or left-leaning media, 
where coverage rates are largely similar (Gun control, while very marginally 
significant, exhibits a similar pattern). Finally, Race and Unemployment are largely 
similar between left-leaning and centrist outlets, but right-leaning outlets cover these 
issues at a higher rate. 
As discussed above, many of these issues were controversial during this period. 
As global temperatures have risen, Climate Change has become a more important 
issue for environmentalists, and this may have resulted in pushback from right-wing 
media. After years of being a side issue, gun control was brought back to the forefront 
of the national agenda by several mass shootings, including the attack on Sandy Hook 
Elementary School in December 2012. That attention to this issue was largely 
uniform (with marginally significant increase in right leaning media) reflects the 
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widespread debate this incident, as well as ancillary concerns like the Fast and 
Furious issue, caused. Also during this period, widespread concerns about inequality 
led to the Occupy Wall Street protests, a left wing movement to draw attention to 
rising income inequality and related issues. Similarly, left wing media scrutinized the 
Susan G. Komen Foundation, which was created to combat breast cancer, for their 
refusal to fund Planned Parenthood outlets as well as the effect of the Affordable Care 
Act on access to birth control. The heightened interest in these issues in partisan 
media may be a consequence of the controversy surrounding these issues and the 
renewed focus within specific partisan circles on them. 
Discussion & Conclusions 
Scholars have known for some time that different media frame issues in 
different ways, and numerous studies have investigated partisanship’s effect on 
framing. This study asked whether the coverage itself differed between outlets. 
Specifically, it hypothesized that partisan outlets will emphasize those issues that are 
important ideologically or that support some partisan goal. On the left, these include 
issues of social justice and intergroup relations. The right, however, was expected to 
emphasize issues of law and order and social justice. All other issues were expected 
to be given more attention in centrist media or somewhat equal attention across 
outlets. Across outlets, then, this could create a distinct agenda for each partisan 
grouping. 
The results indicate that when looking at a broad range of issues, distinct 
agendas emerge across partisan outlets, with left-leaning outlets particularly adept at 
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covering an array of left-wing issues at a uniform rate. This confirms the notion of a 
partisan agenda sphere among media, with left-leaning media standing out as 
especially uniform. Particularly controversial issues seem to have a higher presence in 
partisan media than in centrist media, suggesting that centrist media only attends to 
these issues once they spill over from partisan media. Very few issues, on the other 
hand, received more attention in centrist media than in partisan media; these are 
largely limited to major conflict-driven foreign policy issues and potentially local 
issues like crime coverage.  
The most interesting of these results, however, may be the traditionally left-
leaning issues the right spent more of its time and space discussing: Healthcare 
reform and Race related issues. Healthcare reform may be the consequence of the 
Republican Party’s continued attempts to repeal the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act, popularly known as Obamacare. The higher rate of attention to this issue, 
then, may be tied to the importance of this issue among right-leaning partisans as a 
symbol of the flaws of the current administration. The Right’s attention to Racial 
issues is more difficult to explain, but it may be a consequence of increased scrutiny 
such issues could receive under an African-American President.  
These findings are important for several reasons. As media fragment, and 
people isolate themselves from traditional media in favor of alternate, more partisan 
sources, their view of the world may diverge from the views their less partisan peers 
hold. In fact, this is one of the fundamental assumptions of selective exposure: that as 
media fragment, people who self-select into partisan media will interpret issues 
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differently than other citizens. If the influence inherent in agenda setting theory hold 
true – namely that people believe that issues with higher coverage in the media are 
more important – this could result in varying expectations citizens hold for their 
elected officials in terms of the issues they should address. Furthermore, this may 
have an adverse effect on policymaking: as broad segments of the public start 
prioritizing issues differently, the national discussion about how to solve the nation’s 
problems becomes more difficult to even begin, and elected officials may be unable 
to agree which issues to which limited resources should be devoted. 
A similar effect is also exerted on agenda setting theory. Because agenda setting 
theory depends upon the public largely receiving the same issue set, as media and 
public attention continue to fragment, the power of this mechanism is diminished 
across the broader public. Accordingly, the differences between outlet types suggest 
that agenda setting studies cannot study just one or two outlets but should draw upon 
an ideologically diverse range of outlets. Hopefully, as the methods to accommodate 
the complex feedback cycles of agenda relationships between different segments of 
the media and the public develop, scholars will be better able to explain this 
phenomenon. 
Several questions remain from this research. First, there is likely considerable 
interaction between partisan spheres, as partisan outlets engage with their 
counterparts and attempt to reshape or influence the coverage of centrist media (who 
have the broadest reach). It is also likely that the form of media – broadcast, 
traditional newspaper, blog – shapes the agenda profile of each outlet, but that is not 
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studied here. Finally, the effect of these findings on partisans who engage in selective 
exposure is likely the most important area of future research, as it holds the most 
potential to influence democratic processes. 
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Chapter 5: 
Conclusions 
 
 In his mammoth survey of nascent American culture, Alexis de Tocqueville 
recognized the community newspaper as crucial to the organization and vocalization 
of public opinion: 
The effect of a newspaper is not only to suggest the same purpose to a 
great number of persons, but to furnish means for executing in common 
the designs which they may have singly conceived. …[I]t frequently 
happens that a great number of men who wish or who want to combine 
cannot accomplish it because as they are very insignificant and lost 
amid the crowd, they cannot see and do not know where to find one 
another. A newspaper then takes up the notion or the feeling that had 
occurred simultaneously, but singly, to each of them. All are then 
immediately guided towards this beacon; and these wandering minds, 
which had long sought each other in darkness, at length meet and unite. 
The newspaper brought them together, and the newspaper is still 
necessary to keep them united (de Tocqueville, 1835). 
 
In de Tocqueville’s view, mass media therefore serve as a focusing mechanism, 
coordinating latent public opinion into action. It suggests a media responsive to shifts 
in public opinion that can focus those swings to persuade other parts of the public. 
This may have been true in the early 1800s, when de Tocqueville was crisscrossing 
the Eastern U.S., and when newspapers across the political spectrum proliferated. 
Those newspapers were not mass-oriented, instead often appealing to niche 
audiences, whether local, partisan, or pursuing narrow interests (Williams & Delli 
Carpini, 2011).  
Agenda Setting 
This picture of a responsive media is sharply different from the one painted by 
McCombs and Shaw in 1972. By this point, the often global nature of the news, mass 
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media consolidation, and norms of objectivity and journalist practices had created 
large, national news organizations that guided public opinion instead of responding to 
it. Yet, as this dissertation has shown, technological changes in the last few decades, 
most prominently the rise of the Internet and forms of self-expression, have led to a 
media environment that is far more similar to de Tocqueville’s vision than that of 
mid-20th century American media.  
In the Introduction, I outline the research questions that drove this 
dissertation. The primary research question asked about these interactions: in 
particular, what are the alternate pathways besides traditional agenda setting that 
describe how salience is transferred in the modern era? In Chapter 2, I showed that 
there were high levels of interactivity between the public and mass media agendas 
over the time period 2010-2013. This interactivity was not limited to any type of 
issues, nor was it evident only in specific measures of opinion. In other words, agenda 
interactivity wasn’t constrained to Twitter or blogging, but can be seen broadly in 
Google searches and Wikipedia pageviews. This suggests there are underlying 
dynamics at work that are enabling mass media responsiveness. 
 One element of this interaction that has escaped many researchers looking into 
agenda setting in the digital media age is the existence of both long and short term 
influence. In Chapter 2, I theorize that once the public is made aware of the salience 
of a given topic, attention to that issue is easily reactivated and at higher rates than if 
the salience had not been triggered in the first place. Notably, the reverse, in which 
the public agenda influences the mass media over the long term, is only true in two 
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cases (Arab Spring and Climate Change), although the media is often influenced by 
itself over the long term. Nonetheless, this explains the continued and recurring 
attention that several issues have received in recent years.  
 In Chapter 3, I investigate a few cases (Fracking, Climate Change, and Gun 
Control) to explore the mechanisms underlying some of the other mass media/public 
interaction. In the case of Fracking, influence is more frequently statistically 
significant in the direction of public over mass media. Based on a sampling of blog 
posts and mass media articles, I show that the public is able to draw media attention 
to this issue only when it culminated in either some kind of spectacle that could be 
reported – such as a protest – or governmental action. (Although Inequality was not 
examined in the case study chapter, it is likely that attention to this issue, which had 
widespread latent interest from the public, followed a similar pattern of only 
receiving mass media attention once Occupy Wall Street made the story 
newsworthy.)   
 Fracking is a unique issue in that it is representative of an inverse of the media 
to public transfer of salience associated with classical agenda setting theory. Most 
issues tested showed bi-directional influence, in which the mass media and public 
agendas interacted, but that interaction took different forms. In the case of Climate 
Change, the interaction was both cyclical and influenced by long-term trends. 
Attention was driven by two forces for this issue. On the one hand, attention was 
often spurred by the weather, in which harsh winter storms or hurricanes elicited 
debates over the merits of climate change science; these debates were then picked up 
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by mass media as a crucial element of the issue for sometimes weeks at a time. On the 
other hand, both mass media and public attention was drawn to climate change when 
major official action was taken, like the release of the IPCC’s report or Obama’s 
plans for regulating carbon emissions from energy plans. Like Fracking, this suggests 
that a powerful role remains for elites in drawing attention to an issue. 
 Several issues followed a unique pattern of bi-directional interaction in which 
public and mass media attention was drawn suddenly during a moment of crisis, and 
then often diverted elsewhere once the immediate shock of that crisis had dissipated. I 
call these Crisis Activation issues. In many cases, the crisis sparks discussion of 
deeper, underlying issues, which linger in the media even after the public has moved 
on. In Chapter 3, I study the case of Gun Control, which was almost a non-issue in 
American politics at the start of 2010, but, after a series of major shootings, gained 
prominence on the national agenda. In my examination, I unsurprisingly find that the 
shootings themselves elicit extremely high levels of public attention. This attention 
quickly descends into partisan mudslinging on Twitter, a trend that gets picked up by 
the media. Perhaps because there’s nothing to add besides disgust at the shootings, or 
maybe because the partisan rancor of the discussion leaves little space for thoughtful 
debate, the public turns away quickly, while the media lingers on the issue for several 
more days, covering the debate among elected officials. 
 I also asked in the Introduction if current media conditions, particularly 
fragmentation and polarization, alter agenda setting in any way. As Williams and 
Delli Carpini describe de Tocqueville’s world, media outlets were specialized, often 
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along partisan lines. Chapter 4 determines whether the agendas of partisan outlets 
differ from that of non-partisan outlets. I hypothesize that left-leaning outlets are 
more likely to cover left-leaning issues at a higher rate, right-leaning outlets are more 
likely to cover right-leaning issues at a higher rate, with centrist outlets covering 
broad issues. This in turn creates distinct spheres, in which partisan outlets largely 
cover different issues than their peers from across the aisle.  
The analysis demonstrates that, largely, this is correct, but there are some 
unanticipated exceptions. First, Healthcare Reform and Racial issues, both of which 
seem to belong more intuitively on the left, are covered at a higher rate among right-
leaning outlets than any others. This is surprising until one considers just how 
contentious these issues have been, and how much of right-leaning activism is linked 
to repealing “Obamacare” or mistrust of President Obama’s background and 
intentions. Second, in this analysis, left-leaning and right-leaning outlets attention 
converges on many issues, with lower rates among centrist outlets, which could mean 
that centrist outlets are staying out of the pitched partisan battles taking place 
elsewhere. 
 This separation matters if public attention mirrors these distinctions. 
Unfortunately, we have evidence from Stroud (2011) and others that members of the 
public tend to get their news from sources with which they agree (selective exposure); 
that individuals engage in motivated reasoning to discredit news that contradicts their 
beliefs (Taber & Lodge, 2006); and that political beliefs, even when accurate, are 
difficult to change (Nyhan & Reifler, 2010). Consequently, if people live solely off 
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partisan news – made more likely by selective exposure – the issues they find most 
salient may diverge sharply from their peers, and no amount of reasoning will change 
their views. 
 It is unclear if the increased level of interaction between the mass media and 
the public is a normative good, either, though increasing the range of voices is usually 
beneficial. In the mid-20th century, when mass media exerted a more singular 
influence, it directed public opinion, as de Tocqueville suggests it should. But the 
people determining what the media covered were frequently limited to a small 
demographic, and minority political views, as well as the viewpoints of ethnic and 
religious minorities and women, were often not part of that conversation. 
Accordingly, the modern ecosystem, which allows everyone with access to the 
Internet and a minimal level of technical skill the opportunity to voice their opinion, 
seems to be an improvement from the perspective of an inclusiveness norm. 
 But what about when the most persuasive are incorrect, as many are on 
Climate Change? Many of the Tweets uncovered in the case study in Chapter 3 
demonstrated a limited understanding of climate science. When the media covers this 
debate without refuting the bad science, it legitimizes these inaccurate views and 
makes it more difficult for lawmakers to address a pressing problem. Moreover, while 
sifting through Tweets and blog posts for these case studies, it was difficult not to 
note the profanity and name calling that appeared to be common. Even when Tweets 
were civil, they did not necessarily spur elevated, thoughtful debates, either: although 
I was not systematic in this analysis, I did not find many Tweets in which people 
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were trying to persuade others. Instead, it appeared that many were just sharing their 
views, without engaging with others. This is not deliberation, then, and likely not 
even the mediating public that Habermas sought (Habermas, 2006). 
Finally, it is not clear which voices are receiving attention by mass media. 
While it was outside the scope of this study, determining if minority voices have 
more influence than they have had in the past is an important question. 
Agenda Setting? 
A final caveat to these results is important: it is not clear if these results are 
reflective of public opinion. In traditional agenda setting studies, the public is 
measured by surveys that ask about the “most important problem facing the country 
today;” the media, on the other hand, is measured by the attention it gives an issue. 
While the approach I apply (and which has become common when measuring online 
attention) brings face value parity to these distinctive measures, they may actually not 
be measuring the same phenomenon. On the media side, attention (e.g. article count, 
or article placement and count) is the most appropriate measure because it is the 
output that can influence the public. At the same time, though, members of the public 
do not always show in a measurable way which issues are most important. For 
example: I may think climate change is among the most important issues (and I do), 
but I may not systematically Tweet, blog, or search about the issue every time I think 
of it. Climate Change therefore holds a latent salience that is immeasurable via the 
methods employed here, despite the methodological advantages they offer in other 
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ways. Future research will need to untangle this problem and determine how well 
online behavior aligns with opinions on salience. 
Limitations  
No study, not even ones with as many data points as this dissertation, can 
address every possible related research question or overcome all statistical and data 
hurdles. In fact, the statistical and data requirements of this dissertation posed several 
unique challenges and actually limited the scope substantially. 
In its initial design, this project included as a central research question the 
effects of technological change on agenda setting. Answering this question would 
have required collecting news data from 1990 onward, and adding measures of public 
opinion as they became available. Once the project was approved, I happily set off on 
a project to collect mass media data from Lexis Nexis using a custom-written python 
script. I actually gathered quite a bit before Lexis Nexis turned off access and the 
library discouraged me from continuing this plan. I concluded then that I should only 
include mass media data for the time period in which I had public data. 
Acquiring public data also was not an easy task. I initially wanted to include 
blog posts from 2002, when blogs started to become mainstream; Google search 
trends from 2004, the earliest Google makes available; Wikipedia page views from 
2007 on (also the earliest available); Tweets from 2009 on, which is when CNN 
announced they had a million followers; and Gallup Most Important Problem survey 
results across the entire time frame. Many of the blog aggregation sites, such as 
blogPulse, which tracked blogger topics, had been shuttered or stopped being updated 
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by the time I started this project. Instead, I wrote a few scripts to scrape individual 
blogs as well as results from Google blog search, but many large blogs no longer 
existed, and Google blocked my IP address. Finally, I turned to data companies. After 
6 months of talking with several of the industry leaders and entering into negotiations 
with some of them, I was finally able to land a contract with Crimson Hexagon thanks 
to the support of Professors Bruce Bimber and Barbara Harthorn of UCSB’s Center 
for Nanotechnology.  
After much debate and exploration of the available data, I settled on a 2010-
2013 time frame. However, while Crimson Hexagon offered daily Tweet, media, and 
blog counts, it placed limits on the amount of Twitter data that could be downloaded 
in a day, which meant I had to rely on the counts they provided and not develop a 
more sophisticated textual analysis of this data. 
Nonetheless, data in hand (or, more appropriately, filling up an external hard 
drive and accompanying cloud storage), I set about analyzing it. Having never taken a 
class in time series analysis, these methods were daunting. Moreover, the lag 
structure of the data was confounding: whereas most econometric analysis employed 
just a one, two, or three day structure, I quickly found that my data sometimes utilized 
a 60 or 90 day lag structure. While this ultimately led me to the theoretical model and 
method employed in Chapter 2, it precluded the use of models that may have more 
accurately described this data, such as vector autoregression (although this may have 
value in future analysis) or Brandt’s Bayesian analysis (Brandt & Sandler, 2012). 
!!
 128 
The aggregation process also limited this analysis. Because I analyzed each 
data source at the daily level, I obscured the complex interactions that may occur at 
the intra-day level (such as hourly or quarter hourly analysis), particularly between 
Twitter and broadcast and online media. Accordingly, the results reported herein 
likely underrepresent the level of interaction that actually occurs. Aggregation at the 
daily level also limited me in the opposite direction as well, as it forced me to exclude 
Gallup polling from the analysis, which is only available at a monthly level. Without 
interpolating survey results to cover the days in between, a process that itself could 
have led to spurious results, they simply could not be compared with other measures 
of public opinion. Finally, the complex process for aligning Google searches across 
days relied on several assumptions for how this data is calculated that may have been 
inaccurate. 
Outside the data, the inadequacies of time and skills inherent in being a 
graduate student were limiting as well. Given another year, or two, or three maybe, 
many of the above methodological problems may have been solved. For instance, the 
data is not normally distributed and thus has heteroscedasticity in the error term. To 
correct for this, I should have used some variant of a Generalized Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroscedastic (GARCH) model, but did not have time to research and 
learn how to utilize these methods. I also could have answered the call of many 
secondary research questions (discussed more below) that sparked my curiosity. 
However, I believe the results I have reached are a good first step at answering the 
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broad research questions I asked in the introduction, especially given those 
limitations. 
Future Research 
There are dozens of potential research questions that can be pursued with this 
dataset or with some augmentation. In this section, I will briefly describe a few of the 
projects I find most interesting. 
Methods Comparison. On the methodological side, I would like to determine 
which methods provide the most parsimonious explanation of agenda setting 
interaction. This may be similar to a 2014 article which compared several methods, 
including Poisson autoregression (PAR), based on Brandt’s 2001 article; however, 
this piece does not account for the kind of lag structure I found (Fogarty & Monogan, 
2014). In this future piece, I would include PAR, an update to this method that 
includes Bayesian analysis (Brandt & Sandler, 2012), machine learning methods, as 
well as more traditional methods like the one I used, vector autoregression, or 
GARCH. 
Shorter Time Cycles. This analysis aggregated data to the daily level, in part 
because that is the level at which Google searches and Wikipedia page views are 
available. Yet it is clear from the case study analysis in Chapter 3 that this is too long 
of a time frame to capture this interaction; instead, one hour or maybe even 15-minute 
intervals should be used. This would require much more detailed data, however. 
Role of elites. My case studies showed that there remains a powerful role for 
elites in the mass media-public relationship, but the details of how elites guide 
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attention were not part of this analysis. Do elites interpret issues for the public outside 
of media? Through media? How effective are they are revisiting an issue and 
reactivating latent attention? A study like this would integrate public speeches, 
interviews, and social media updates from political elites into this analysis. 
In-Depth Case Studies. The case studies here were constrained by space, time, 
and the limitations Crimson Hexagon places on downloads of social media data. 
Without the latter limitation, I could use text analysis to determine which elements 
(frames or components) of the issue are receiving the most attention in the public as 
well as how that attention waxes and wanes. Additionally, I could determine which 
media sources were driving most of this coverage. This would answer a multitude of 
questions; perhaps the most interesting to me is determining how much influence 
partisan sources have on the public. 
Public Understanding. Along with the case studies, I am curious how much 
the public actually understands the issues to which it is attending. This is particularly 
the case with science based issues like Climate Change, which my case study (as well 
as numerous polls) showed was poorly understood by many of the people Tweeting 
about it. How does this limited understanding shape attention? How does it influence 
media attention? 
Concluding Thoughts 
 As the set of sample research studies above suggests, there is much more work 
that can be done with this data, and, more broadly, to explain the evolving 
relationship between the mass media and the public. It is likely that this snapshot will 
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only explain a brief moment in time: that some new app or infrastructure that is just a 
glimmer in some developer’s eye in Silicon Valley will upend the media ecosystem 
once again. It will be important to understand how we got to that point, though. I look 
forward to the research that I, as well as my colleagues studying political 
communication around the globe, offer to explain these phenomenon. 
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Appendix A: 
Issues and Search Terms 
!
 
Issue Keyword 
Left 
 
 
Abortion abortion or roe or personhood 
 
Climate Change "climate change" OR "global warming" OR "cap and trade" OR "carbon tax" 
 
Education Reform 
"education reform" OR "charter school" OR "test scores" OR "race to the top" OR "no 
child left behind" 
 
Fracking fracking OR "hydraulic fracturing" 
 
Healthcare Reform 
"healthcare reform" OR obamacare OR "socialized medicine" OR "individual mandate" 
OR "employer mandate" 
 
Inequality inequality OR poverty OR "minimum wage" 
 
Labor 
"labor union" OR "union membership" OR ("card check" AND union) OR "right to work" 
or (union AND strike AND NOT "european union") 
 
Medicare medicare 
 
Race racial OR racism OR racist 
 
Reproductive Rights "birth control" OR "morning after pill" OR "planned parenthood" 
 
Same Sex Marriage "gay marriage" OR "same sex marriage" OR "civil union" OR "traditional marriage" 
 
Social Security "social security" 
 
Welfare welfare OR "food stamps" 
Right 
 
 
Afghanistan Afghanistan OR (war AND Afghanistan) 
 
Crime crime or criminal 
 
Deficit 
"federal deficit" OR "deficit reduction" OR "fiscal cliff" OR sequester OR ((debt OR 
deficit) AND (gdp OR Obama OR congress)) 
 
Drugs drugs OR legalization OR "drug abuse" OR "drug addiction" 
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Gun Control 
"gun control" OR "assault weapon ban" OR "background check" OR NRA OR "national 
rifle association" OR "second amendment" OR "2nd amendment" 
 
Immigration 
immigration OR "immigration reform" OR "dream act" OR "illegal immigrant" OR 
"illegal alien" OR "undocumented worker" 
 
Iraq Iraq OR (war AND Iraq) 
 
Terrorism terrorism OR terrorist OR "bin laden" or qaeda  
General 
 
 
Arab Spring "Arab Spring" OR "Arab Awakening" OR tahrir 
 
Net Neutrality "net neutrality" 
 
Taxes taxes OR "tax cut" 
 
Unemployment unemployment 
!
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Appendix B: 
Outlets 
 
Type Outlet Alignment  
Broadcast ABC C 
Blog Althouse C 
Blog Americablog L 
Blog American Thinker R 
Blog Daily Dish C 
Newspaper Associated Press C 
Newspaper Arizona Republic R 
Newspaper Atlanta Journal-Constitution L 
Blog Balkin C 
Blog Balloon Juice L 
Online News Breitbart News R 
Online News Business Insider C 
Blog Cato Blog R 
Broadcast CBS C 
Newspaper Chicago Sun-Times C 
Newspaper Chicago Tribune C 
Broadcast CNN C 
Blog Crooks and Liars L 
Online News Daily Beast C 
Online News Daily Caller R 
Blog Daily Kos L 
Newspaper Dallas Morning News C 
Blog Brad DeLong L 
Newspaper Denver Post C 
Newspaper Detroit Free Press C 
Blog Digbys Blog L 
Blog Director Blue R 
Online News Drudge Report R 
Blog Firedoglake L 
Online News Five Thirty Eight L 
Online News Forbes C 
Online News Foreign Policy C 
Blog Heritage Blog R 
Newspaper Houston Chronicle R 
Online News Huffington Post L 
Blog In These Times L 
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Blog Joshua Pundit R 
Blog Juan Cole L 
Newspaper Kansas City Star C 
Blog Keith Hennessey C 
Newspaper LA Times C 
Newspaper Las Vegas Review-Journal C 
Blog Legal Insurrection R 
Blog Media Matters L 
Blog Media Research Center R 
Blog Michelle Malkin R 
Newspaper Minneapolis post C 
Online News Mother Jones L 
Broadcast MSNBC L 
Online News National Journal C 
Online News National Review R 
Broadcast NBC C 
Newspaper 
New Hampshire Union 
Leader C 
Newspaper Newsweek C 
Blog Nece Deb R 
Blog No More Mister L 
Broadcast NPR L 
Newspaper NY Post R 
Newspaper NY Times C 
Blog Outside the Beltway C 
Blog Patt Dollard R 
Newspaper Pittsburgh Post-Gazette C 
Blog PJ Media R 
Blog Political Wire C 
Online News Politico C 
Blog Politics and Finance R 
Blog Powerline Blog R 
Blog Prospect L 
Online News Real Clear Politics C 
Online News Reason R 
Blog Red State R 
Blog Riehl World View R 
Blog Right Wing Watch L 
Newspaper Sacramento Bee C 
Online News Salon L 
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Newspaper San Diego Union Tribune R 
Newspaper San Jose Mercury News C 
Newspaper Seattle Post-Intelligencer C 
Online News Slate C 
Newspaper St. Louis Post-Dispatch C 
Blog Sultan Knish R 
Online News Talking Points Memo L 
Online News The Atlantic C 
Online News The Blaze R 
Online News The Daily Beast C 
Newspaper The Daily Oklahoman R 
Blog Think Progress L 
Newspaper Time C 
Blog Total Capitol C 
Blog Townhall R 
Newspaper USA Today C 
Blog VA Right R 
Blog Volokh Conspiracy C 
Newspaper Wall Street Journal R 
Online News Washington Monthly L 
Newspaper Washington Post C 
Newspaper Washington Times R 
Blog White House Dossier R 
Blog Zero Hedge C 
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Appendix C: 
Agenda Setting Studies and their Sources 
 
Citations( Article( Sources( Intermedia(
5833$ McCombs$&$Shaw$1972$ Local$and$national$ Y$
1058$ Dearing$&$Rogers$1996$ $unavailable$ $$
651$ Iyengar$&$Simon$1993$ ABC$News$ $$
531$ Erbring$et$al.$1980$ 94$newspapers$ $$
502$ Behr$&$Iyengar$1985$ CBS$news$ $$
437$ Weaver,$Graber,$McCombs,$Eyal$1981$ $4$local$newspapers$and$$ $$
326$ McLeod$et$al.$1974$ Local$Q$a$liberal$and$a$conservative$journal$ Y$
325$ Cook$et$al.,$1983$ Experiment;$2$tv$programs$ $$
318$ McCombs$et$al.$1997$ 2$local$newspapers$and$1$tv$news$station$ $$
291$ Winter$and$Eyal$1981$ New$York$Times$ $$
286$ Wanta,$Golan,$Lee$ ABC,$CBS,$CNN,$NBC$ $$
260$ Ader$1995$ New$York$Times$ $$
246$ Althaus$&$Tewksbury$2002$
Online$and$paper$versions$of$New$York$
Times$ $$
246$ Brosius$&$Kepplinger$1992$ 4$major$German$network$news$ $$
218$ Neuman$1990$ New$York$Times,$Readers$Guide$Index$ $$
213$ Benton&$Frazier$1976$
Local$newspapers,$Time,$Newsweek,$three$
broadcast$networks$ $$
182$ Roberts$&$Wanta$2002$ New$York$Times,$AP,$Reuters,$Time,$CNN$ $$
157$ Kiousis$2004$ New$York$Times$ $$
157$ Soroka$2002$
Canada;$7$English$newspapers$and$one$
French$one$ $$
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144$ Palmgreen$and$Clarke$1977$
1$local$newspaper,$ABC,$CBS,$NBC,$local$
newscasts$ $$
143$ Shaw$&$Martin$1992$ 1$newspaper$ $$
139$ Wanta$and$Hu$1993$ New$York$Times,$ABC,$CBS,$NBC$Newscasts$ $$
138$ Kiousis$&$McCombs$2004$
Washington$Post,$New$York$Times,$LA$
Times,$Newsweek,$US$News$&$World$
Report,$ABC,$CBS$News$ $$
135$ Atwater$et$al.$1985$ Three$local$newspapers$ $$
135$ Zhu$1992$ New$York$Times,$ABC,$CBS,$NBC$Newscasts$ $$
126$ Wallsten$2007$ New$York$Times$ $$
122$ LopezQEscobar$et$al.$1998$ 2$local$newspapers,$1$television$network$ $$
118$ Walgrave$et$al.$2008$
3$Flemish$newspapers,$2$Walloon$
newspapers;$2$tv$channels$ $$
116$ Yagade$&$Dozier$1990$ Time$magazine$ $$
112$ Meraz$2009$ New$York$Times,$Washington$Post$ $$
111$ Stone$&$McCombs$ Time,$Newsweek$ $$
110$ Hester$&$Gibson$2003$
ABC,$CBS,$CNN,$Fox,$NBC;$NY$Times,$USA$
Today,$WSJ;$Chicago$SunQTimes,$Atlanta$
JournalQConstitution$ $$
107$ Gilberg,$et$al.,$1980$
Washington$Post,$New$York$Times,$ABC,$
CBS,$NBC$ $$
101$ Brosius$&$Weimann$1996$ 4$major$German$network$news$ $$
101$ Dalton$et$al.$1998$ 46$newspapers$ $$
100$ Tipton$1975$
3$local$newspapers,$2$local$tv$broadcasts,$
3$local$radio$broadcasts$ $$
100$
Wanta$and$Wu$1992(Interpersonal$
Communication)$
National$ABC$News,$local$ABC$News,$2$
local$newspapers$ $$
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97$ Golan$2006$ New$York$Times,$ABC,$CBS,$NBC$Newscasts$ Y$
95$ Sweetser$et$al.,$2008$ ABC,$CBS,$CNN,$Fox,$NBC$ Y$
94$ McClure$&$Patterson$1976$
network$news$and$unspecified$
newspapers$ $$
88$ Kiousis$et$al.$2006$ $unavailable$ $$
87$ Wanta$&$Hu$1994$
ABC$News,$local$ABC$news,$2$local$
newspapers$ $$
84$ Demers$et$al.$1989$ ABC,$CBS,$NBC$ $$
82$ Boyle$2001$
New$York$Times,$Washington$Post,$LA$
Times,$ABC,$CBS,$CNN,$NBC$ $$
79$ Kleinnijenhuis$&$Reitberg$ 3$newspapers$ $$
75$ Wanta$&$Foote$1994$ $unavailable$ $$
69$ Tsfati$2003$
NY$Times,$WSJ,$Washington$Post,$
Washington$Times;$ABC,$CBS,$NBC$News$ $$
68$ Lasorsa$and$Wu$1990$
New$York$Times,$local$newspaper,$ABC$
News,$Newsweek$ $$
62$ Zhu$et$al.$1993$ New$York$Times,$ABC,$CBS,$NBC$Newscasts$ $$
62$ Dunaway,$et$al.,$2010$ 24$Local$newspapers$ $$
61$ Craft$&$Wanta$2004$ 2$local$newspapers$and$ABC,$CNN$ $$
60$ Lim$2006$ 3$online$newspapers$ $$
59$ Yang$&$Stone$2003$
5$papers:$WSJ,$NYT,$USAT,$Chicago$
Tribune,$1$local;$ABC,$NBC,$CBS;$Time,$
Newsweek,$US$News$&$World$Report$ $$
55$ Lee$2007$
New$York$Times,$CNN,$Associated$Press,$
Time$ Y$
50$ Weaver$1994$ $unavailable$ $$
49$ Gonzenbach$1992$ New$York$Times$ $$
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44$ Henry$&$Gordon$2001$ 1$newspaper$ $$
36$ Sayre$et$al.$2010$ 8$California$newspapers$ $$
33$ Tan$&$Weaver$2007$ New$York$Times$ $$
31$ Uscinski$2009$ ABC,$CBS,$NBC$ $$
27$ Meraz$2011$ New$York$Times,$Washington$Post$ $$
25$ Ragas$&$Kiousis$2010$
Left:$The$Nation;$Right:$Weekly$Standard$&$
National$Review$ $$
15$ Messner$&$Garrison$2011$
NY$Times,$Washington$Post,$LA$Times,$
Christian$Science$Monitor,$USA$Today;$
ABC,$CBS,$CNN,$NBC,$Fox$News$ $$
!!
 141 
Appendix D: 
Python Script: Lexis Nexis Scraping 
 
File: grabNews.py 
# Note: This script no longer functions due to a January 2014 update 
to the LN site. 
from selenium import webdriver 
from selenium.webdriver.support.ui import Select, WebDriverWait 
 
import os 
import sys 
import re 
import time, datetime 
from datetime import timedelta 
import calendar 
import random 
import logging 
import argparse 
import re 
 
strBasePath = '/Volumes/Data/' 
strNoResults = 'No Documents Found' 
strTooManyResults = 'More than 3000 Results' 
FirstStartDate = datetime.datetime.now() 
FinalEndDate = datetime.datetime.now() 
 
def HalfDate(startDate, endDate): 
    print "Too many results.  Doing a search on half that." 
    # take the difference between start and end date and reduce by 
half 
    dtStartDate = datetime.datetime.strptime(startDate, '%m/%d/%Y') 
    dtEndDate = datetime.datetime.strptime(endDate, '%m/%d/%Y') 
    delta = dtEndDate - dtStartDate 
    HalfwayDay = delta.days / 2 
    dtNewEndDate = dtStartDate + timedelta(days=HalfwayDay) 
    newEndDate = dtNewEndDate.strftime('%m/%d/%Y') 
 
    dtNewStartDate = dtNewEndDate + timedelta(days=1) 
    newStartDate = dtNewStartDate.strftime('%m/%d/%Y') 
 
    return {'FirstStart': startDate, 'FirstEnd': newEndDate, 
'SecStart': newStartDate, 'SecEnd': endDate} 
 
 
def DoSearch(driver, searchString, startDate, endDate): 
    print "Searching '" + searchString + "' from " + startDate + " 
to " + endDate 
    Connect(driver) 
    NavToSearch(driver) 
    PerformSearch(driver, startDate, endDate, searchString) 
    # Test to see if we got to the results page 
    try: 
        ClickDownloadButton(driver) 
    except Exception, e: 
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        # FIX 
        # Either taken to the too many results page or the NO 
results page.  Test for that. 
        print "Not the results page." 
 
        src = driver.page_source 
        text_found = re.search(strTooManyResults, src) 
        if text_found: 
            print "Too many results found." 
            # Taken to the too many results page.  Need to repeat 
search, but in half 
 
            newDates = HalfDate(startDate, endDate) 
            # FIX: Doesn't get hung up on days with problems. 
            if (newDates['FirstStart'] == newDates['SecEnd']): 
                # Then we'll just end up in an an endless loop 
because we're searching the same day over and over 
                logging.warning('Too many results for one day: ' + 
newDates['FirstStart'] + "Time: " + str(datetime.datetime.now())) 
            else: 
                DoSearch(driver, searchString, 
newDates['FirstStart'], newDates['FirstEnd']) 
                DoSearch(driver, searchString, newDates['SecStart'], 
newDates['SecEnd']) 
        else: 
            print "No results found.  Moving to the next search 
dates." 
    else: 
        SetDownloadSettings(driver, startDate, endDate, 
searchString) 
        try: 
            select = Select(driver.find_element_by_id('delFmt')) 
            select.select_by_value('QDS_EF_GENERICTYPE') 
        except: 
            # Redo Search 
            print "Got an error, re-searching." 
            DoSearch(driver, searchString, startDate, endDate) 
 
        maxResults = int(RetrieveMaxResults(driver)) 
        if (maxResults > 0): 
            SetupDownload(driver, maxResults, searchString, 
startDate, endDate) 
        else: 
            print "Error: no results found in download window" 
 
 
def SearchLexisNexis(driver, searchString, startDate, endDate): 
# Set up iterating over each 
# dtStartDate = datetime.datetime.strptime(startDate, '%m-%d-
%Y') 
# dtEndDate = datetime.datetime.strptime(endDate, '%m-%d-%Y') 
    dtStartDate = datetime.datetime.strptime(startDate, '%m/%d/%Y') 
    dtEndDate = datetime.datetime.strptime(endDate, '%m/%d/%Y') 
    startDay = dtStartDate.day 
    currYear = dtStartDate.year 
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    currMonth = dtStartDate.month 
    endYear = dtEndDate.year 
    endMonth = dtEndDate.month 
    while (currYear, currMonth) <= (endYear, endMonth): 
        # If in the first month of the string, want to start at the 
date specified 
        if ((currMonth == dtStartDate.month) and (currYear == 
dtStartDate.year)): 
            strStartDay = str(startDay) 
        else: 
            strStartDay = "1" 
        strStartDate = str(currMonth) + "/" + strStartDay + "/" + 
str(currYear) 
        # Same goes for the last month 
        if ((currMonth == dtEndDate.month) and (currYear == 
dtEndDate.year)): 
            strLastDay = str(dtEndDate.day) 
        else: 
            strLastDay = str(calendar.monthrange(currYear, 
currMonth)[1]) 
        strEndDate = str(currMonth) + "/" + strLastDay + "/" + 
str(currYear) 
 
        #Perform Search 
        DoSearch(driver, searchString, strStartDate, strEndDate) 
 
        # Very rudimentary attempt to not look like a bot. 
        time.sleep(random.randrange(0, 20)) 
        currMonth += 1 
        if currMonth > 12: 
            currMonth = 1 
            currYear += 1 
 
 
def Connect(driver): 
    driver.get("http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/?") 
 
 
def NavToSearch(driver): 
    driver.switch_to_frame("mainFrame") 
    driver.find_element_by_id("news").click() 
    driver.implicitly_wait(200) 
    time.sleep(5) 
    driver.find_element_by_link_text("Newspapers & Wires").click() 
    time.sleep(4) 
    driver.find_element_by_id('140954').click() 
    driver.find_element_by_id('8411').click() 
 
 
 
def PerformSearch(driver, startDate, endDate, searchString): 
    select = Select(driver.find_element_by_id('dateSelector1')) 
    select.select_by_value('from') 
 
    driver.find_element_by_id("fromDate1").clear() 
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    driver.find_element_by_id("fromDate1").send_keys(startDate) 
 
    #driver.find_element_by_id("toDate1").clear() 
    driver.find_element_by_id("fromDate1").click() 
    driver.find_element_by_id("toDate1").send_keys(endDate) 
    #driver.find_element_by_id("terms").clear() 
    driver.find_element_by_id("fromDate1").click() 
    driver.find_element_by_id("terms").send_keys(searchString) 
    time.sleep(random.randrange(0, 10)) 
    
driver.find_element_by_css_selector("input[type=\"submit\"]").click(
) 
 
 
def ClickDownloadButton(driver): 
    driver.switch_to_frame(1) 
    driver.find_element_by_css_selector("img[alt=\"Download 
Documents\"]").click() 
    driver.switch_to_window(driver.window_handles[1]) 
 
 
def SetDownloadSettings(driver, startDate, endDate, searchString): 
    ResultsFound = False 
    while not ResultsFound: 
        try: 
            select = Select(driver.find_element_by_id('delFmt')) 
            select.select_by_value('QDS_EF_GENERICTYPE') 
            ResultsFound = True 
        except: 
            print "There was an error when trying to download.  Re-
running the current search." 
            Connect(driver) 
            NavToSearch(driver) 
            PerformSearch(driver, startDate, endDate, searchString) 
            ClickDownloadButton(driver) 
            time.sleep(random.randrange(0, 10)) 
 
 
def RetrieveMaxResults(driver): 
    txt = driver.find_element_by_id('docText').text 
    re1 = '.*?'    # Non-greedy match on filler 
    re2 = '\\d+'    # Uninteresting: int 
    re3 = '.*?'    # Non-greedy match on filler 
    re4 = '(\\d+)'    # Integer Number 1 
 
    rg = re.compile(re1 + re2 + re3 + re4, re.IGNORECASE | 
re.DOTALL) 
    m = rg.search(txt) 
    if m: 
        maxResults = m.group(1) 
        print str(maxResults) + " records found" 
        return maxResults 
    else: 
        return -1 
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def SetupDownload(driver, maxResults, searchString, startDate, 
endDate): 
    if (int(maxResults) <= 500): 
        # No need to do anything; all should be set 
        DoDownload(driver) 
    else: 
        print "More than 500 results -  need to do this multiple 
times." 
        currentStart = 1 
        currentMax = 500 
        i = 0 
        while (currentMax <= maxResults): 
            i += 1 
            print "Pass " + str(i) 
 
            #setup range 
            rangeStr = str(currentStart) + '-' + str(currentMax) 
            driver.find_element_by_id('sel').click() 
            driver.find_element_by_name('selDocs').clear() 
            
driver.find_element_by_name('selDocs').send_keys(rangeStr) 
 
            # Actual Download 
            DoDownload(driver) 
 
            # Cleanup, revert to old screen, etc. 
            currentStart += 500 
            currentMax += 500 
            # Make sure we're not asking for more than is there 
            if (currentMax > maxResults): 
                currentMax = maxResults 
                # but this could cause an infinite loop, so provide 
a way to exit 
                if (currentStart >= maxResults): 
                    currentMax += 500 
 
            time.sleep(random.randrange(0, 10)) 
 
            if (currentMax <= maxResults): 
                Connect(driver) 
                NavToSearch(driver) 
                PerformSearch(driver, startDate, endDate, 
searchString) 
                ClickDownloadButton(driver) 
                SetDownloadSettings(driver, startDate, endDate, 
searchString) 
 
 
def DoDownload(driver): 
    driver.find_element_by_css_selector("#img_orig_bottom > a > 
img[alt=\"Download\"]").click() 
    driver.find_element_by_partial_link_text('Newspaper').click() 
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if __name__ == "__main__": 
 
    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(prog="GrabNews-Papers") 
    parser.add_argument("Issue", help="Issue Name.  Must be single 
word.") 
    parser.add_argument("SearchTerm", help="Actual Search String") 
    parser.add_argument("StartDate", help="Date to start searching.  
Use format MM/DD/YYYY.") 
    parser.add_argument("EndDate",  help="Date to stop searching.  
Use format MM/DD/YYYY.") 
    parser.add_argument("-p", "--path", help="Path to save 
documents.  Make sure to end in a /.") 
    args = parser.parse_args() 
 
    issue = args.Issue 
    searchString = args.SearchTerm 
    FirstStartDate = args.StartDate 
    FinalEndDate = args.EndDate 
 
    print "*******************************" 
    print "Searching US Newspapers for issue %s" % issue 
    print "Using terms:" + searchString 
    print "Dates: %s - %s" % (FirstStartDate, FinalEndDate) 
    print "*******************************" 
 
    if args.path: 
        strBasePath = args.path 
    ''' 
    title = sys.argv[1] 
    searchString = sys.argv[2] 
    startDate = sys.argv[3] 
    endDate = sys.argv[4] 
    ''' 
    dlPath = strBasePath + issue 
    if not os.path.isdir(dlPath): 
        os.makedirs(dlPath) 
 
    # FIX: Added logging 
    logging.basicConfig(filename=issue + '.log', 
level=logging.WARNING) 
    logging.info('Starting search on \'%s\' from %s to %s' % (issue, 
FirstStartDate, FinalEndDate)) 
 
    fp = webdriver.FirefoxProfile() 
    fp.set_preference("browser.download.folderList", 2) 
    fp.set_preference("browser.download.manager.showWhenStarting", 
False) 
    fp.set_preference("browser.download.dir", dlPath) 
    fp.set_preference("browser.helperApps.neverAsk.saveToDisk", 
"text/plain") 
    fp.set_preference("browser.helperApps.alwaysAsk.force", False) 
 
    driver = webdriver.Firefox(firefox_profile=fp) 
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    SearchLexisNexis(driver, searchString, FirstStartDate, 
FinalEndDate) 
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Appendix E: 
Python Script: Scraping Google Blog Search Results 
 
File: grabGoogleBlogs.py 
from selenium import webdriver 
from selenium.webdriver.support.ui import Select, WebDriverWait 
from random import shuffle 
import csv 
import time 
import random 
import argparse 
 
strBasePath = "./topblogs/" 
 
def NavigateToGoogle(driver): 
    driver.get("http://www.google.com/") 
    driver.find_element_by_id("gbqfq").clear() 
 
def SetupSearch(driver, strStartDate, strEndDate, strSearchTerm, 
simple=False): 
 
    if not simple: 
        shuffle(blogTypes) 
        btString = ' OR '.join(blogTypes) 
        print btString 
        print strSearchTerm 
        searchString = strSearchTerm + " " + str(btString) 
 
        #driver.find_element_by_id("gbqfq").send_keys("guns" + " 
wordpress OR \"movable type\" OR blogspot") 
        driver.find_element_by_id("gbqfq").send_keys(searchString + 
'\n') 
        ''' 
        try: 
            driver.find_element_by_id("gbqfb").click() 
        except: 
            driver.find_element_by_id("gbqfba").click() 
        ''' 
        time.sleep(random.randrange(4, 15)) 
 
    # Click on Search Tools 
    driver.find_element_by_id("hdtb_tls").click() 
    time.sleep(random.randrange(5, 10)) 
 
    # Find Custom Range button 
    driver.find_element_by_css_selector("div.hdtb-mn-hd > span.mn-
dwn-arw").click() 
    driver.find_element_by_id("cdrlnk").click() 
    driver.find_element_by_id("cdr_min").clear() 
 
    # Fill out date 
    driver.find_element_by_id("cdr_min").send_keys(strStartDate) 
    driver.find_element_by_id("cdr_max").clear() 
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    time.sleep(random.randrange(5, 15)) 
    driver.find_element_by_id("cdr_max").send_keys(strEndDate) 
    
driver.find_element_by_xpath("(//input[@value='Go'])[2]").click() 
    time.sleep(random.randrange(4, 15)) 
    driver.find_element_by_id("hdtb_tls").click() 
 
 
def DoSearch(driver, strSearchDate, strSearchTerm, simple=False): 
 
    random.seed() 
    SetupSearch(driver, strSearchDate, strSearchDate, strSearchTerm, 
simple) 
 
    #Make us look more human 
    time.sleep(random.randrange(3, 20)) 
    ''' 
    # Find out how many results for this day 
    try: 
        elm = driver.find_element_by_id('resultStats') 
        resultsCount = elm.text 
    except: 
        resultsCount = 0 
    return [strSearchTerm, strSearchDate, resultsCount] 
    ''' 
 
def SetDates(driver, strStartDate, strEndDate): 
    # Click on Search Tools 
    driver.find_element_by_id("hdtb_tls").click() 
    time.sleep(random.randrange(5, 10)) 
 
    # Find Custom Range button 
    driver.find_element_by_css_selector("div.hdtb-mn-hd > span.mn-
dwn-arw").click() 
    driver.find_element_by_id("cdrlnk").click() 
    driver.find_element_by_id("cdr_min").clear() 
 
    # Fill out date 
    driver.find_element_by_id("cdr_min").send_keys(strStartDate) 
    driver.find_element_by_id("cdr_max").clear() 
    time.sleep(random.randrange(5, 15)) 
    driver.find_element_by_id("cdr_max").send_keys(strEndDate) 
    
driver.find_element_by_xpath("(//input[@value='Go'])[2]").click() 
    driver.find_element_by_id("hdtb_tls").click() 
    time.sleep(random.randrange(4, 15)) 
 
def CorrectDateFormat(strDate): 
    str2 = strDate.strip() 
    print strDate 
    if str2[:len(str2)-1] == '-': 
        print "True!" 
        return True 
    else: 
        print "False!" 
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        return False 
 
def SavePageResults(driver, outfile): 
    dates = [] 
    links = [] 
 
    raw_dates = 
driver.find_elements_by_xpath("(//span[@class='f'])") 
    for d in raw_dates: 
        dates.append(d.text.split('-')[0]) 
 
    raw_links = driver.find_elements_by_class_name("r") 
    for elm in raw_links: 
        a = elm.find_element_by_tag_name("a") 
        links.append(a.get_attribute("href")) 
 
    if len(raw_links) > 0: 
        LinkInfo = zip(dates, links) 
        for link in LinkInfo: 
            outfile.writerow([link[0], link[1]]) 
 
 
    time.sleep(random.randrange(3, 12)) 
 
    try: 
        
driver.find_element_by_xpath("//a[@id='pnnext']/span").click() 
    except Exception as e: 
        raw_input('Found an error.  Go check on it!!') 
        time.sleep(10, 15) 
        
driver.find_element_by_xpath("//a[@id='pnnext']/span").click() 
    time.sleep(random.randrange(15, 25)) 
 
 
def RunAndSaveSearch(driver, outputFN): 
    out = csv.writer(open(outputFN, 'a')) 
    resultsCount = 0 
    pageCount = 0 
    print "trying to save" 
    try: 
        elm = driver.find_element_by_id('resultStats') 
        resultText = elm.text.replace(',','') 
        print resultText 
        words = resultText.split(' ') 
        for word in words: 
            if word.isdigit(): 
                resultsCount = int(word) 
                break 
        if resultsCount > 0: 
            pageCount = resultsCount / 10 
        #while 
driver.find_element_by_xpath("//a[@id='pnnext']/span"): 
        print pageCount 
        for i in range(0, pageCount): 
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            SavePageResults(driver, out) 
            try: 
                WebDriverWait(driver, 10).until(lambda 
s:s.find_element_by_xpath("//a[@id='pnnext']/span").is_displayed()) 
            except: 
                break 
    except Exception as e: 
        # Less than one page of results.  Just save it. 
        print e 
        SavePageResults(driver, out) 
 
 
 
 
def SetupSearch(driver, outputFN, strSearchTerm, strStartDate='', 
strEndDate=''): 
    driver.find_element_by_id("gbqfq").send_keys(strSearchTerm + 
"\n") 
    #driver.find_element_by_id("gbqfb").click() 
 
    # Wait until page is loaded - in this case, search tools 
    WebDriverWait(driver, 5).until(lambda 
s:s.find_element_by_id("hdtb_tls").is_displayed()) 
    if (strStartDate and strEndDate): 
        SetDates(driver, strStartDate, strEndDate) 
    print "entering runands" 
    RunAndSaveSearch(driver, outputFN) 
 
 
 
def Old_DoSearch(strStartDate, strEndDate, strSearchTerm): 
    fp = webdriver.FirefoxProfile() 
    fp.set_preference("browser.download.folderList", 2) 
    fp.set_preference("browser.download.manager.showWhenStarting", 
False) 
    #fp.set_preference("browser.download.dir", dlPath) 
    fp.set_preference("browser.helperApps.neverAsk.saveToDisk", 
"text/plain") 
    fp.set_preference("browser.helperApps.alwaysAsk.force", False) 
    driver = webdriver.Firefox(firefox_profile=fp) 
 
    random.seed() 
    SetupSearch(driver, strStartDate, strEndDate, strSearchTerm) 
 
    #Make us look more human 
    time.sleep(random.randrange(10, 30)) 
    LinkInfo = [] 
    dates = [] 
    links = [] 
    out = csv.writer(open(outputFN, 'a')) 
    while driver.find_element_by_xpath("//a[@id='pnnext']/span"): 
        raw_dates = driver.find_elements_by_class_name("f") 
        for d in raw_dates: 
            dates.append(d.text.split('-')) 
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        raw_links = driver.find_elements_by_class_name("r") 
        for elm in raw_links: 
            a = elm.find_element_by_tag_name("a") 
            links.append(a.get_attribute("href")) 
 
        LinkInfo = zip(dates, links) 
        for link in LinkInfo: 
            out.writerow([strSearchTerm, link[0], link[1]]) 
            
driver.find_element_by_xpath("//a[@id='pnnext']/span").click() 
        time.sleep(random.randrange(10, 15)) 
        try: 
            WebDriverWait(driver, 10).until(lambda 
s:s.find_element_by_xpath("//a[@id='pnnext']/span").is_displayed()) 
        except: 
            break 
 
 
def BuildSearchString(strTerm, strSite): 
    return strTerm + ' ' + 'site:' + strSite 
 
 
def stripDates(strStart,strEnd): 
    return strStart.replace('/','') + "_" + strEnd.replace('/','') 
 
if __name__ == "__main__": 
 
    #i = 0 
    #out = csv.writer(open(outputFN, 'a')) 
 
    _DateSearch = False 
    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(prog='GrabGoogleBlogs') 
    parser.add_argument("searchTerm", help="Actual Search Term") 
    parser.add_argument("site", help="Site to search") 
    parser.add_argument("-i", "--issue", help="Issue Name - only 
needed if different from search term") 
    parser.add_argument("-s", "--start", help="Start Date.  Must 
have End Date.") 
    parser.add_argument("-e", "--end", help="End Date. Must have 
Start Date.") 
    args = parser.parse_args() 
 
    strIssue = args.issue 
    if not strIssue: 
        strIssue=args.searchTerm 
 
    if (args.start and args.end): 
        _DateSearch = True 
        outputFN = strBasePath + strIssue + "_" + args.site + "_" + 
stripDates(args.start, args.end) + '.csv' 
    else: 
        outputFN = strBasePath + strIssue + "_" + args.site + '.csv' 
 
    fp = webdriver.FirefoxProfile() 
    fp.set_preference("browser.download.folderList", 2) 
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    fp.set_preference("browser.download.manager.showWhenStarting", 
False) 
    #fp.set_preference("browser.download.dir", dlPath) 
    fp.set_preference("browser.helperApps.neverAsk.saveToDisk", 
"text/plain") 
    fp.set_preference("browser.helperApps.alwaysAsk.force", False) 
    driver = webdriver.Firefox(firefox_profile=fp) 
 
    strSearch = BuildSearchString(args.searchTerm, args.site) 
 
    NavigateToGoogle(driver) 
    #Old_DoSearch('01/01/2008', '12/31/2008') 
    if _DateSearch: 
        SetupSearch(driver, outputFN, strSearch, args.start, 
args.end) 
    else: 
        SetupSearch(driver, outputFN, strSearch) 
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Appendix F: 
Python Script: Scraping Wikipedia Pageviews 
 
File: scrapeWikipedia.py 
import simplejson 
import urllib2 
import csv 
import argparse 
import time 
from dateutil import rrule, parser 
import random 
 
 
outputFile = 'wikipedia.csv' 
strbaseUrl = 'http://stats.grok.se/json/en/' 
dtStartDate = parser.parse('2010-01-01') 
dtEndDate = parser.parse('2013-12-31') 
strIssue = '' 
 
 
def getDailyCounts(url): 
    print url 
    data = None 
    while data is None: 
        try: 
            req = urllib2.Request(url) 
            opener = urllib2.build_opener() 
            f = opener.open(req) 
            data = simplejson.load(f) 
        except Exception,e: 
            print "Error: " + str(e) 
            pausetime = random.randrange(60, 150) 
            print "Pausing for %i seconds" % pausetime 
            time.sleep(pausetime) 
            pass 
 
    return data.get('daily_views').items() 
 
 
def SaveDailyCounts(filename, obj, searchTerm): 
    if len(obj) > 0: 
        csvwriter = csv.writer(open(filename, 'a')) 
 
        for dailycount in obj: 
            csvwriter.writerow([dailycount[0], str(dailycount[1]), 
strIssue, searchTerm.rstrip('\n')]) 
 
def RunSearch(searchMonth, searchTerm, issue): 
    if not (searchTerm[0:1] == '/'): 
        searchTerm = '/' + searchTerm 
    strUrl = strbaseUrl + searchMonth + searchTerm 
    SaveDailyCounts(issue + '.csv', getDailyCounts(strUrl), 
searchTerm) 
 
!!
 155 
if __name__ == "__main__": 
    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(prog='Wikipedia') 
    parser.add_argument("Issue", help="Name of issue.") 
    parser.add_argument("Filename", help="Name of file with list of 
pages.  Format /pagename") 
    args = parser.parse_args() 
 
    strIssue = args.Issue 
    pages = [] 
    try: 
        with open(args.Filename) as f: 
            pages = f.readlines() 
    except Exception as e: 
        print e 
 
    cntPages = 0 
    for page in pages: 
        cntPages += 1 
        print "Now evaluating:"+page 
        for dt in rrule.rrule(rrule.MONTHLY, dtstart=dtStartDate, 
until=dtEndDate): 
            strSearchMonth = str(dt.year) + str(dt.month).zfill(2) 
            RunSearch(strSearchMonth, page, args.Issue) 
            time.sleep(random.randrange(20,40)) 
        time.sleep(random.randrange(20,40)) 
    print "Completed.  Got history for %s pages."%cntPages 
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